A Theory of Crimes Against Humanity by Luban, David
Georgetown University Law Center 
Scholarship @ GEORGETOWN LAW 
2004 
A Theory of Crimes Against Humanity 
David Luban 
Georgetown University Law Center, luband@law.georgetown.edu 
 
 
This paper can be downloaded free of charge from: 
https://scholarship.law.georgetown.edu/facpub/146 
 
29 Yale J. Int'l L. 85-167 (2004) 
This open-access article is brought to you by the Georgetown Law Library. Posted with permission of the author. 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.georgetown.edu/facpub 




















Professor of Law 




This paper can be downloaded without charge from: 
Scholarly Commons:  http://scholarship.law.georgetown.edu/facpub/146/ 
 
 
Posted with permission of the author 
HeinOnline -- 29 Yale J. Int’l L. 85 2004
A Theory of Crimes 
Against Humanity 
David Luban t 
I. INTRODUCTION: CRIMES AGAINST HUMANNESS AND CRIMES AGAINST HUMANKIND ................. 86 
II. CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY: THE DISTINCTIVE LEGAL FEATURES ............................................. 93 
III. CRIMES AGAINST HUMANNESS AND THE POLITICAL ANIMAL .................................................... 109 
A. Aspects of Humanity ...................... , ................................................................................ 109 
B. The Political Animal ................................................ ....................................................... III 
C. "Unsociable Sociability" Versus Group Diversity; Crimes Against Humanity Versus 
Genocide ......................................................................................................................... 114 
IV. CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY AS POLITICS GONE CANCEROUS ................................................... 116 
V. SCHMITT'S DEMONIZA TION CRITIQUE: A RESPONSE .................................................................. 120 
VI. CRIMES AGAINST HUMANKIND AND THE Locus OF JURISDICTION ............................................. 124 
A. The Normative Weakness of "Laws of Humanity" ............................................ ............. 125 
B. Social Contract Theory and the Domestic Analogy: Rawls ........... ................................. 131 
C. The Failure of the Domestic Analogy ............................................................................. 134 
VII. THE VIGILANTE JURISDICTION .................................................................................................... 137 
A. The Human Interest in Repressing Crimes Against Humanity ....................................... 137 
B. Hostis Humani Generis ................................................................................................... 140 
VIII. NATURAL JUSTICE AND JURISDICTIONAL ECLECTICISM .............................................................. 141 
IX. AN ILLUSTRATION: CONGO V. BELGIUM ...............................................•. ......................••............. 146 
A. Judge Bula-Bula 's Separate Opinion ............................................................................. 148 
B. The Universal Jurisdiction Opinions .............................................................................. 150 
C. Immunity and the End of Politics as Usual ..................................................................... 156 
X. CONCLUSION: WHAT'S IN A NAME? ............................................................................................ 159 
APPENDIX: SOME STATUTORY DEFINITIONS OF CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY AND GENOCIDE ............... 162 
t Frederick Haas Professor of Law and Philosophy, Georgetown University Law Center. I 
wrote an earlier, by now almost unrecognizably different, version of this paper for a conference on 
crimes against humanity at Western Ontario University in January 2002. I wish to thank the participants 
in that conference for their comments, and the conveners, Charles Jones and Richard Vernon, for the 
initial invitation to think seriously about the subject. I have also received helpful responses to this paper 
from participants in Georgetown University's faculty research workshop, including written comments 
from Emma Coleman Jordan and Neal Katyal. My research assistant, Mike Garcia, helped with a 
detailed critique of an earlier version of the paper, and Kate Kerr provided essential research assistance 
in preparing the final draft. I presented a later incarnation of the paper at Yale Law School's Schell 
Center, and received valuable comments and suggestions from many participants, particularly Paul 
Kahn. Larry May gave me useful comments on a later draft, and I have benefited as well from the 
opportunity to read the manuscript of his forthcoming book, Crimes Against Humanity: A Normative 
Account. I also wish to thank participants in a workshop on the paper at the University of Maryland 
philosophy colloquium. Finally, I want to thank Julie O'Sullivan for encouragement and innumerable 
insights as we worked through this material for our International Criminal Law class. 
85 
HeinOnline -- 29 Yale J. Int’l L. 86 2004
86 THE YALE JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol. 29: 85 
I. INTRODUCTION: CRIMES AGAINST HUMANNESS AND CRIMES AGAINST 
HUMANKIND 
No record exists of how the term "crimes against humanity" came to be 
chosen by the framers of the Nuremberg Charter. The term was selected by 
U.S. Supreme Court Justice Robert Jackson, the chief U.S. prosecutor at 
Nuremberg and the head of the American delegation to the London 
Conference that framed the Charter. Jackson consulted with the great 
international law scholar Hersch Lauterpacht, but they decided to leave their 
deliberations unrecorded, apparently to avoid courting controversy. In 1915, 
the French, British, and Russian governments had denounced Turkey's 
Armenian genocide as "crimes against civilization and humanity," and the 
same phrase appeared in a 1919 proposal to conduct trials of the Turkish 
perpetrators. But the United States objected at that time that the so-called 
"laws of humanity" had no specific content, and the proposal to try the Turks 
was scuttled. Apparently, Jackson saw no reason to invoke a precedent to 
which his own government had earlier objected on rule of law grounds and 
concluded that the less said, the better. 1 Cherif Bassiouni, who chronicles 
these events, nevertheless finds the crimes-against-humanity terminology 
"most appropriate," and, aside from worries to be considered below that the 
term runs the danger of demonizing those who commit such crimes, it is hard 
to disagree.2 The phrase "crimes against humanity" has acquired enormous 
resonance in the legal and moral imaginations of the post-World War II world. 
It suggests, in at least two distinct ways, the enormity of these offenses. First, 
the phrase "crimes against humanity" suggests offenses that aggrieve not only 
the victims and their own communities, but all human beings, regardless of 
their community. Second, the phrase suggests that these offenses cut deep, 
violating the core humanity that we all share and that distinguishes us from 
other natural beings.3 
This double meaning gives the phrase potency, but also ambiguity-an 
ambiguity we may trace back to the double meaning of the word "humanity." 
"Humanity" means both the quality of being human-humanness-and the 
1. M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI, CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY IN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 
17-18 (2d ed. 1999). See also LAWRENCE DOUGLAS, THE MEMORY OF JUDGMENT: MAKING LAW AND 
HISTORY IN THE TRIALS OF THE HOLOCAUST 44-46 (2001); KRIANGSAK KITTICHAISAREE, 
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 85-86 (2001). For further discussion of the origin of the legal notion of 
crimes against humanity, see ANTONIO CASSESE, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 67-74 (2003). The 
term "crimes against humanity" appeared in some Latin American penal codes in the 1920s, and the 
states that employed it asserted universal jurisdiction over such crimes. Harvard Research Project on 
Criminal Jurisdiction, 29 AM. J. INT'L L. 435, 571 (Supp. 1935) (citing penal codes of Costa Rica and 
Venezuela). 
2. BASSIOUNI, supra note 1, at 17,62-63. The worry about demonization comes out with 
particular clarity in CARL SCHMITT, THE CONCEPT OF THE POLITICAL 54 (George Schwab trans., 1996) 
("To confiscate the word humanity, to invoke and monopolize such a term probably has certain 
incalculable effects, such as denying the enemy the quality of being human .... "). See the illuminating 
discussion of Schmitt in MARTT! KOSKENNIEMI, THE GENTLE CIVILIZER OF NATIONS: THE RISE AND 
FALL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 1870-1960, at 415-436 (2001). I discuss Schmitt's argument infra at Part 
V. 
3. Here and elsewhere my argument overlaps with Richard Vernon, What Is a Crime Against 
Humanity?, 10 J. POL. PHIL. 231, 242-45 (2002). Vernon notes the distinction presented here. Id. at 238-
40. I shall note other points of overlap (as well as disagreement) when they arise. 
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aggregation of all human beings-humankind.4 Taken in the former sense, 
"crimes against humanity" suggests that the defining feature of these offenses 
is the value they injure, namely humanness. The law traditionally 
distinguishes between crimes against persons, crimes against property, crimes 
against public order, crimes against morals, and the like. Here, the idea is to 
supplement the traditional taxonomy of legally protected values-property, 
persons, public order, morals-by adding that some offenses are crimes 
against humanness as such. 
The terminology chosen by the framers of the Nuremberg Charter 
suggests that they were thinking of crimes against humanity in this sense. In 
Article 6, which enumerates the crimes under the Tribunal's jurisdiction, we 
find the traditional category of war crimes5 supplemented by two new 
categories: crimes against peace6 and crimes against humanity.7 The parallel 
wording suggests that crimes against humanity offend against humanity in the 
same way that crimes against peace offend against peace. If this parallelism 
holds, then "humanity" denotes the value that the crimes violate, just as 
"peace" denotes the value that wars of aggression and wars in violation of 
treaties assault. 
An argument of Hannah Arendt provides an illustration of how this 
sense of the phrase "crimes against humanity" figures in legal and moral 
argument. In the Epilogue to Eichmann in Jerusalem, Arendt describes the 
Holocaust as a "new crime, the crime against humanity-in the sense of a 
crime 'against the human status,' or against the very nature of mankind.,,8 She 
borrows the phrase "crimes against the human status" from the French 
Nuremberg Prosecutor Franyois de Menthon, and explains it thus: 
"[Genocide] is an attack upon human diversity as such, that is, upon a 
characteristic of the 'human status' without which the very words 'mankind' 
or 'humanity' would be devoid of meaning.,,9 To attack diversity, in other 
words, is to attack humanness. This is an intriguing and important argument, 
to which I will return. For the moment, I wish merely to note that Menthon's 
phrase and Arendt's explication of it adopt the "crimes against humanness" 
reading of "crimes against humanity." The crime, for Menthon, is an attack on 
whatever it is that makes us human. "Humanity" refers to the quality of being 
4. This ambiguity is noted as well in CASSESE, supra note 1, at 67. The word has a third 
primary meaning as well, namely compassion-not humanness but humaneness-and that sense 
sometimes figures in discussions of crimes against humanity when we focus on the merciless, ruthless, 
cold-blooded aspects of the crimes. I propose to set this meaning to one side, however, because the 
absence of compassion, of humaneness, hardly distinguishes crimes against humanity from many other 
crimes. 
5. Charter of the International Military Tribunal, Aug. 8, 1945, art. 6(b), 59 Stat. 1544, 1547, 
82 V.N.T.S. 279, 288 (1945) [hereinafter Nuremberg Charter], reprinted in 1 INT'L MILITARY 
TRIBUNAL, NUMREMBERG, TRIAL OF TIlE MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE INTERNATIONAL 
MILITARY TRIBUNAL, NUREMBERG, 14 NOVEMBER 1945 -1 OCTOBER 1946, at 10 (1947). 
6. [d. art. 6(a), 59 Stat. at 1547, 82 V.N.T.S. at 288. 
7. [d. art. 6(c), 59 Stat. at 1547, 82 V.N.T.S. at 288. 
8. HANNAH ARENDT, EICHMANN IN JERUSALEM: A REpORT ON TIlE BANALITY OF EVIL 268 
(rev. ed. 1965). 
9. /d. at 257, 268-69. 
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human, that is, to an abstract property, not to the human race or a set of 
individual humans. 
Taken in the latter sense, "humanity" refers to humankind-the set of 
individuals-not humanness. Under this interpretation, "crimes against 
humanity" suggests that the defining feature of these offenses is the party in 
interest. In law, some wrongs-chiefly civil wrongs, like torts-are thought to 
affect only the victims and their dependents. Other wrongs, inflicted on 
equally determinate victims, violate important community norms as well, and 
the community will seek to vindicate those norms independently of the victim. 
These wrongs are crimes, not torts or other civil breaches, and the community, 
not just the victims, has a distinct interest in punishment. If, for example, you 
punch me in the nose, I may sue you for damages, and the civil case will be 
named after the parties in interest: Me v. You. But, in addition, you may be 
prosecuted for assault and battery, and the criminal case will be titled State v. 
You, People v. You, or Crown v. You. The former case name reflects the fact 
that you have injured me, and that I am seeking recompense; the latter case 
names connote that by injuring me, you have committed an offense against the 
community. In the former, the parties in interest are you and I. In the latter, 
the interested parties are you and the state, the people, or the Crown. I may 
decide to drop my civil lawsuit against you, perhaps because we have settled 
out of court. But that will not matter to the state, which remains free to 
proceed with the assault prosecution despite our settlement because the state's 
interest in punishing the wrong differs fundamentally from my own interest. 
Viewed along these lines, the term "crimes against humanity" signifies that all 
humanity is the interested party and that humanity'S interest may differ from 
the interests of the victims. 
Eichmann in Jerusalem illustrates this sense of the term as well. Arendt 
quotes Telford Taylor's observation that "a crime is not committed only 
against the victim, but primarily against the community whose law is 
violated,,,IO a fact that she observes distinguishes crimes from civil wrongs. 
She then argues: 
[T]he physical extermination of the Jewish people was a crime against humanity, 
perpetrated upon the body of the Jewish people .... Insofar as the victims were Jews, it 
was right and proper that a Jewish court should sit in judgment; but insofar as the crime 
was a crime against humanity, it needed an internl!tional tribunal to do justice to it. 11 
Notice that Arendt draws a jurisdictional conclusion from the distinction 
between crimes against the Jews and crimes against humanity perpetrated 
against the Jews. The question of who gets jurisdiction over international 
crimes is an important one and currently the subject of vigorous debate; we 
shall return to it later in this Article, where I will call Arendt's argument into 
10. ARENDT, supra note 8, at 261 (quoting Telford Taylor, Large Questions in Eichmann 
Case, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 22, 1961, § 6, at 22). 
11. [d. at 269. 
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question. Here, however, I cite Arendt's argument only to note that in it the 
word "humanity" refers to humankind, not to the quality of being human. 12 
Another illustration of this sense of "humanity" appears in Mary Ann 
Glendon's explication of the distinction drawn at Nuremberg between crimes 
against peace and crimes against humanity: 
[T]o wage a war of aggression was a crime against international society and ... to 
12. Because Arendt's treatment of the Eichmann case will figure prominently in this Article's 
argument, some background may prove useful for readers unfamiliar with either Arendt's book or the 
case. Adolph Eichmann was a lieutenant colonel in the Schutzstaffel (S.S.) whose job consisted of 
organizing the roundup of European Jews and their deportation to the death camps in the East. Although 
he was by no means one of the instigators of the Final Solution, Eichmann was the highest-ranked Nazi 
whose duties consisted entirely of annihilating Jews. After the war, Eichmann escaped to Argentina, 
where he lived incognito until Israeli agents located and kidnapped him in 1960. He was brought to 
Jerusalem and tried for crimes against humanity and "crimes against the Jewish people," convicted, and 
hanged. For important accounts of the Eichmann trial (in addition to Arendt's), see DOUGLAS, supra 
note I, at 97-182 and TOM SEGEV, THE SEVENTH MILLION: THE ISRAELIS AND THE HOLOCAUST 323-84 
(Haim Watzman trans., 1993). 
Hannah Arendt was commissioned by The New Yorker magazine to cover the Eichmann trial, 
and her articles were enlarged into the book Eichmann in Jerusalem: A Report on the Banality of Evil. It 
proved to be one of the most controversial books of its time, provoking an "inferno of inSUlt, accusation, 
denunciation, and pure hatred" directed against Arendt that raged for three years and has smoldered ever 
since. DAVID LASKIN, PARTISANS: MARRIAGE, POLITICS, AND BETRAYAL AMONG THE NEW YORK 
INTELLECTUALS 238 (2000). Arendt took the Israeli government and the prosecution to task for 
attempting to politicize the trial, which she believed should consist solely of a quest for impartial justice. 
In addition, critics charged that Arendt whitewashed Eichmann through her idea of the "banality of 
evil," by which she meant that Eichmann was not motivated by antisemitism, psychopathology, sadism, 
or the desire to do something monstrous; instead, he regarded himself as nothing more than a 
responsible jobholder conscientiously performing a normal job. To make matters worse, she combined 
this idea with a few inflammatory pages taking to task the Jewish leadership in occupied Europe for 
cooperating in the roundup of Jews. "The Controversy," as the bitter debate over Arendt's work came to 
be known, ended decade-long friendships .. For an extensive account of ''The Controversy," see 
ELIZABETH YOUNG-BRUEHL, HANNAH ARENDT: FOR LoVE OF THE WORLD 328-78 (1982). 
"The Controversy" flared up again, briefly, in the mid-1990s with the revelation of Arendt's 
youthful love affair with her professor, Martin Heidegger, who later became a Nazi, and with whom she 
reconciled and resumed her friendship in 1950. See generally ELZBlETA ETTINGER, HANNAH ARENDT-
MARTIN HElDEGGER (1995). The Heidegger connection seemed to Arendt's critics like outrageous 
further proof of her arrogance and skewed judgment, both amply demonstrated by her unwillingness to 
treat the enemies of the Jewish people as her own enemies. In my view, the critics are almost entirely 
wrong. See David Luban, When Hannah Met Martin (1997) (unpublished manuscript, on file with The 
Yale Journal of International Law); David Luban, What the Banality of Evil Is Not (1997) (unpublished 
manuscript, on file with The Yale Journal of International Law). In addition to polemics, scholarly 
interest in Eichmann in Jerusalem has remained lively. See, e.g., DOUGLAS, supra note I, at 110-13, 
173-82; RICHARD J. BERNSTEIN, HANNAH ARENDT AND THE JEWISH QUESTION (1996); The Special Issue: 
Hannah Arendt and Eichmann in Jerusalem, 8 HISTORY AND MEMORY No.2 (FalllWinter 1996). 
None of these issues will be my concern in the present Article. In the midst of the smoke and 
flames of "The Controversy," Arendt's Epilogue to Eichmann in Jerusalem, in which she takes up legal 
and theoretical issues that the case presents, has been largely, though not entirely, ignored. Seyla 
Benhabib has suggested that Arendt's analysis of crimes against humanity is the most important legacy 
of Eichmann in Jerusalem. Seyla Benhabib, Arendt's Eichmann in Jerusalem, in THE CAMBRIDGE 
COMPANION TO HANNAH ARENDT 76 (Dana Villa ed., 2000). And Mark Osiel has explored the 
significance of Arendt's work for international criminal law in two important books. See MARK OSIEL, 
MASS ATROCITY, ORDINARY EVIL, AND HANNAH ARENDT: CRIMINAL CONSCIOUSNESS IN ARGENTINA'S 
DIRTY WAR (2001) [hereinafter OSIEL, MAss ATROCITY, ORDINARY EVIL]; MARK J. OSIEL, OBEYING 
ORDERS: ATROCITY, MILITARY DISCIPLINE, AND THE LAW OF WAR (1999). I share Benhabib's and 
Osiel's belief that the Epilogue, which contains Arendt's ideas about the nature of crimes against 
humanity and genocide, is a work of major theoretical importance, although I do not share all of their 
other judgments of her argument. As will become clear in the course of this Article, I agree with Arendt 
on some points and disagree on others. 
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persecute, oppress, or do violence to individuals or minorities on political, racial, or 
religious grounds in connection with such a war, or to exterminate, enslave, or deport 
civilian populations, was a crime against humanity.13 
Here, the phrase "international society" refers to the traditional subject of 
international law, namely the society of states. "Humanity," Glendon is 
suggesting, refers to something different-not the society of states, nor even 
John Rawls's slightly different concept of the Society ofPeoples14-but rather 
the Society of People: humankind in the aggregate. Glendon's argument, then, 
asserts that just as international society has an interest in repressing crimes 
against peace, humanity has an interest in repressing the various misdeeds that 
fall under the rubric "crimes against humanity." 
I offer these examples to illustrate two simple points. First, discussions 
of crimes against humanity take the term seriously and at face value, treating 
"humanity" as an operative concept with intelligible, normative content, and 
not just a placeholder in a legal term of art. Second, discussions of crimes 
against humanity draw on both senses of the word "humanity"-humanity as 
humanness and humanity as humankind. The central questions for any theory 
of crimes against humanity are how these deeds violate humanness, and why 
they offend against all humankind. 
Labeling something a crime against humanity may well imply both 
conclusions, but it is important to realize that violating humanness and 
offending against humankind are not equivalent. Arguably, all human beings 
share an interest in suppressing grave acts of environmental destruction-an 
interest that may well justify making such acts international crimes; but the 
value that is harmed is not, strictly speaking, human at all. Conversely, an 
especially sadistic rape or murder might degrade the humanity of its victim 
without implicating the interests of the entire human race. Crimes against 
humanity are simultaneously offenses against humankind and injuries to 
humanness. They are so universally odious that they make the criminal hostis 
humani generis-an enemy of all humankind, like the pirate on the high seas. 
under traditional international law-and they are universally odious because 
they injure something fundamental to being human in a way that municipal 
legal systems fail to address. But what is that something? 
The answer I offer in this Article is that crimes against humanity assault 
one particular aspect of human being, namely our character as political 
animals. We are creatures whose nature compels us to live socially, but who 
cannot do so without artificial political organization that inevitably poses 
threats to our well-being, and, at the limit, to our very survival. Crimes against 
humanity represent the worst of those threats; they are the limiting case of 
politics gone cancerous. Precisely because we cannot live without politics, we 
exist under the permanent threat that politics will tum cancerous and the 
13. MARY ANN GLENDON, A WORLD MADE NEW: ELEANOR ROOSEVELT AND THE UNIVERSAL 
DECLARA nON OF HUMAN RIGHTS 9 (2001). 
14. JOHN RAWLS, THE LAW OF PEOPLES (1999). For Rawls, a people differs from a state 
because the term "state" refers principally to the government, whereas a "people" is a politically 
organized set of human beings. See id. at 23-27. 
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indispensable institutions of organized political life will destroy us. That is 
why all humankind shares an interest in repressing these crimes. The theory 
that I aim to defend here consists of two propositions: (i) that "humanity" in 
the label "crimes against humanity" refers to our nature as political animals, 
and (ii) that these crimes pose a universal threat that all humankind shares an 
interest in repressing. 
The argument proceeds as follows. In Part II, I extract from the various 
statutes and decisions a set of five features that, I claim, characterize the legal 
core of crimes against humanity. All the statutory definitions of crimes against 
humanity have in common that they criminalize atrocities and severe 
persecutions inflicted on civilian gopulations as part of an organized plan by a 
state or a state-like organization. 5 In other words, the target of these statutes 
consists of organized attacks of the gravest and most barbaric kind carried out 
by political entities against groups under their control. That having been 
established, I set out, in Part III, the conception of humanity as the political 
animal sketched above. Then, in Part IV, I verify that this conception of the 
political animal properly accounts for the five previously identified features of 
the law of crimes against humanity. This conclusion completes the argument 
that "humanity" in "crimes against humanity" refers to our character as 
political animals. Part V then turns to a question raised in the very first 
paragraph of this Article: whether the concept of a "crime against humanity" 
runs the risk of implicitly demonizing those who commit such crimes. Taking 
an argument to that effect by Carl Schmitt as my foil, I answer in the 
. 16 
negatIve. 
The Article then turns to the question of why all humankind has an 
interest in repressing these crimes. Evidently, this question concerns 
jurisdiction over crimes against humanity, for jurisdiction is the study of the 
interests that create a legitimate stake in prescribing and enforcing law. I will 
defend the familiar proposal that crimes against humanity should be treated as 
universal jurisdiction offenses-that is, offenses that can be tried in any 
properly constituted court, national or international-but the defense I offer 
will be less familiar. In Parts VI and VII, I ground the claim of universal 
jurisdiction not in an argument that all states have an interest in repressing 
crimes against humanity, but in the claim that all individual persons do. I label 
this the vigilante jurisdiction, and, as the term suggests, it carries the 
implication that criminals against humanity are anyone's fair target. Clearly, 
that can be a fantastically dangerous proposition---one that raises the specter 
of lynch-mob justice. The solution to this problem, I suggest, is a delegation 
of the vigilante jurisdiction to any officially constituted tribunal, national or 
international, that satisfies the requirements of natural justice. 17 According to 
15. For convenient reference, the Appendix to this Article includes the text of five different 
statutory definitions of crimes against humanity-those of the Nurernberg Charter, Allied Control 
Council Law No. 10, the Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for Former Yugoslavia, the 
Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, and the Rome Statute for the International 
Criminal Court-along with the Rome Statute's definition of the crime of genocide. 
16. See SCHMIIT, supra note 2. 
17. I borrow the term "natural justice" from John Rawls. See JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF 
JUSTICE (1971). Used in this sense, natural justice refers to the basic features of due process-"a process 
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this argument, the basis for universal jurisdiction is not simply to expand the 
reach of prosecution, but also to expand the possibility of a fair forum 
protecting suspects against the rigors of vigilante justice. So I shall argue in 
Part VIII. 
In February 2002, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) decided its 
most im~ortant case on international criminal law since the 1927 Lotus 
decision. 8 The case, between Belgium and the Democratic Republic of the 
Congo, held that incumbent foreign ministers are immune from prosecution 
for serious international crimes such as crimes against humanity. 19 In addition, 
several separate opinions handed down in the case addressed the validity of 
universal jurisdiction, an issue of great importance that the opinion of the 
Court did not reach, but which will soon be treated by the ICJ in the pending 
case Congo v. France. 2o In Part IX, I utilize Congo v. Belgium to illustrate 
points about the account of crimes against humanity developed here: first, that 
the possibility of a politicized prosecution may undermine the requirement of 
natural justice, and second, that the legal arguments about immunity and 
universal jurisdiction reflect the larger tension between the interests of states 
and the interests of humankind that permeates the law of crimes against 
humanity. Finally, the concluding section recapitulates the argument and 
reasonably designed to ascertain the truth, in ways consistent with the other ends of the legal system, as 
to whether a violation has taken place and under what circumstances." [d. at 239. Rawls offers some 
examples of what natural justice requires: 
[A) legal system must make provisions for conducting orderly trials and hearings; it must 
contain rules of evidence that guarantee rational procedures of inquiry .... [J]udges must 
be independent and impartial, and no man may judge his own case. Trials must be fair 
and open, but not prejudiced by public clamor. 
[d. I do not read Rawls as suggesting that these are the only requirements of natural justice; his list is 
suggestive, not exhaustive. In this Article, I use the term ''natural justice" rather than "due process" 
because the latter misleadingly suggests that I am referring only to doctrines of American constitutional 
law, whereas I mean to refer to the basic minimum standards of fairness in tribunals anywhere and 
everywhere, not just in the United States. To forestall misunderstanding, let me emphasize that talk of 
natural justice makes no assumption, pro or con, about the existence or validity of natural law. A legal 
positivist can accept the moral need for fair and rational adjudicatory process, which is all I mean by 
natural justice. 
18. S.S. Lotus (Fr. v. Turk.), 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 10 (Sept. 7), reprinted in 2 WORLD 
COURT REpORTS 23 (Manley O. Hudson ed., 2000). 
19. Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Oem. Rep. of Congo v. Belg.), 41 l.L.M. 536 (2002) 
[hereinafter Congo v. Belgium). The issue will be litigated before the ICJ again. In August 2003, Liberia 
instituted proceedings against Sierra Leone for issuing a warrant against former Liberian President 
Charles Taylor, arguing that the warrant violates Taylor's immunity. Press Release, Int'l Court of 
Justice, Liberia Applies to the International Court of Justice in a Dispute with Sierra Leone Concerning 
an International Arrest Warrant Issued by the Special Court for Sierra Leone Against the Liberian 
President (Aug. 5, 2003), http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/ipresscomlipress2003/ipresscom2003-
26_ xx _ 20030805.htm. 
20. See Congo v. Belgium, supra note 19. On Certain Criminal Proceedings in France (Dem. 
Rep. of Congo v. Fr.) [hereinafter Congo v. France), see Press Release, In!'1 Court of Justice, The 
Republic of the Congo Seizes the International Court of Justice ofa Dispute with France (Dec. 9, 2002), 
http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/ipresscomlipress2002/ipresscom2002-37_xx_20021209.htm; Press 
Release, In!'1 Court of Justice, The French Republic Consents to the Jurisdiction of the International 
Court of Justice to Entertain an Application Filed by the Republic of the Congo Against France: The 
Court Enters the New Case in its List and Sets a Date for the Hearings on the Request for the Indication 
of a Provisional Measure (Apr. II, 2003), http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/ipresscomlipress2003/ipress 
com2003-14_xx_20030411.htm. On June 17, 2003, the ICJ declined to enact provisional measures in 
this case on the basis that the Congo faces no immediate injury. Order of 17 June 2003, Request for the 
Indication of a Provisional Measure, Congo v. France, http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/idocketl 
icoflicoforderlicoUorder_ 20030617.pdf. 
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defends it against a legal realist objection to the very idea of a theory of 
crimes against humanity. 
II. CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY: THE DISTINCTIVE LEGAL FEATURES 
We begin by asking which crimes satisfy the two conditions of 
offending against humanness and implicating the interests of all humankind. 
The first step of the inquiry is to learn how the evolving law of crimes against 
humanity has attempted to answer this question. Let us begin with the familiar 
language of Article 6(c) of the Nuremberg Charter, which defines crimes 
against humanity as: 
murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation, and other inhumane acts committed 
against any civilian population, before or during the war, or persecutions on political, 
racial, or religious grounds in execution of or in connection with any crime within the 
jurisdiction of the Tribunal, whether or not in violation of domestic law of the country 
where perpetrated. 21 
I will focus on five features of Article 6(c) that characterize the law of crimes 
against humanity in all its subsequent embodiments. My aim is to develop 
what might be thought of as the "common law" of crimes against humanity-
a single set of underlying ideas given varying specifications by different 
statutes and jurisdictions. Ronald Dworkin distinguishes between legal 
concepts and their varying conceptions,22 and in his tenninology I shall extract 
a concept of crimes against humanity from the differing conceptions given in 
various statutes and judicial decisions. 
1. Crimes against humanity are typically committed against fellow 
nationals as well as foreigners. Reviewing the legislative history of Article 
6(c), Cherif Bassiouni observes that the legal problem it was meant to solve 
arose from a lacuna in humanitarian law as it existed in 1945. Under 
prevailing law, the category of war crimes against civilian populations 
included only offenses against foreign populations, whereas the Nazis 
committed these crimes against their own Jewish nationals and those of 
annexed territories in Austria and Sudetenland as well.23 Apparently, the idea 
that a government would use its resources to murder its own people had not 
been anticipated adequately by the laws of war, although Turkey had done 
precisely that to its Annenian subjects in 1915.24 Article 6(c) would fill this 
gap. Crimes against humanity would include atrocities committed before as 
well as during the war, crimes committed by civilians as well as soldiers, and 
crimes committed by a government against its own people as well as against 
21. Nuremberg Charter, supra note 5, art. 6(c), 59 Stat. at 1547, 82 U.N.T.S. at 288. 
22. RONALD DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE 70-71 (1986). 
23. BASSIOUNI, supra note 1, at 72; KITIICHAISAREE, supra note 1, at 87. 
24. For discussion of the Annenian genocide and the ineffectuality of legal responses, see 
Vahakn N. Dadrian, Genocide as a Problem of National and International Law: The World War I 
Armenian Case and Its Contemporary Legal Ramifications, 14 YALE J. INT'L L. 221 (1989); Vahakn N. 
Dadrian, The Historical and Legal Interconnections Between the Armenian Genocide and the Jewish 
Holocaust: From Impunity to Retributive Justice, 23 YALE J. lNT'L L. 503 (1998); Vahakn N. Dadrian, 
The Turkish Military Tribunal's Prosecution of the Authors of the Armenian Genocide: Four Major 
Court-Martial Series, 11 HOLOCAUST AND GENOCIDE STUD. 28 (1997). 
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an adversary's people.25 In practice, the last of these three distinctions is the 
most fundamental. That is because crimes against humanity committed in 
peacetime and those committed by civilians (e.g., police forces or informal 
militias like the Rwandan interahamwe) will most likely be committed against 
one's own population. After all, a state has little opportunity to do violence to 
foreign nationals on foreign territory except in the course of war-
international terrorism being the important exception. Violations against 
fellow nationals typify the "pure case" of crimes against humanity-that is, 
crimes against humanity that are not also war crimes. 
In other words, the unique evil criminalized by Article 6( c) is the 
horrific novelty of the twentieth century: politically or~anized persecution and 
slaughter of people under one's own political control. 6 This is not to say that 
crimes against humanity can be committed only against one's fellow 
nationals. Nothing in the statutory language limits the category of crimes 
against humanity in this way, and the human rights that the law aims to defend 
apply with equal force at home and abroad.27 However, since crimes against 
humanity committed by armed forces abroad will simultaneously be war 
crimes, the pure case of crimes against humanity-those that are not also war 
crimes-involve depredations against one's own people. What might be called 
"autopolemic" crimes are thus the most typical and characteristic crimes 
against humanity. For purposes of theorizing about crimes against humanity, I 
therefore focus specificall~ on crimes against humanity committed within 
rather than across borders.2 
25. There are some differences between the particular offenses that constitute war crimes and 
those that constitute crimes against humanity, but the most important offenses (murder, enslavement, 
mass deportation, torture, ill-treatment) are fundamentally the same. 
26. See Nuremberg Charter, supra note 5, art. 6(c), 59 Stat. at 1547, 82 U.N.T.S. at 288. 
27. All of the principal statutory definitions of crimes against humanity describe the context as 
an "attack on a civilian population" without specifying whether the civilian population is domestic or 
foreign. See infra Appendix. 
28. Richard Vernon believes that the term should be reserved exclusively for crimes 
committed by a state against its own subjects. Vernon, supra note 3, at 248-49. He has a powerful point: 
only autopolemic crimes exhibit the distinctive perversion of politics that on Vernon's account-and, as 
we shall see, on mine as weIl-4:haracterizes crimes against humanity. However, reserving the label for 
autopolemic crimes does not represent the law as it is currently understood. Restricting the label to 
autopolemic crimes also proves to be unnecessary for a theory of crimes against humanity as political 
crimes, of the sort that both Vernon and I develop. Vernon implicitly assumes that political relations 
between a state (or any similar organization) and individuals exist only when the individuals reside in 
that state. He assumes, that is, that political relationships between individuals and states exist only 
within national, not transnational, politics. The clearest counterexample to this assumption is the 
relationship between a state and individuals in its colonies, sateIlites, or de facto dependencies-and an 
invading army creates, at least temporarily, a de facto dependency. I do not go as far as Lea Brilmayer, 
who argues in Justifying International Acts that the self-same political theory that justifies a state's 
behavior toward its own citizens (whatever theory that turns out to be) must be employed to justify 
behavior toward foreigners abroad. LEA BRILMAYER, JUSTIFYING iNTERNATIONAL ACTS 28-29 (1989). 
Political relationships depend in large part on mutual expectations, and a state's own residents have 
different and higher reasonable expectations of their own government than they do of another state. But, 
to the extent that a state displaces another people's government, it assumes governmental responsibilities 
to protect the interests of those in its sphere of domination. This point of political theory is echoed in the 
Second Hague Convention, in Article 43 ("The authority of the legitimate power having actually passed 
into the hands of the occupant, the latter shall take all steps in his power to re-establish and insure, as far 
as possible, public order and safety, while respecting, unless absolutely prevented, the laws in force in 
the community.") and Article 46 ("Family honours and rights, individual lives and private property, as 
HeinOnline -- 29 Yale J. Int’l L. 95 2004
2004] A Theory of Crimes Against Humanity 95 
2. Crimes against humanity are international crimes. Article 6( c) of the 
Nuremberg Charter, in bringing under international law crimes committed by 
a state against its own residents, represents an incursion against state 
sovereignty-a point emphasized by the criminalization of acts "whether or 
not in violation of the domestic law of the country where perpetrated.,,29 For 
that matter, Articles 7 and 8 of the Nuremberg Charter (abolishing sovereign 
immunity and the superior orders defense) are also incursions against 
sovereignty, because they pierce the veil of domestic authority.3o Most 
dramatic of all is the first clause of Article 6(c), criminalizing murders, 
exterminations, enslavements, deportations, and other inhumane acts before 
the war as well as during the war.3l On its face, this clause criminalizes Nazi 
atrocities against German Jews before 1939, thereby brushing aside the 
prerogatives of a peacetime sovereign. This was a radical step; perhaps 
unsurprisingly, the Nuremberg Tribunal interpreted the phrase "before the 
war" out of the Nuremberg Charter.32 However, it did so by arguing that it had 
no jurisdiction over offenses that predated the commission of crimes against 
peace and war crimes, not by arguing that German sovereignty barred 
prosecution.33 Thus, even the Nuremberg Tribunal left intact what I take to be 
the second defining feature of crimes against humanity: their criminality 
overrides state sovereignty, turning them into international crimes. 
3. Crimes against humanity are committed by politically organized 
groups acting under color of policy. The Nuremberg Charter presupposed that 
crimes against humanity were committed by agents of a state. Article 6( c) 
requires that crimes against humanity be committed "in execution of or in 
connection with" crimes against peace and war crimes/4 both of which could 
be committed only by state actors, or by high-placed civilians embroiled with 
state actors. This state action requirement excludes, for example, "free lance" 
well as religious convictions and liberty, must be respected. Private property cannot be confiscated."). 
Convention with Respect to the Laws and Customs of War (Hague Convention II), Regulations 
Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, July 29, 1899, arts. 43, 46, 32 Stat. 1803, 1821-22. 
29. Nuremberg Charter, supra note 5, art. 6(c), 59 Stat. at 1547, 82 U.N.T.S. at 288. 
30. Id. arts. 7, 8, 59 Stat. at 1548, 82 U.N.T.S. at 288. 
31. Id. art. 6(c), 59 Stat. at 1547,82 U.N.T.S. at 288. 
32. 22 INT'L MILITARY TRIBUNAL, NUREMBERG, TRIAL OF THE MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS 
BEFORE THE INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL, NUREMBERG, 14 NOVEMBER 1945 - 1 OCTOBER 
1946, at 498 (1948). See DOUGLAS, supra note I, at 48-56 (discussing the deradicalization of Article 
6(c) through interpretation of its language). 
33. Allied Control Council Law No. 10 contained no such jurisdictional restriction. Allied 
Control Council Law No. 10, Punishment of Persons Guilty of War Crimes, Crimes Against Peace and 
Against Humanity, Dec. 20, 1945, reprinted in TELFORD TA ¥LOR, FINAL REpORT TO THE SECRETARY OF 
THE ARMy ON THE NUREMBERG WAR CRIMES TRIALS UNDER CONTROL COUNCIL LAW No. 10, at 250 
(1949) [hereinafter CCL No. 10). Allied courts applying CCL No. 10 were divided on the issue of 
whether they had jurisdiction over crimes against humanity committed before 1939. The courts in the 
Flick and Ministries cases, following the Nuremberg Tribunal, refused to take jurisdiction over pre-1939 
crimes against humanity, while the courts in the Einsatzgruppen and Justice cases stated in dicta that 
such jurisdiction would exist. See the discussion of this issue in Telford Taylor, Nuremberg Trials: War 
Crimes and International Law, 450 INT'L CONCILIATION 241, 342-44 (1949). At least the latter decisions 
give some support to the idea that German national sovereignty posed no obstacle to prosecution. Kai 
Ambos and Steffen Wirth demonstrate that the "war nexus" was always a jurisdictional requirement, not 
a substantive element of the law of crimes against humanities, and as such it has gradually disappeared 
from the law. Kai Ambos & Steffen Wirth, The Current Law of Crimes Against Humanity, 13 CRIM. 
L.F. 1,3-13 (2002). 
34. Nuremberg Charter, supra note 5, art. 6(c), 59 Stat. at 1547, 82 U.N.T.S. at 288. 
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anti-Semites who decided to piggyback on the Nazi lead and murder Jews on 
their own, as happened repeatedly in Romania, Latvia, and the Ukraine.35 
Their crimes could be prosecuted as murder under domestic law, but not as 
crimes against humanity under international law. Indeed, the nexus to state 
acts was deemed necessary to bring the crimes into the purview of 
international law . 36 
The Bosnian War led drafters to weaken the "state action" requirement 
because the Serb militias were unofficial and only loosely affiliated with the 
Yugoslav state. Thus, the Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the 
Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) requires only that crimes against humanity be 
committed "in armed conflict, whether international or internal in 
character.,,37 However, the armed conflict requirement still presupposes 
armies and government-like entities. The Tadic judgment, for example, refers 
to "entities exercising de facto control over a particular territory but without 
international recognition of formal status of a de jure state, or by a terrorist 
group or organization.,,38 Rwanda led to an additional weakening of the 
requirement because unaffiliated civilians committed much of the genocide, 
which had no direct connection with armed conflict, occurring as it did in 
areas of the country outside the battle zones of the civil war.39 Here, the state 
action requirement-broadened in Yugoslavia to include non-state but state-
like actors-was broadened again. In place of the "armed conflict" 
requirement, the Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda 
(ICTR) requires only "a widespread or systematic attack against anlo civilian 
population on national, political, ethnic, racial or religious grounds." 0 Finally, 
the Rome Statute for the International Criminal Court adopts nearly identical 
language but eliminates the requirement that the attack be on national, 
political, ethnic, racial or religious grounds. Offenses are crimes against 
humanity "when committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack 
35. "[ejrimes against humanity ... must be strictly construed to exclude isolated cases of 
atrocities or persecutions." United States v. Alstiitter (U.S. Mil. Trib. 1947), in 6 UNITED NATIONS WAR 
CRIMES COMM'N, LAW REpORTS OF TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS 47 (1948) [hereinafter Justice case]. 
Ambos and Wirth point out that German courts applying CCL No. 10 law reached the same conclusion. 
See Ambros and Wirth, supra note 33, at 6. 
36. See Ambos & Wirth, supra note 33, at 7. See also CASSESE, supra note 1, at 73-74 
(discussing the elimination of the war nexus from the definition of crimes against humanity). 
37. Statute of the International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for 
Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the Former 
Yugoslavia Since 1991, S.C. Res. 827, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 3217th mtg., art. 5, U.N. Doc. 
SlRES/827 (1993), amended by S.c. Res. 1166, U.N. SCOR, 53rd Sess., 3878th mtg., U.N. Doc. 
SlRES/1166 (1998) [hereinafter ICTY Statute]. 
38. Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-T (App. Chamber, Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former 
Yugoslavia, May 7, 1997), http://www.un.org/icty/tadic/appealljudgment. 
39. MAHMOOD MAMDANI, WHEN VICTIMS BECOME KILLERS: COLONIALISM, NATIVISM, AND 
THE GENOCIDE IN RWANDA 6-7 (2001). 
40. Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible 
for Genocide and Other Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the 
Territory of Rwanda and Rwandan Citizens Responsible for Genocide and Other Such Violations 
Committed in the Territory of Neighboring States, Between 1 January 1994 and 31 December 1994, 
S.C. Res. 955, U.N. SCOR, 49th Sess., 3453d rntg., art. 3, U.N. Doc. SlRES/955 (1994), amended by 
S.C. Res. 1165, U.N. SCOR, 53rd Sess., 3877th mtg., U.N. Doc. SlRES/1165 (1998) [hereinafter ICTR 
Statute]. 
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directed against any civilian population, with knowledge of the attack.,,41 The 
Rome Statute also requires that the offenses flow from "a State or 
organizational policy.,,42 
In this way, the state action requirement has metamorphosed into a 
broader "widespread or systematic attack" element, linked with a state or 
organizational policy. What all these requirements have in common seems to 
be that crimes against humanity are crimes committed through political 
organization. Although perpetrated by individuals, they are not individual 
crimes. To count as a crime against humanity, the perpetrator's decision to 
commit the crime must be mediated by his participation in, and knowledge of, 
a widespread or systematic attack.43 We may summarize this feature as the 
requirement of organizational responsibility. 
We may illustrate how central organizational responsibility is to crimes 
against humanity by contrasting the crime of genocide, as defined in the 1948 
Genocide Convention, with the crime against humanity consisting of 
extermination of a civilian popUlation on racial or ethnic grounds. In a 
practical and intuitive sense, genocide and ethnic extermination seem virtually 
indistinguishable. But the legal definitions differ in crucial respects. The 
Genocide Convention requires the prosecution to prove "intent to destroy, in 
whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such.'M The 
crime against humanity of group extermination requires no similar proof of 
intent to destroy. Thus, whereas genocide is a crime directed at groups viewed 
as collective entities, with a moral dignity of their own, crimes against 
humanity are assaults on civilian populations viewed not as unified 
metaphysical entities but simply as collections of individuals whose own 
human interests and dignity are at risk and whose vulnerability arises from 
their presence in the target population. More to the present point, however, is 
41. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, United Nations Diplomatic Conference 
of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court, July 17, 1998, art. 7(1) 
U.N. Doc. NCONF.183/9, http://www.un.orgllaw/icc/statutelromefra.htm [hereinafter Rome Statute]. 
42. Rome Statute, supra note 41, art. 7(2)(a). 
43. The case law uniformly requires proof that the defendant knew that his crime was part of a 
widespread or systematic attack. See STEVEN R. RATNER & JASON S. ABRAMS, ACCOUNTABILITY FOR 
HUMAN RIGHTS ATROCITIES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: BEYOND THE NUREMBERG LEGACY 62 (2d ed. 
2001). 
44. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Dec. 9, 1948, 
art. 2, 78 U.N.T.S. 277 [hereinafter Genocide Convention]. This requirement is an onerous burden 
because intent is hard to prove, and prosecutors will typically charge crimes against humanity rather 
than genocide because of the practicalities of proving the case. There are two reasons for the specific 
intent requirement for genocide, both of which were central to the thinking of Raphael Lemkin, the 
Polish-Jewish lawyer who coined the word 'genocide' and lobbied for decades to have it incorporated as 
a crime under international law. First, Lernkin hoped (in vain, it seems) that future genocides would be 
halted in their early stages, before great loss of life ensued, in which case the bare intent would 
nevertheless suffice to convict perpetrators. Thus, Lernkin saw the intent requirement as easing the 
prosecutor's burden rather than making it more onerous. Second, and more fundamentally, the focus on 
the intent to destroy a group was meant to identify the singular evil of genocide: it encompasses not 
merely physical attacks ("barbarity," in Lernkin's early terminology) but also efforts to wipe out the 
victimized group's distinctive culture (which Lernkin called "vandalism"). In other words, Lemkin 
understood genocide to be a spiritual as well as a physical attack on groups as such, and he meant for the 
intent requirement to focus on the communal rather than the individual aspect of the crime. On these 
points, see SAMANTHA POWER, A PROBLEM FROM HELL: AMERICA AND THE AGE OF GENOCIDE 21, 43, 
54,57 (2002) and, more generally, chapters 2-4 of the same work. 
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a second difference: the definition of genocide does not contain a requirement 
of either a "widespread or systematic attack," or a "state or organizational 
policy." A solitary individual who disseminates a deadly disease with intent to 
destroy, in whole or in part, a national group is guilty of genocide, even if he 
acted entirely on his own-but he will not be guilty of the crime against 
humanity of extermination.45 The distinguishing feature of the crime against 
humanity is not the actor's genocidal intent, but the organized, policy-based 
decision to commit the offenses. One might say that whereas the definition of 
genocide focuses attention on the collective character of the victim, the 
definition of crimes against humanity emphasizes the collective character of 
the perpetrator. 
4. Crimes against humanity consist of the most severe and abominable 
acts of violence and persecution. Article 6(c) of the Nuremberg Charter 
distinguishes between two types of crimes against humanity. The first consists 
of murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation, and "other inhumane 
acts," and commentators sometimes use the shorthand term "crimes of the 
murder type.,,46 Crimes of the murder type are those that, in the words of the 
Canadian Supreme Court's Finta decision, have an "added dimension of 
cruelty and barbarism.,,47 To the Article 6(c) list of murder, extermination, 
enslavement, and deportation, subsequent statutes have added imprisonment 
"in violation of fundamental rules of international law,,,48 torture, enforced 
disappearance, sex crimes against women (including rape, sexual slavery, 
enforced prostitution, forced pregnancy, and enforced sterilization), and, in 
the Rome Statute, the "crime of apartheid.,,49 Article 6(c) and all subsequent 
45. A real-life example is the strange case of Abba Kovner, a Holocaust survivor, resistance 
fighter in the Vilna ghetto, and poet, who in 1945 unsuccessfully attempted to poison the Hamburg 
water supply in revenge for the Holocaust. Kovner said that his ultimate goal was to kill six million 
Germans. The incident is described in SEGEV, supra note 12, at 140-46. 
There exists some legal authority to the contrary of my assertion that genocide can occur even 
without organizational responsibility. See. e.g., Prosecutor v. Jelisec, Case No. IT-95-IO-A, para. 101 
(App. Chamber, Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia, July 5, 2001), 
http://www.un.org/icty/jelisiJappeal/judgment (noting that "it will be very difficult in practice to provide 
proof of the genocidal intent of an individual if the crimes committed are not widespread and if the 
crime charged is not backed by an organisation or a system"). A similar observation is made in 
Prosecutor v. Kayishema, Case No. IT-95-I-T, para. 94 (Trial Chamber II, Int'l Crim. Trib. for Rwanda, 
May 21, 1999), http://www.ictr.org/ENGLISHIcases/kayRuzlJudgementl4.htm. See generally WILLIAM 
A. SCHABAS, GENOCIDE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: THE CRIME OF CRIMES 207-09 (2000). Schabas notes 
that Amnesty International has opposed the proposal of building organizational responsibility into the 
set of elements that must be proven to establish genocide. However, the Jelisec and Kayishema 
decisions do not require such proof. Instead, they merely argue that without proof of an organizational 
plan, it would be difficult to prove genocidal intent in practice. See Jelisec, supra, para. 100; Kayishema, 
supra, para. 94. This conclusion, I think, shows failure of imagination on the part of the Tribunals. Abba 
Kovner essentially admitted his genocidal intent and, unhappily, the possibility of a lone terrorist aiming 
to wipe out a population by introducing biological agents is all too imaginable. 
46. This terminology dates back to Egon Schwelb, Crimes Against Humanity, 32 BRIT. Y.B. 
INT'L. L. 178, 190 (1946). A better term might be "acts of the murder type," to avoid the implication that 
these acts are already criminalized under domestic law, which they mayor may not be. 
47. Regina v. Finta, [1994] S.c.R. 701, 818. 
48. Rome Statute, supra note 41, art. 7(1)(e). 
49. Rome Statute, supra note 41, art. 7(1)(j). For conceptual clarity, one should probably 
classify the crime of apartheid among the crimes of the persecution type rather than the crimes of the 
murder type because one of its elements is "an institutionalized regime of systematic oppression and 
domination by one racial group over another racial group or groups." Id. art. 7(2)(h). Of course, 
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statutes add the catch-all category of "other inhumane acts," of which Ratner 
and Abrams offer the following examples: "medical experimentation, 
mutilations, severe beatings, food deprivation, sterilizations, violations of 
corpses, forced undressing, forced witnessing of atrocities against loved ones, 
and other egregious physical and mental assaults."so The "big idea" seems to 
be that these are crimes whose sheer ugliness places them beyond the pale of 
ordinary criminality. 
The second Article 6(c) category-"crimes of the persecution type"-
consists of persecutions on racial, religious, or political grounds. In the 
category of persecutions, Ratner and Abrams, drawing on Nuremberg and 
CCL No. 10 decisions, include "deprivations of the rights to citizenship, to 
teach, to practice professions, to obtain education, and to marry freely; arrest 
and confinement; beatings, mutilation, and torture; confiscation of property; 
deportation to ghettos; slave labor; and extermination."sl Some of these 
offenses, however, are already crimes of the murder type (e.g., confinement, 
beatings, mutilation, torture, deportation, slave labor, extermination). 
Eliminating persecutions that are already acts of the murder type would leave 
a residual category of "pure" persecutions consisting of severe group-based 
discrimination-those on Ratner and Abrams's list, together with indignities 
such as compelling group members to wear distinctive costume (such as the 
Nazis' infamous yellow arm bands for Jews), or prohibiting use of the group's 
native language. The Rome Statute defines persecution as "the intentional and 
severe deprivation of fundamental rights contrary to international law by 
reason of the identity of the group or collectivity,,,s2 and this definition-
leaving aside some vagueness about which rights are "fundamental" and 
which rights are protected by internationallaw--captures the basic idea. 
Severity appears to be the most fundamental criterion for making 
international crimes of these deeds: the category of crimes against humanity 
should contain only the worst things that people do to each other. At the time 
of the Nuremberg Charter and CCL No. 10, those crimes included murder, 
extermination, enslavement, deportation, torture, and rape. Over the decades, 
the list has slowly expanded, in sad tribute to the range of human 
inventiveness in devising ways to torment other people. The Rome Statute 
adds to the catalogue other items from the Pandora's box of atrocious evils: 
"sexual slavery, enforced prostitution, forced pregnancy, enforced 
sterilization, or any other form of sexual violence of comparable gravity,,,s3 
enforced disappearance, apartheid, and lawless imprisonment.s4 Of course, as 
a historical matter, Nazi Germany had engaged in all of these practices except 
apartheid was implemented through crimes of the murder type, including murder, torture, and mass 
deportation; perhaps apartheid cannot even be conceived without these accompaniments. But it is the 
acts of murder, torture, and deportation, not the overall legal regime of systematic racial oppression and 
domination, that constitute crimes of the murder type. The establishment of grossly discriminatory laws 
seems much closer to a crime of the persecution type. 
50. RATNER & ABRAMS, supra note 43, at 74. 
51. Id. at 74-75. Ambos & Wirth include destruction of one's home as a form of persecution. 
Ambos & Wirth, supra note 33, at 79-80. 
52. Rome Statute, supra note 41, art. 7(2)(g). 
53. Id. art. 7(J)(g). 
54. Id. art. 7(J)(e), (i), 0). 
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enforced impregnation, and perhaps the only reason they were omitted from 
the enumeration of crimes in Article 6(c) of the Nuremberg Charter was that 
the overwhelming immensity of genocide eclipsed them in the minds of the 
Charter's drafters. Perhaps their salience became clear only after the 
experiences of South African apartheid, enforced disappearance in the 
Argentinian and Chilean "dirty wars," and ethnic cleansing and political sex 
crimes in Bosnia. In any event, the drafters of the international statutes also 
understood that human beings will always come up with novel atrocities, and 
for that reason, all the statutes include the "other inhumane acts" catch-all 
provision--or, in the case of the Rome Statute, the more developed category 
of "other inhumane acts of a similar character intentionally causing great 
suffering, or serious injury to body or to mental or physical health.,,55 
In precisely the way that the statutory lists of crimes of the murder type 
have followed humankind's learning curve in devising new forms of 
organized atrocities, the statutory definitions of persecution have followed the 
learning curve of group discrimination. The Nuremberg Charter singles out 
discrimination on political, racial, or religious grounds, while the Tokyo 
Charter mentions only discrimination on political or racial grounds, 
presumably because Japan did not persecute on the basis of religion.56 
Evidently, each of these statutes was tailored to their target states, although 
the catalogue of victim groups in the Nuremberg Charter was already too 
narrow, failing to mention homosexuals, the mentally retarded, the aged, and 
the infirm, all of whom suffered group-based attacks by the Nazis. The ICTR 
Statute expands the list to cover attacks on "national, political, ethnic, racial or 
religious grounds,,,57 and the Rome Statute broadens the range even further to 
"[p ]ersecution against any identifiable group or collectivity on political, racial, 
national, ethnic, cultural, religious, gender . . . or other grounds that are 
universally recognized as impermissible under international law.,,58 Just as 
"progress" in the art of atrocity required expanding the Article 6( c) list of 
murder-type crimes to include forced impregnation, "progress" in the art of 




Id. art. 7(1)(k). 
Charter for the International Military Tribunal for the Far East, Apr. 26, 1946, I.l.A.S. 
57. In fact, the ICTR Statute is muddled. In Article 3, it criminalizes "persecutions on 
political, racial and religious grounds" when they are "committed as part of a widespread or systematic 
attack against any civilian population on national, political, ethnic, racial or religious grounds." ICTR 
Statute, supra note 40, art. 3. No explanation seems forthcoming of this convoluted and almost 
inconsistent fonnulation. 
58. Rome Statute, supra note 41, art. 7(l)(h). 
59. Are acts of terrorism crimes against humanity? Some scholars have answered in the 
affirmative. See, e.g., James D. Fry, Terrorism as a Crime Against Humanity and Genocide: The 
Backdoor to Universal Jurisdiction, 7 UCLA J. INT'L L. & FOREIGN AFF. 169 (2002); Lucy Martinez, 
Prosecuting Te"orists at the International Criminal Court: Possibilities and Problems, 34 RUTGERS 
L.J. I, 26-41 (2002). However, as ICTY ex-President Antonio Cassese notes, during the negotiations 
leading up to the Rome Statute, the U.S. government successfully opposed adding terrorism to the list of 
crimes against humanity because, among other reasons, the offense is not well-defined and thus doing so 
might lead to excessive politicization of the International Criminal Court (ICC). Antonio Cassese, 
Terrorism Is Also Disrupting Some Crucial Legal Categories of International Law, 12 EUR. 1. lNT'L. L. 
993,994 (2001). Cassese also points out that American and French courts have rejected treating terrorist 
attacks as crimes against humanity. Id. An attack such as the September II, 2001 attack on the World 
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Crimes of the murder type and crimes of the persecution type have one 
obvious feature in common. In the same way that crimes of the murder type 
are the most appalling evils that people have devised to visit on the bodies of 
others, crimes of the persecution type are the most extreme humiliations to 
visit on their spirits. In both cases, the intuitive ground for condemnation 
seems to be the desire to draw a line between civilized and uncivilized 
conduct, and to insist that some torments and humiliations cross that line. I 
suspect that no underlying principle explains why some evils cross the 
boundary between the civilized and the barbaric, whereas others-such as 
banditry, suppression of the free press, and denial of the right to vote or own 
real property---do not. 60 The atrocities and humiliations that count as crimes 
against humanity are, in effect, the ones that turn our stomachs, and no 
principle exists to explain what turns our stomachs. 
But crimes of the persecution type are not just discrimination taken to 
the most extreme degree, such as the 1935 Nuremberg Laws, Jim Crow laws 
in the southern United States, or the non-violent aspects of apartheid. All the 
statutes contain requirements similar to the Rome Statute's mandate that the 
acts of persecution be "committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack 
directed against any civilian population.,,61 The requirement of an attack 
means that something more is going on than the erection of a stable system of 
group subordination or oppression, such as the subordination of women 
Trade Center would nevertheless very likely fall under the Rome Statute's definition of crimes against 
humanity, which includes murder and extennination "when committed as part of a widespread or 
systematic attack directed against any civilian population, with knowledge of the attack" and defines an 
"attack directed against any civilian popUlation" as "a course of conduct involving the multiple 
commission of acts referred to in paragraph I [including murder) against any civilian population, 
pursuant to or in furtherance of a State or organizational policy to commit such attack." Rome Statute 
supra note 41, art. 7(1). Although a terrorist group like al Qaeda is a non-state actor, the "State or 
organizational policy" language demonstrates that the statute does not limit itself to crimes sponsored by 
states. However, although the September 11 attacks fall under the ICC's statutory definition of crimes 
against humanity, the ICC would not have jurisdiction over the attacks because they took place before 
the statutory limit. See id. art. 11 (on jurisdiction ratione temporis). Furthennore, some cases of 
terrorism, such as attacks against property, acts committed by individuals who are not part of an 
organization, or acts of hijacking or aerial piracy, are clearly not crimes against humanity. The 
September 11 attack against the Pentagon, like the bombing of the u.S.S. Cole on October 12, 2000, 
might likewise not count as a crime against humanity because it was arguably an act of war against a 
military force rather than a civilian population, even though civilians work at the Pentagon and were 
among the casualties. On the question of whether an attack on a military target can be a crime against 
humanity, see infra note 73 and accompanying text. But, quite aside from the litigator's question of 
whether a terrorist attack can or cannot be shoehorned into the existing statutory language, there is the 
deeper question of whether doing so amounts to "disrupting some crucial legal categories." Cassese, 
supra, at 993. I think the answer is yes, and so I would not include terrorism among the crimes against 
humanity. Like Richard Vernon, I argue in this Article that the basic evil the law of crimes against 
humanity aims to condemn is a perversion of politics-the use of political and military power to assault 
rather than protect the well-being of those over whom the perpetrators exercise de facto authority. See 
Vernon, supra note 3. Even highly organized terrorist attacks seldom meet this description, as terrorists 
nonnally employ political violence divorced from governmental powers and political authority. 
However, under some circumstances, terrorist attacks may amount to genocide, a crime whose idea 
focuses on the evil of attempting to destroy groups on the basis of their ethnic, religious, or racial 
character, quite apart from any specifically political motivation. See supra note 44 and accompanying 
text. 
60. So I argue in David Luban, Intervention and Civilization: Some Unhappy Lessons of the 
Kosovo War, in GLOBAL JUSTICE AND TRANSNATIONAL POLITICS: ESSAYS ON THE MORAL AND 
POLITICAL CHALLENGES OF GLOBALIZATION 79, 101-07 (Pablo de Greiff & Ciaran Cronin eds., 2002). 
61. Rome Statute, supra note 41, art. 7(1). 
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throughout most of recorded history. The word suggests something dynamic, 
something moving and ongoing-a persecution in the process of getting 
worse, persecution conducted through a military campaign of some kind, 
persecution working to destroy or drive away the persecuted group rather than 
subordinating and exploiting it, and typically conjoined with crimes of the 
murder type. This limitation of the concept of persecution makes sense. 
Without it, the concept of persecution threatens to balloon until most of the 
world is implicated in crimes against humanity because, after all, most of the 
world is implicated in nauseating racial, ethnic, religious, or political 
discrimination. No good purpose is served by labeling all the world's 
oppressions crimes against humanity. Doing so would be little more than an 
invitation to permanent misanthropy. 
The Rome Statute embodies this approach in its definitions of the phrase 
"attack on a civilian population,,,62 the crime of apartheid,63 and persecution.64 
An attack on a civilian population consists of committing the particular crimes 
against humanity itemized in Article 7(1) multiple times. Fulfilling this 
definition requires specific flash points of criminality over and above the 
general evil of erecting a social system of oppression and domination. Indeed, 
even the crime of apartheid as defined in Article 7(2)(h) consists of specific 
acts constituting crimes against humanity, committed against a backround of 
racial oppression and domination, rather than the system itself.6 Finally, 
persecution counts as a crime against humanity only "in connection with any 
act referred to in this paragraph [i.e., the paragraph enumerating crimes 
against humanity] or any crime within the jurisdiction of the Court. ,,66 All of 
these definitions adopt the same approach: they define concepts denoting 
generalized evils-attacks on civilian populations, apartheid, and 
persecution-as patterns of specific criminal acts committed in a context of 
organizational planning.67 Taken together, these three definitions imply that 
62. Id. art. 7(2)(a). 
63. Id. art. 7(2)(h). 
64. /d. art. 7(1 )(h). 
65. Id. art. 7(2)(h). 
66. /d. art. 7(1 )(h). It should be noted, however, that the ICTY has concluded that this 
stipulation in the Rome Statute does not reflect customary international law, and that persecutions not 
accompanied by other crimes may still constitute crimes against humanity. Prosecutor v. Kupreskic, 
Case No. IT-95-16-T, para. 580 (Trial Chamber II, Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia, Jan. 14, 
2000), http://www.un.org/ictylkupreskic/trialc2/judgementlindex.htm. Ambos and Wirth agree with the 
Kupreskic panel in rejecting the rule of thumb I am proposing-namely that discrimination rises to the 
level of a persecution-type crime against humanity only when accompanied by crimes against humanity 
of the murder type. They regard it as a wrongheaded vestige of the now-abandoned requirement of a 
nexus to war, resulting from nothing more than a political compromise during the drafting of the Article. 
Ambos & Wirth, supra note 33, at 71-72. However, they also observe that the connection between 
persecution and murder-type acts "serves the ... purpose of limiting the court's jurisdiction to forms of 
persecution which are of an elevated objective dangerousness," id. at 73, which in my view is an 
important rationale, not merely a pointless vestige of the Nuremberg Charter. My argument differs 
slightly from theirs because in my view the point of this "connection requirement" is not limiting 
jurisdiction to acts of "an elevated objective dangerousness," but rather limiting jurisdiction to 
persecutions that form part of an attack. 
67. An American criminal lawyer will no doubt see analogies with the Racketeer Influenced 
and Corrupt Organizations (RICO) Act, which criminalizes multiple criminal offenses that form a 
"pattern" of racketeering activity, defined as at least two crimes on a specified list of offenses committed 
within ten years of each other. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(5) (2000). As elaborated by the Supreme Court, the 
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non-violent persecutions become crimes against humanity only when 
accompanied by crimes of the murder type, a context that distinguishes 
persecution from "mere" oppression.68 
In sum, if the "big idea" behind the crimes of the murder type is their 
cruelty and barbarity, the big idea behind crimes of the persecution type seems 
to be that severe non-violent indignities visited upon individuals offend 
against humanity when they form part of an attack on a group, recognizable as 
such because it includes crimes of the murder type. 
S. Crimes against humanity are inflicted on victims based on their 
membership in a population rather than their individual characteristics. 
Unlike crimes of the persecution type, Article 6( c) of the Nuremberg Charter 
attaches no requirement that crimes of the murder type be committed with 
discriminatory intent-that is, on the basis of the victim's political, racial, or 
religious group-and neither does the subsequent formulation in the ICTY 
statute.69 But this issue became a matter of controversy: in the Tadic 
judgment, the ICTY imposed a discriminatory intent requirement for all 
crimes against humanity notwithstanding the contrary language in the Statute, 
only to be reversed by the Appeals Chamber.7o The corresponding definition 
in the ICTR Statute does require discriminatory intent for crimes of both the 
crime of RICO consists of multiple individual crimes woven into a pattern characterized by continuity 
and relatedness. H. J. Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Tel., 492 U.S. 229, 250 (1989). 
68. Unfortunately, Article 7(1)(h) of the Rome Statute muddles this idea. Its phrase 
"persecution ... in connection with any act referred to in this paragraph" (i.e., persecution in connection 
with any crime against humanity) should properly read "persecution in connection with any act referred 
to in other subsections of this paragraph" (i.e., persecution in connection with any murder-type crime 
against humanity) in order to avoid a problem of self-reference. See Rome Statute, supra note 41, art. 
7(1 )(h). As commentators have noted, the current phrasing criminalizes not merely acts of persecution 
connected with murder-type acts, but also acts of persecution "in connection with ... any act of 
persecution." Machtheld Boot & Christopher K. Hall, Persecution, in COMMENTARY ON THE ROME 
STATUTE OF THE lNTERNA TIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: OBSERVERS' NOTES, ARTICLE BY ARTICLE 146, lSI 
(Otto Triffterer ed., 1999) [hereinafter TRIFFTERER COMMENTARY]. But criminalizing acts of persecution 
committed in connection with acts of persecution comes close to nonsense. Every act is committed in 
connection with itself, so the clause as written fails to delimit the class of persecutions in any way. 
Furthermore, the clause abandons the point of the rule of thumb, which is to criminalize persecutions 
only when they occur within a pattern of violent attacks. 
In proposing that attacks, persecutions, and crimes of apartheid must include crimes of the 
murder type-and proposing to read the Rome Statute this way-I am rejecting the assertion in the 
Akayesu judgment of ICTR Trial Chamber I that "[a]n attack may also be non violent in nature, like 
imposing a system of apartheid ... or exerting pressure on the popUlation to act in a particular manner .. 
. . " Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, para. 581 (Trial Chamber I, Int'l Crim. Trib. for 
Rwanda, Sept. 2, 1998), http://www.ictr.orgiENGLISHIcases/AkayesuljudgementlakayOOl.htm.It 
strikes me as naive to suppose that a system of apartheid could be established nonviolently; and 
"pressure on the population to act in a particular manner" is far too vague, and encompasses far too 
much, to constitute a crime against humanity. Under this definition, a system oflaws prohibiting the use 
of foreign languages in official documents and traffic signs, if designed to force immigrant groups to 
leam the native language of a country, could constitute crimes against humanity of the persecution type. 
Regardless of what one thinks of the wisdom of such language laws, labeling them crimes against 
humanity is absurd. 
69. Nuremberg Charter, supra note 5, art. 6(c), 59 Stat. at 1547, 82 U.N.T.S. at 288; ICTY 
Statute, supra note 37, art. 5. 
70. Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-I-T, paras. 644, 652 (Trial Chamber II, In!'1 Crim. 
Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia, May 7, 1997), http://www.un.org'/icty/tadic/trialc2/judgementltad-
tsj70507JT2-e.pdf; Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-I-T, paras. 281-305 (Appeals Chamber, Int'l 
Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia, July 15, 1999), http://www.un.orglicty/tadic/ 
appeal/judgementltad-aj990715e.pdf. See Simon Chesterman, An Altogether Different Order: Defining 
the Elements of Crimes Against Humanity, 10 DUKE J. COMPo & lNT'L L. 307, 311, 327-28 (2000). 
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murder and persecution types.71 However, the Rome Statute contains no such 
requirement, and consequently ICC prosecutors will not have to prove 
discriminatory intent to secure convictions for crimes against humanity of the 
murder type. 
Nevertheless, even though Article 6(c) imposes no discriminatory intent 
requirement on crimes of the murder type, it does require that they be 
committed against a "civilian population," a requirement that the ICTY, 
ICTR, and Rome Statutes all retain.72 For short, I will call this the "population 
requirement." It contains two important ideas. First, if we emphasize the word 
"civilian" in "civilian popUlation," the requirement serves to distinguish 
crimes against humanity from military battles against soldiers, which might 
otherwise formally qualify as crimes against humanity.73 Second, and more 
importantly for the present argument, if we emphasize the word "population," 
the requirement distinguishes crimes directed against a population from 
crimes directed against individual victims.74 That contrast implicitly means 
that those who launch crimes against humanity are targeting individuals on a 
non-individualized or collective basis. 75 
71. ICTR Statute, supra note 40, art. 3. France, in the Touvier decision, and Canada, in Finta, 
likewise read a discriminatory intent requirement into the definition of crimes against humanity. 
Prosecutor v. Touvier, CA Paris, Ie ch., Apr. 13, 1992, Gaz. Pal. 1992, I, 387, translated and reprinted 
in 100 INT'L L. REp. 338, 341 (1995) (holding that an individual "cannot be held to have committed a 
crime against humanity unless it is also established that he had a specific motivation to take part in the 
execution of a common plan by committing in a systematic manner inhuman acts or persecutions in the 
name of a State practicing a policy of ideological supremacy"); Regina v. Finta, [1994] 1 S.C.R. 701, 
814 (holding that "[w]hat distinguishes a crime against humanity from any other criminal offence under 
the Canadian Criminal Code is that the cruel and terrible actions which are essential elements of the 
offence were undertaken in pursuance of a policy of discrimination or persecution of an identifiable 
group or race''). But neither of these decisions represents the main line of thought about crimes against 
humanity, nor should they. Leila Sadat Wexler describes Touvier as a "blatant attempt[] to exonerate, in 
advance, the Vichy government from wrong," and notes that French commentators suspect that the 
decision also may have aimed to release French officials from potential liability for atrocities in Algeria. 
Leila Sadat Wexler, The Interpretation of the Nuremberg Principles by the French Court of Cassation: 
From Touvier to Barbie and Back Again, 32 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 289, 355 (1994). No such 
suspicion clouds the Finta decision, but the Court has, in my view, misread the plain language of the 
Canadian statute. The statute defines a crime against humanity as one of the specific enumerated acts 
"committed against any civilian population or any identifiable group of persons." Canadian Crim. Code, 
§ 7(3.76), quoted in Finta, 1 S.C.R. at 802. The Court bases its discriminatory intent requirement 
exclusively on the "identifiable group of persons" clause and in effect reads the "any civilian 
population" clause out of the statute. Of course, it is the latter clause, not the former, that appears in the 
principal international instruments defining crimes against humanity. Finta, 1 S.C.R. at 814. 
72. ICTY Statute, supra note 37, art. 5; ICTR Statute, supra note 40, art. 3; Rome Statute, 
supra note 41, art. 7. 
73. See Chesterman, supra note 70, at 322-26. In conversation, Paul Kahn has argued that the 
military/civilian distinction may no longer make sense, because in an age when enemy soldiers are as 
helpless as civilians to protect themselves against American air power, and pose no greater risk than 
civilians, blowing up a battalion of enemy soldiers seems morally indistinguishable from exterminating 
an equivalent population of civilians. See generally Paul W. Kahn, The Paradox of Riskless Warfare, in 
WAR AFTER SEPTEMBER 11, at 37 (Vema V. Gehring ed., 2002). I do not address this provocative 
argument here. However, it is worth noting that the jurisprudence of crimes against humanity counts 
resistance fighters and even soldiers as civilians when they are hors de combat. See, e.g., Federation 
Nationale v. Barbie, Casso Crim. Paris, Dec. 20,1985, J.C.P. 1986, II, 20655, translated and reprinted in 
78 lNT'L. L. REp. 136, 140; Kupreskic, supra note 66, para. 547. 
74. See Justice case, supra note 35, at 40. 
75. This holds true even if individual perpetrators of the crimes select some of their victims 
for more individualized reasons. For example, if a militiaman participating in an attack chooses his rape 
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Let me emphasize that the population requirement does not build 
discriminatory intent into the definition of crimes of the murder type. After 
all, an organization can target a civilian population for reasons having nothing 
to do with group-based animus-for example, because targeting the 
population is the simplest way to eradicate the resistance fighters living within 
it, or because the population occupies strategically or economically important 
territory that the oppressor wishes to seize. The perpetrators in such 
circumstances have no discriminatory intent: if the civilian population lived 
elsewhere, or if there were no resistance fighters, its members would not 
become victims of crimes against humanity. In the language of the Genocide 
Convention and the Rome Statute, the perpetrators in these examples are not 
targeting the group "as such.,,76 Or rather, although they may in fact be 
targeting the group as such, this is not a requirement for the crimes committed 
in the attack to count as crimes against humanity. 
In another sense, however, crimes against humanity share one morally 
disturbing telltale feature with genocide and other forms of group-based 
discrimination: the victims become victims for reasons having nothing to do 
with their individual characteristics. As in the crime of genocide, the victims 
are, in Samantha Power's telling words, "getting attacked for being (rather 
than for doing).'.77 In this latter sense, the population requirement in the 
definition of crimes of the murder type functions in parallel to the 
discriminatory intent requirement in the definition of crimes of the persecution 
type. Both requirements imply that at bottom crimes against humanity are 
launched against individuals because they belong to a targeted group. The 
difference between the two requirements is that the discriminatory intent 
requirement for persecutions and genocide limits itself to specific categories 
of groups (political, religious, racial, etc.), whereas a "population" can be any 
identifiable group. 
At first glance it may seem that drawing the distinction this way makes 
sense. Exterminations, enslavements, and other murder-type crimes are so 
intrinsically atrocious that they will count as crimes against humanity 
whenever they are inflicted on a population, regardless of the nature of the 
population, whereas persecutions that are not so atrocious will be crimes 
against humanity only when they are inflicted on "suspect classes," that is, 
victims for their looks rather than at random, the rape is still a crime against humanity because the attack 
in which he is participating is aimed at a population rather than individuals within it. Thus, I do not 
mean to suggest a motive requirement, such that a perpetrator must be shown to attack a victim because 
of group membership rather than individual enmity. The Rome Statute imposes no such mens rea 
requirement. Rome Statute, supra note 41, art. 7(1). But the attack itself is launched against a 
popUlation, not against individual victims--and, in any case, evidence about motive may well prove 
relevant in determining whether the crime was part of the attack rather than a crime of opportunity 
merely taking advantage of the lawless chaos produced by the attack. The latter is not a crime against 
humanity. Recall that "crimes against humanity ... must be strictly construed to exclude isolated cases 
of atrocities or persecutions." Justice case, supra note 35, at 47. In drafting the Rome Statute, "the 
concern had been to exclude isolated and random acts, and ordinary crimes under national law, from the 
ambit of crimes against humanity." Rodney Dixon, Article 7: Introduction/General Remarks, in 
TRIFFTERER COMMENTARY, supra note 69, at 123. 
76. Genocide Convention, supra note 44; Rome Statute, supra note 41, art. 6. 
77. POWER, supra note 44, at 36. 
HeinOnline -- 29 Yale J. Int’l L. 106 2004
106 THE YALE JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol. 29: 85 
groups whose commonalities have historically formed the basis for targeting 
by outsiders.78 
I wish to reject this line of thought, however, and argue that severe 
persecutions of any population, not just racial, religious, ethnic, and political 
groups, should be treated as crimes against humanity. In other words, just as 
crimes of the murder type are forbidden regardless of the specific nature of the 
victim population, crimes of the persecution type should be as well. Why 
should international criminal law give persecutors a free pass merely because 
the group they persecute consists of gays or intellectuals, rather than Jews or 
Tutsis? One familiar answer is that discrimination among groups is inevitable 
in any legal system because laws always classify people and fall with 
differential force on different groups. Only when the type of group suffering 
discrimination is a "suspect class"-American constitutional law's term for a 
class that has historically been a target of bigotry-can we be confident that 
the discrimination is invidious enough to be criminalized.79 
This reply fails, however, once we recall that discriminatory practices 
count as persecution-type crimes against humanity only when they form part 
of an attack on a group, accompanied by crimes of the murder type. All such 
attacks are invidious, and no discrimination in the course of such an attack can 
be rationalized away as the mere accidental by-product of an otherwise 
defensible legal classification. It follows that severe group-based persecutions 
in the course of a violent attack on the group-think, for example, of 
suppression of the group's native language or confiscation of group members' 
property-should count as crimes against humanity regardless of the nature of 
the group. The drafters of the Nuremberg, ICTY, and ICTR Statutes 
apparently missed this point. The drafters of the Rome Statute came closer 
because they expanded the list of "suspect classes" to include any group 
whose persecution is "universally recognized as impermissible under 
international law." The breadth of the latter category remains unclear. I am 
arguing that it should include any group at all-"any civilian population"-if 
78. Ratner and Abrams reflect this line of thought: "The bifurcation makes sense as an effort 
to derive notions of humanity. Certain acts are so heinous and destructive of a person's humanity that 
they per se are crimes. Others are crimes because the assault on the victim is based on political, racial, or 
religious grounds and thereby attacks humanity through some of the most basic groups into which it is 
organized." RATNER & ABRAMS, supra note 43, at 62-63. The "bifurcation" of which they speak is a 
bifurcation between murder-type crimes, for which there is no discriminatory intent requirement, and 
persecution-type crimes, for which there is. I am suggesting that the population requirement itself 
functions as a kind of discriminatory intent requirement, because it requires attacks on a popUlation 
rather than on individuals. But a bifurcation remains-between the broad population requirement for 
murder-type crimes and the narrower discriminatory intent requirement for persecution-type crimes-
which singles out specific categories of groups rather than criminalizing attacks against any "civilian 
popUlation." Unlike Ratner and Abrams, I deny that the bifurcation makes sense as an effort to derive 
notions of humanity. 
79. On the notion of a suspect classification in American constitutional law, see LAURENCE H. 
TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1465-521 (2d ed. 1988). I do not mean to suggest that the 
"suspect classes" recognized by the law of crimes against humanity coincide with the suspect classes in 
American constitutional law. I mean only that the root idea is the same: certain groups have so 
persistently been the objects of bigotry that any measures which selectively damage these groups must 
be supposed to arise from bigotry rather than the pursuit oflegitimate governmental ends. 
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the group is suffering an attack that includes crimes against humanity of the 
murder type.80 
To sum up, statutes defining crimes against humanity include the 
population requirement as an element of crimes of the murder type, and the 
discriminatory intent requirement as an element of crimes of the persecution 
type. Both of these specify, in effect, that a misdeed counts as a crime against 
humanity only when it forms part of an attack on a group or population, 
disregarding the individuality of group members. Until the Rome Statute, the 
two requirements differed in that the discriminatory intent requirement limited 
itself to national, ethnic, racial, religious, and political groups, while the 
population requirement included any group. The Rome Statute expands the 
categories of persecuted groups to include all groups whose unequal treatment 
in the course of a violent attack contravenes international law-and, if I am 
right, this development should bring the discriminatory intent requirement for 
persecution into parity with the population requirement. 
One final question is how large a group must be to constitute a 
population. Does the population requirement mean that the crimes are 
committed on a large "population-size" scale-in other words, that to qualify 
as crimes against humanity, they must be not just atrocities but mass 
atrocities?81 To support this reading of the population requirement, it might be 
argued that nothing less than mass horror justifies internationalizing the 
crimes and making them matters of worldwide rather than domestic concern. 
However, such reasoning ignores the main animating idea behind 
outlawing crimes against humanity, namely the interest of humankind in 
preventing and penalizing the horrors that governments inflict on their own 
people. To assert that only large-scale horrors warrant international interest 
reverts to the very fetishism of state sovereignty that the Nuremberg Charter 
rightly rejected. The assertion implies that small-scale, government-inflicted 
atrocities remain the business of national sovereigns-that a government 
whose agents, attacking a small community as a matter of deliberate policy, 
forcibly impregnate only one woman, or compel only one father to witness the 
torture of his child, retains its right to be left alone. These are profoundly 
cynical conclusions, and it will do no credit to the Rome Statute if the ICC 
accedes to them by interpreting the requirement of mUltiple acts to mean many 
acts. 82 Fortunately, "multiple" might be read to mean as few as two, in which 
case the damage the mUltiple act requirement inflicts need not be severe. 
Indeed, reading "multiple" to mean "two or more" in the Rome Statute's 
80. Rome Statute, supra note 41, art. 7(1)(h). The drafters of the Rome Statute had in mind 
groups persecuted on the basis of "social, economic and mental or physical disability grounds." Report 
of the Preparatory Committee on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court, United Nations 
Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an International Criminal Case, at 
26 n.15, U.N. Doc. NCONF. I 83/2/Add. I (1998). 
81. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Blaskic, Case No. IT-95-14-T, para. 205 (Trial Chamber I, Int'l 
Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia, Mar. 3, 2000), http://www.un.org/itcylblaskic/trialcll 
judgementlbla-tj00303e.pdf (stating that to count as "systematic" an attack must contain crimes 
committed on a very large scale). 
82. Rome Statute, supra note 41, art. 7(2)(a) (interpreting the population requirement to 
require "the multiple commission of acts"). 
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formulation has the virtue of making clear that even small-scale atrocities and 
persecutions can be crimes against humanity. 
Furthermore, the Rome Statute, like the ICTR statute, stipulates that the 
attack on civilian populations must be "widespread or systematic.,,83 The 
word "or" signals that systematic attacks can be crimes against humanity 
whether or not they are widespread.84 Any body-count requirement threatens 
to debase the idea of international human rights and draw us into what I once 
called "charnel house casuistry"-legalistic arguments about how many 
victims it takes to make a "population.,,85 No doubt political prudence will 
make outsiders reluctant to intervene against any but large-scale atrocities. 
But the question of whether crimes against humanity call for a humanitarian 
military intervention to halt them is both conceptually and practically different 
from the question of whether to charge someone with crimes against humanity 
and try him. 86 To decline to prosecute a perpetrator because his attack on a 
civilian population had "only" a few victims diminishes the value of the 
victims. 
It is time to summarize this discussion of the five distinguishing 
characteristics of crimes against humanity. Crimes against humanity are 
international crimes committed by politically organized groups acting under 
color of policy, consisting of the most severe and abominable acts of violence 
and persecution, and inflicted on victims because of their membership in a 
population or group rather than their individual characteristics. Is there a core 
intuition that this body of "common law" expresses? It seems clear that the 
answer is yes. The leitmotif binding together all the legal features is that of 
politics gone horribly wrong. The crimes are committed by organized political 
groups against other groups, typically within the same society. Rivalry and 
antagonism is normal among groups in virtually every society, but crimes 
against humanity occur when normal rivalry and antagonism "go supernova" 
83. [d. art. 7(1) (emphasis added). 
84. Systematicity refers to the element of coordinated planning, which in my view can exist 
even if the attack succeeds in hanning only one person (perhaps because the assailants are swiftly 
repelled by defenders). Here I disagree with Ambos and Wirth, who believe that to speak of an attack on 
a "population" "simply requires that a mUltiplicity of victims exists." Ambos & Wirth, supra note 33, at 
21. 
85. David Luban, The Legacies of Nuremberg, in LEGAL MODERNISM 335, 343-44 (1994). 
Simon Chesterman is likewise skeptical of what he calls "the gruesome calculus of establishing a 
minimum number of victims necessary to make an attack 'widespread. ", Chesterman, supra note 70, at 
315. It should be noted that debates over "the numbers problem" have persisted for decades in 
discussions of the law of genocide because of its requirement of specific intent to destroy a civilian 
popUlation "in whole or in part." How big must a "part" be? See POWER, supra note 44, at 65-66; 
SCHABAS, supra note 45, at 230-40. The U.S. Senate, in ratifying the Genocide Convention, included an 
understanding that "part" means "substantial part," and the implementing legislation defines "substantial 
part" as "a part of a group of such numerical significance that the destruction or loss'of that part would 
cause the destruction of the group as a viable entity within the nation of which such group is a part." 18 
U.S.C. § 1091(a), § 1093(8) (2000). In my view, debates over "the numbers problem" for the crime of 
genocide make a certain amount of sense given the defmition of genocide, because the character of the 
crime as an assault on a group "as such" inevitably invites the question of how large a part of the group 
must be the target of destructive intention for the intention to count as aiming at the group. My point 
about "charnel house casuistry" is that parallel questions about crimes against humanity are 
wrongheaded and even grotesque. 
86. For a discussion of the moral requirements for humanitarian military intervention, see 
Luban, supra note 60, at 88-90. 
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and explode into violence and extraordinary persecution. Their character as 
international crimes reflects the idea that sovereignty-the talisman states 
invoke to shield their own political processes from interference by others-
should no longer be permitted to protect politics that have become so dreadful. 
Thus, all five characteristics of crimes against humanity reflect the same basic 
idea, namely that political infernos generate a distinctive evil that the law 
must condemn. The next task is to put this analysis to work answering the 
questions raised in Part I, namely how these deeds violate humanness, and 
why they offend against all humankind. 
III. CRIMES AGAINST HUMANNESS AND THE POLITICAL ANIMAL 
A. Aspects of Humanity 
Crimes against humanity cut deep; they are the worst thing that human 
beings do to each other. Intuitively, they seem to violate humanness itself. The 
question is how. 
What makes this question so pressing is that the very idea of 
"humanness itself," what Richard Rorty derisively calls "Man's Glassy 
Essence," seems deeply suspect.87 The Judaeo-Christian notion of man created 
in God's image, like the metaphysical concept of an immaterial, immortal 
soul, is too parochial and too contestable to anchor our intuitions about what 
makes humans special and gives us special value-all the more so if these 
intuitions are supposed to be shared across confessions and cultures. Indeed, it 
seems likely that any metaphysical theory of humanness will prove far more 
debatable than the intuitions it is supposed to anchor. For that reason, it would 
be a mistake to seek an answer to our question through metaphysical 
investigation. Instead, we should seek the idea in the same set of intuitions 
that informs the law of crimes against humanity. That is, we should seek the 
image of humanness reflected in the law. 
Recall the five defining features of crimes against humanity (presented 
in altered order for convenience in the subsequent discussion): 
(1) Crimes against humanity are inflicted on victims based on their 
group membership rather than their individual characteristics; 
(2) Crimes against humanity are crimes committed against fellow 
nationals as well as foreigners; 
(3) Crimes against humanity are international crimes, and their 
criminality overrides state sovereignty; 
87. RICHARD RORTY, PHILOSOPHY AND THE MIRROR OF NATIJRE 42-43 (1980). Rorty 
explicitly connects his skepticism about philosophical anthropology with the subject of human rights in 
Richard Rorty, Human Rights. Rationality. and Sentimentality, in ON HUMAN RIGHTS III, 114-19 
(Stephen Shute & Susan Hurley eds., 1993). 
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(4) Crimes against humanity are committed by politically 
organized groups acting under color of policy; 
(5) Crimes against humanity include only the most severe and 
abominable acts of violence and persecution. 
What image of humanness do these five features capture? I shall argue that the 
specific fact about human beings most central to the law of crimes against 
humanity is our character as political animals. To forestall misunderstanding: 
although the phrase is classical, the explication that I shall offer is not. 
To describe humans as political animals does not imply yet another 
picture of Man's Glassy Essence competing with the metaphysical theories of 
soul-substance, creation in God's image, or other familiar attempts to nail 
down what it is that differentiates us from the rest of nature. We ought to be 
skeptical of claims that anyone feature can be identified as the essential 
quality that makes us special. Many things can lay claim to being central 
aspects of the human condition, in the sense that to imagine human life 
without them is to imagine something alien and in some cases repugnant. 
Philosophers over the centuries have focused attention on rationality, on 
language use, on our capacity to transform nature through artifice (homo 
faber), on autonomy and free will, on individuality, on awareness of our own 
finitude and mortality,88 and even on such seemingly incidental features of 
humanity as playfulness89 or our capacities to laugh and cry.90 Nietzsche slyly 
inverted the classical philosophers' attempts to discover an immutable human 
essence when he wrote that man is the as-yet-undetermined animal,91 and in 
so doing he provided an especially memorable determination of the human 
animal: an image of protean fluidity to add to the gallery of philosophical 
anthropologies. The dangers of this kind of speculation are obvious-
pretentiousness, glibness, banality-but when they avoid these dangers, this 
multitude of philosophical musings on the human condition has plenty to 
teach us even if none can really stake a credible claim to defining the unique 
human essence (because there is no such thing). They shed light on aspects, 
not essences, of humanness. 
In this respect, it seems possible to find crimes corresponding to various 
aspects of humanness, and in an important sense these would all be "crimes 
against humanity." If, for example, we focus on rationality as a defining 
feature of humanity, it would be a crime against humanity to kidnap people 
and deliberately subject them to brain surgery that destroys their reason. 
Opponents of human cloning sometimes envision a science-fiction dystopia of 
narcissists and megalomaniacs populating the world with hosts of their own 
88. See generally MARTIN HElDEGGER, BEING AND TIME (John Macquarrie & Edward 
Robinson trans., Harper & Row 1962) (1927). 
89. See generally JOHAN HUIZINGA, HOMO LUDENS (The Beacon Press 1955) (1950). 
90. See generally HELMUTH PLESSNER, LAUGHING AND CRYING (James Spencer Churchill & 
Marjorie Grene trans., Northwestern Univ. Press 1970) (1961). 
91. FRIEDERICH NIETZSCHE, BEYOND GOOD AND EVIL § 62, at 74 (Walter Kaufinann trans., 
Vintage Books 1989) (1886). 
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genetic replicas.92 That would make human cloning a "crime against 
humanity" if we regard genotypic uniqueness as a defining aspect of 
humanity. Plainly, these are not the crimes against humanity defined in 
international legal instruments. The interpretation offered here is that the 
crimes defined by propositions (1) through (5) above violate aspects of 
humanness pertaining to our political nature. 
B. The Political Animal 
To declare that we are political animals is not meant as a metaphysical 
speculation. On the contrary, the observation that we are political animals is a 
wholly naturalistic one, anchored at bottom in common observation and 
common sense. It begins with the fact that we are just one kind of animal 
among many in the natural order. Some animals-tigers, bears, and 
butterflies, for example-lead an essentially solitary existence. They come 
together to mate, but they do not travel in packs or flocks, and outside the 
reproductive process they live alone. Others-the ants and the termites-are 
entirely social. Individual insects removed from the colony quickly die, and 
indeed they barely count as individuals, except in the arithmetic sense of 
being numerically distinct from one another. Human beings occupy a mid-
point between these extremes.93 We live in groups, but we are not social 
92. See, e.g., George J. Annas et aL, Protecting the Endangered Human: Toward an 
International Treaty Prohibiting Cloning and Inheritable Alterations, 28 AM. J. L. & MED. 151, 153-54 
(2002). See also The Science and Ethics of Human Cloning: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Sci., 
Technology and Space of the Sen. Comm. on Commerce, Sci., and Transp., 108th Congo (2003), 
http://coromerce.senate.gov/pdflkassOI2903.pdf (statement of Leon Kass, Chairman of the President's 
Corom. on Bioethics, describing cloning to produce people as a threat to personal identity); Leon Kass, 
The Meaning of Life - In the Laboratory, PUB. INT., Winter 2002, at 38 (likening human cloning to the 
"Brave New World," from ALDOUS HUXLEY, BRAVE NEW WORLD (Harper & Row 1969) (1946»; Rick 
Weiss, Free To Be Me: Would-Be Cloners Pushing the Debate, WASH. POST, May 12, 2002, at Al 
(describing cloning as "the chance to propel one's genetic self into the future undiluted by another"). 
93. The variety of animal social behavior is enormous, and the evolution of social behavior in 
animals is a vast and fascinating subject explored by sociobiology. See generally EDWARD O. WILSON, 
SOCIOBIOLOGY: THE NEW SYNTHESIS (1975). Patterns range from solitary life through herd or pack 
behavior to "parasociality" (several families cooperating) and fully colonial or "eusocial" behavior. 
Eusociality "means that two or more generations overlap in the society, adults take care of the young, 
and, most importantly, adults are divided into reproductive and nonreproductive castes, in other words 
queens and kings versus workers." BERT HOLLDOBLER & EDWARD O. WILSON, THE ANTS I (1990). 
Although eusocial behavior occurs only in termites, ants, and some bees and wasps, these turn out to be 
the dominant insects on the planet, in the sense that they compose three-fourths of the total insect 
biomass. Id. A colony of eusocial insects consists of a single vast family: the myriad individuals in each 
caste come from the eggs of a single queen or a small group of related queens. In this sense, the sociality 
of insects is very different from the sociality of, for example, a monkey colony or a herd of sheep, which 
will include multiple families. However, one evolutionary route to eusociality among wasps begins with 
several females from the same generation cooperating in a single colony, with one female eventually 
dominating the others and becoming a de facto queen. /d. at 27. This pattern of parasociality helps to 
verify the idea that animals can be ranged on a continuum from true solitaries (which include certain 
kinds of wasps), through parasociality, to full sociality. On the evolution of eusociality, see id. at 27-30, 
184-85. The fundamental mechanism for the evolution of social behavior seems to be kin selection: 
propagating one's genes by advancing the interests of relatives as well as of one's self and one's 
offspring. Id. at 180. On the evidence for and against kin selection as the driving mechanism for the 
evolution ofeusocial insects, with a cautious endorsement of the theory, see id. at 184-96. 
Obviously, the naturalistic outlook adopted in this Article assumes that human sociality is an 
evolved trait that will be explained by the same kind of naturalistic arguments that are used in animal 
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animals in the selfless way that ants are social. 94 Although communitarian 
theorists often insist that groups constitute our individual identity, their claim 
is grossly misleading if we take it literally. As a metaphysical thesis, it implies 
the absurd consequence that two people involved in identical social 
relationships are literally the same person; and as a natural observation, it 
erroneously lumps us together with the bees and termites, wholly lacking in 
individuality.95 But, unlike the bees and termites, human beings are 
individuals, and each of us recognizes himself or herself as an individual. This 
fact--call it self-awareness-lies at the basis of what the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights calls "the inherent dignity" of each human 
b · 96 emg. 
For us-self-aware individuals with interests of our own, who 
nevertheless have a natural need to live in groups-sociability has an 
ambiguous character. It is always at once a necessity and a threat.97 Kant 
speaks of mankind's "unsociable sociability," the "propensity to enter into 
society, bound together with a mutual opposition which constantly threatens 
to break up the society.,,98 "Unsociable sociability" seems like a happy phrase 
sociobiology. But great caution is in order. In recent years, many legal scholars have fallen in love with 
human sociobiology as a way of explaining moral and social phenomena without appealing to moral 
laws or political choices. It is important, however, not to oversell the explanatory power of human 
sociobiology. For important cautions on this issue, see generally PHILIP KITCHER, VAULTING AMBITION: 
SOCIOBIOLOGY AND THE QUEST FOR HUMAN NATURE (1985); Alan Gibbard, Sociobiology, in A 
COMPANION TO CONTEMPORARY POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 597 (Robert E. Goodin & Philip Pettit eds., 
1993). My own naturalism in this section is not meant to imply a grand reductionism of complex human 
aspirations to aspects of inclusive fitness (that is, fitness that includes kin selection). Neither is it meant 
to endorse dubious analogies between animal and human behavior designed to show that unappealing 
human traits are hard-wired into us and therefore beyond our power to change or control. 
94. In this respect, the view offered here quibbles with Kant. In his Anthropology, Kant 
writes, "Man was not meant to belong to a herd like the domesticated animals, but rather, like the bee, to 
belong to a hive community. It is necessary for him always to be a member of some civil society." 
IMMANUEL KANT, ANTHROPOLOGY FROM A PRAGMATIC POINT OF VIEW 247 (Victor Lyle Dowdell trans., 
S. Ill. Univ. Press 1978) (1798). Like Kant, I mean to emphasize that the natural condition of humanity 
is social living, but Kant's hive metaphor is not a happy one because it carries misleading overtones of 
natural hierarchies and caste divisions that are actually antithetical to Kant's fundamental egalitarianism 
and cosmopolitanism. If an animal metaphor is really called for, the herd seems far better than the hive. 
95. For an elaboration of this critique of communitarianism's theory of the self, see David 
Luban, The Self: Metaphysical Not Political, 1 LEGAL THEORY 401 (1995). 
96. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A, pmbl., U.N. Doc. N810 (Dec. 
10, 1948), http://www.un.orglOverview/rights.html. 
97. One might say that communitarians notice only the necessity of social living, whereas 
contractarians (who model society on contractual agreements among self-interested individuals who can 
identify their own interests exogenously to the life of the group) notice only the threat. Fans of critical 
legal studies will note some similarity between my remarks here and the notion of a "fundamental 
contradiction" in human nature between individuality and sociability. See Duncan Kennedy, The 
Structure of Blackstone's Commentaries, 28 BUFF. L. REv. 205, 211-13 (1979). Roberto Unger calls 
attention to "the problem of solidarity," namely that "[ w]e present to one another both an unlimited need 
and an unlimited danger, and the very resources by which we attempt to satisfy the former aggravate the 
latter." ROBERTO MANGABEIRA UNGER, PASSION: AN ESSAY ON PERSONALITY 20 (1984). More 
poetically, Unger observes that "people ... live in mutual longing and jeopardy." Id. at 95. 
98. Immanuel Kant, Idea for a Universal History from a Cosmopolitan Point of View (1784), 
reprinted in ON HISTORY 15 (Lewis White Beck ed. & trans., 1963). The phrase "unsociable sociability" 
translates Kant's "ungesellige Geselligkeit." Kant elaborates the idea behind this phrase in one of his 
least read works, the Anthropology, in a section entitled "Basic Features Concerning the Description of 
the Human Species' Character." KANT, supra note 94, at 247-51. "The character of the species, as is 
well known from the experience of all times and all nations, is as follows .... [Human beings] cannot 
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to describe why we are not so much social animals as political animals. For 
politics is the art of organizing society so that the "mutual opposition which 
constantly threatens to break up the society" does not tum our "propensity to 
enter into society" into a suicide pact. Politics is as much about individual 
self-assertion against groups as it is about group solidarity. Only individuals 
with unsociable natures need to be bound by political rather than natural 
bonds, but only individuals whose nature is sociable can be bound by political 
bonds. Human beings are both, and as I use it, the phrase "political animal" is 
nothing more than convenient shorthand for recognizing this double nature of 
ours. To call us political animals underlines a fundamental fact of life: we 
need to live in groups, but groups pose a perpetual threat to our individuality 
and individual interests. Hence, human existence involves a perpetual 
negotiation over the terms of our own belonging to society-a belonging that 
we need and dread. Social life, like individuality, comes naturally to human 
beings; but there is nothing natural about the specific terms of social life, and 
calling us "political animals" signifies the necessity of some form of artificial 
coercive organization together with the contingency and variability among 
. I fi 99 partlcu ar orms. 
It is possible to couch this description of humankind in game-theoretic 
or rational-choice terms, which some readers may find more perspicuous. As 
students of simple, paradigmatic games-such as the prisoner's dilemma, the 
chicken game, or the assurance game-have long understood, individual 
rationality may conflict with collective rationality. In the prisoner's dilemma, 
for example, defection is the individually rational strategy, whereas mutual 
cooperation is the collectively rational strategy-a fact that all players can, in 
principle, recognize, even though they recognize as well that their rationality 
dooms them to mutual defection. The basic problem of social living is, in 
these terms, figuring out some way that rational individuals can be gotten to 
do what is collectively rational. The simplest mechanism seems to be an 
external enforcer who alters the payoffs by making defection a worse option 
than cooperation. In the schematic world of game theory, the enforcer 
represents the political system or state, and the tension between individual and 
be without peaceful coexistence, and yet they cannot avoid continuous disagreement with one another." 
[d. at 249. 
99. Kant concludes the Anthropology by observing that we strive "to advance constantly from 
the evil to the good," and thus that "our intention in general is good, but achievement is difficult because 
we cannot expect to reach our goal by the free consent of individuals, but only through progressive 
organization of the citizens of the earth .... " KANT, supra note 94, at 251. That is why politics is 
necessary. The argument that "political animal" and "social animal" are not at a\1 synonymous comes 
from HANNAH ARENDT,THE HUMAN CONDITION 22-28 (\ 958). 
Although I emphasize the Kantian notion of "unsociable sociability," J. B. Schneewind finds the 
same idea in the work of the founder of intemationallaw, Hugo Grotius. Schneewind describes "the 
Grotian problematic" in terms very much like Kant's: "We are self-preserving and quarrelsome beings; 
but we are also sociable. These two aspects of human nature make the problem of maintaining the social 
order quite definite: how are quarrelsome but socia\1y minded beings like ourselves to live together?" J. 
B. SCHNEEWIND, THE INVENTION OF AUTONOMY: A HISTORY OF MODERN MORAL PHILOSOPHY 72 
(1998). The phrase "Grotian problematic" appears in id. at 70, and Schneewind later points out the echo 
of the Grotian problematic in Kant's writings, id. at 519-20. 
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collective rationality represents "unsociable sociability," the feature of our 
existence that makes us political animals as well as social animals. 100 
C. "Unsociable Sociability" Versus Group Diversity; Crimes Against 
Humanity Versus Genocide 
Earlier I presented an argument offered by Hannah Arendt: what makes 
crimes against humanity an offense against humanness is their assault on 
human diversity, the "characteristic of the 'human status' without which the 
very words 'mankind' or 'humanity' would be devoid of meaning."IOI More 
recently, Michael Ignatieffhas echoed and expanded Arendt's argument: 
What it means to be a human being, what defines the very identity we share as a species, 
is the fact that we are differentiated by race, religion, ethnicity, and individual difference. 
These differentiations define our identities both as individuals and as a species. No other 
species differentiates itself in this individualized abundance. A sense of otherness, of 
distinctness, is the very basis of our consciousness of our individuality, and this 
consciousness, based in difference, is a constitutive element of what it is to be a human 
being. To attack any of these differences-to round up women because they are women, 
Jews because they are Jews, whites because they are whites, blacks because they are 
blacks, gays because they are gay-is to attack the shared element that makes us what we 
are as a species. 102 
Weare now in a position to see what is right in this argument and what 
is not. What is right is that group diversity accounts for half of the double 
nature of humanness represented in the conception of us as political animals. 
A crucial fact about human groups is their plurality-the fact that we are born 
into families, communities, ethnicities, religious confessions, societies-and 
their inherent diversity-the fact that human groups vary widely in their form 
and content. Diversity does not logically follow from plurality: beehives of a 
single species of bees are plural-there are thousands of them-but they are 
all more or less interchangeable. 103 For that matter, individual diversity does 
not follow from plurality either. One could imagine a race of clones who all 
possess individual self-awareness but display no other meaningful differences. 
However, the diversity of human beings as well as human groups is a natural 
fact. 
What is also right is that individual diversity-or, more simply, 
individuality-composes the other half of the political animal's double nature. 
Lastly, what is right is that individual diversity lies at the root of group 
diversity. The fact that human groups vary widely in their form and content, 
100. It may be objected that a state is not invariably necessary to solve the problem posed by 
individual rationality. The classic defense of this anarchist view in game theory can be found in 
MICHAEL TAYLOR, THE POSSIBILITY OF COOPERATION (1987). Taylor demonstrates the possibility of 
uncoerced cooperation under certain conditions. But in my view, the conditions Taylor discovered-
roughly, that a sufficiently large number of people are conditional cooperators, who will cooperate if 
they know that enough other people are also conditional cooperators-are so unrealistic because of the 
level of mutual transparency and knowledge they require that his argument for the possibility of 
cooperation is equally an argument for its improbability. 
101. ARENDT, supra note 8, at 268-69. 
102. Michael Ignatieff, Lemkin 's Word, THE NEW REpUBLIC, Feb. 26, 2001, at 27-28. 
103. Vernon notes the important distinction between plurality and diversity. Vernon, supra note 
3, at 241. 
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their languages and customs and religions, derives from the differences among 
individual human beings, who leave their personal imprints on groups to 
which they belong even as they imperfectly transmit the imprints left by their 
ancestors. 
What is wrong in Ignatieffs argument is the thought that individual 
diversity (individuality) can be meaningfully lumped together with group 
diversity into a single category of diversity, and hence that diversity alone is 
"what it means to be a human being." We are indeed, in Ignatieffs words, 
"differentiated by race, religion, ethnicity, and individual difference,,,I04 but 
individual difference belongs in a category distinct from the three group-based 
differentiations Ignatieff enumerates. Group diversity and individuality are 
very different; they are not simply two different forms of diversity. As 
individuals, we are not only differentiated by race, religion, and ethnicity; we 
are also differentiated from all other individuals, including those who share 
our race, religion, or ethnicity. Thus, when Ignatieff writes that "[t]hese 
differentiations define our identities ... as individuals,,,lo5 he is mistaken ifby 
"these differentiations" he means differentiations into racial, religious, or 
ethnic groups. Individual identity can never be reduced to the nexus of groups 
to which one belongs; indeed, our nature as political, rather than social, 
animals derives from the fact that our groups often pose an existential threat to 
individual identity. Alternatively, if Ignatieff means that individual 
differentiation defines our identity as individuals, his proposition becomes a 
tautology. Both Arendt and Ignatieff err when they use words like "diversity" 
and "differentiation" to define "the human status," because these words 
equivocate between the diversity of individuals and the diversity of groupS.I06 
104. Ignatieff, supra note 102 
105. [d. 
106. Their arguments reflect a more serious fallacy, namely treating "diversity" in the sense of 
"difference from other things" as a property of individuals, be they individual persons or individual 
groups, rather than a relation among individuals. This is the fallacy of inferring from the statement 
''They are a diverse couple" that "He is a diverse person, and she is a diverse person." Put this starkly, 
the error seems too elementary to miss: the word "diversity" in the premise refers to the differences 
between the members of the couple, whereas the conclusion fallaciously distributes "diversity" to each 
member. But the error can also occur more subtly. Arendt commits this fallacy when she writes: 
"Everything that exists among a plurality of things is not simply what it is, in its identity, but it is also 
different from others; this being different belongs to its very nature." HANNAH ARENDT, THE LIFE OF 
THE MIND: THINKING 183 (1978) (emphasis added). To define "otherness from the rest of the world" as 
part of the "nature" of a thing confuses a merely formal fact-that every thing is identical to itself and 
not identical to things other than itself-with a claim about a thing's substantive properties. It is this 
metaphysical view, I fear, that underlies Arendt's identification of "human diversity" as "a characteristic 
of the human status." ARENDT, supra note 8, at 269. Ignatieff brushes against the same fallacy in the 
final sentence of the passage quoted above: "A sense of otherness, of distinctness, is the very basis of 
our consciousness of our individuality, and this consciousness, based in difference, is a constitutive 
element of what it is to be a human being." Ignatieff, supra note 102, at 28. A sense of distinctness-of 
being this person, me, and not someone else-is not the same as a sense of othemess-of not being that 
person, as though identity consists only in the negative property of "difference from others" rather than 
in positive attributes that make me who I am. 
Richard Vernon offers a different criticism of Arendt's argument. He argues that when Arendt 
promises a defense of diversity, she really succeeds in delivering only a defense of plurality. Vernon 
points out that in Arendt's overall political theory, it is not the diversity of human groups that makes 
them valuable, but "the fact that they are self-constructed and serve important universal purposes." 
Vernon, supra note 3, at 241. I am not so sure. For Arendt, the fact of human individuality connects 
closely with creativity-the possibility of imagining the world different than it is and acting to bring that 
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"Unsociable sociability"-sociality coupled with individuality-keeps the 
distinction straight by reminding us that the political animal has a double 
nature within which association and individuality cannot be reduced to each 
other. It seems clear that Arendt and Ignatieff focus on the value of group 
diversity because their topic is not crimes against humanity in general, but 
h th 'fi' f 'd 107 rat er e specl lC cnme 0 genocl e. 
Why should this make a difference? I pointed out earlier that genocide 
targets groups "as such," that is, groups taken as collective entities. Arendt's 
and Ignatieff s arguments make sense as efforts to explain the special value of 
collective entities over and above the value of the individuals composing 
them. They mean to argue that killing off an entire human grouping harms all 
of humanity-humanity taken collectively, not severally-because the human 
species is characterized by an "individualized abundance,,108 of groups. As we 
saw earlier, diversity among groups is an aspect of humanity, and genocide is 
a crime against this aspect of humanity. 
However, the trouble with regarding group diversity as the defining 
feature of humanity is that it ignores the value of individuals apart from the 
groups to which they belong. Arendt and Ignatieff obviously realize this, as 
evidenced by their interest in showing that diversity is central to the life of 
each of us as well as all of us. But, if I am right, the gap between individual 
and collective cannot be papered over. As I shall now argue, this double 
nature as individuals and group members is precisely what crimes against 
humanity assault, and precisely what makes them crimes against humanness. I 
verify this by showing how the political nature of human beings underlies the 
five defining features of crimes against humanity identified earlier in the 
Article. 
IV. CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY AS POLITICS GONE CANCEROUS 
The point comes out most plainly when we consider the first item in our 
catalogue of legal features of crimes against humanity: crimes against 
humanity are inflicted on victims based on their membership in a population 
rather than their individual characteristics. The crimes therefore possess a 
double character: they simultaneously assault individuals and groups. More 
than that, crimes against humanity do not merely assault individuals. All 
crimes against persons do that. Crimes against humanity violate one of the 
political animal's two defining characteristics: individuality, respect for which 
difference about. In Arendt's vocabulary, freedom arises from natality. Her defense of plurality connects 
very closely with the value she places on human creativity, that is, diversity. But Vernon is surely right 
that even if human groups were as alike as beehives or anthills, it would still be a crime against 
humanity for one hive to exterminate another. 
107. Genocide is Ignatieffs explicit topic in the article from which I have quoted, and Arendt's 
topic is the Holocaust. Arendt uses the term "crime against humanity" to refer to genocide, which is 
perfectly natural in everyday usage, but in legal terms confuses two distinct crimes with different 
elements. ARENDT, supra note 8, at 268-69,273. 
108. Ignatieff, supra note 102, at 28. 
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requires that even my enemies must attack me because of who I am, not 
merely because of what group I belong to. 109 
Similarly, by directing the attack against groups, crimes against 
humanity violate the second of the political animal's defining characteristics: 
the fact that to be human is to live in groups with other humans. Living in 
some group or another is a human inevitability, and attacking people because 
of their membership in a group violates humanity as much as attacking them 
because they breathe would. By attacking individuals on the basis of their 
group affiliation and targeting groups and populations through their individual 
members, crimes against humanity assault humanness as such, provided that 
we understand "humanness as such" in terms of the political animal. 
Crimes against humanity are committed against groups or populations; 
they are also committed by groups-by states or state-like organizations. This 
is another important way in which crimes against humanity may be 
understood as violations of our nature as political animals. Crimes against 
humanity are not just horrible crimes; they are horrible political crimes, 
crimes of politics gone cancerous. 110 The legal category of "crimes against 
humanity" recognizes the special danger that governments, which are 
supposed to protect the people who live in their territory, will instead murder 
them, enslave them, and persecute them, transforming their homeland from a 
haven into a killing field. 111 As political animals, we have no alternative to 
living in groups; and groups have no alternative to residing in territories under 
someone or another's political control. For a state to attack individuals and 
their groups solely because the groups exist and the individuals belong to 
them transforms politics from the art of managing our unsociable sociability 
into a lethal threat. Criminal politics bears the precise relationship to healthy 
politics that cancer bears to healthy tissue. 
This point, I think, captures the significance of the next three defining 
features of crimes against humanity as the law understands them: that the 
crimes are characteristically committed against fellow nationals, or others in 
territory under the perpetrators' control; that state sovereignty provides no 
shield from culpability; and that the crimes are committed by organized 
groups. To criminalize acts of a government toward groups in its own 
jurisdiction, and thus to pierce the veil of sovereignty through international 
criminal law, is tantamount to recognizing that the cancerous, autopolemic 
character of crimes against humanity reRresents a perversion of politics, and 
thus a perversion of the political animal. 12 
109. Even the mugger attacks me for my wallet, not my skin color. The hate criminal attacks 
me for my skin color, and that makes him a proto-criminal against humanity. Put him in an organized 
political group attacking my race systematically, and he becomes the paradigm case of a criminal against 
humanity. 
110. This idea receives important development in Vernon's work. Vernon, supra note 3, at 242, 
244-45. What I call "politics gone cancerous" Vernon describes as "an abuse of state power involving a 
systematic inversion of the jurisdictional resources of the state." [d. at 242. The systematic inversion he 
refers to is that "powers that justify the state are, perversely, instrumentalized by it." [d. at 245. 
III. In Vernon's words, "territoriality is transformed from a refuge to a trap." [d. 
112. Understanding that crimes against humanity represent a perversion of politics may help us 
come to terms with their novelty. In the great multiethnic empires of the past-the Roman, Han, 
Ottoman, and Austro-Hungarian empires-the imperial power subjugated other peoples, but the aim was 
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To describe autopolemic political violence as a perversion of politics is 
not uncontroversial; it represents a fundamentally liberal vision of politics. On 
one longstanding view of politics, violence, massacre, and persecution 
represent something close to the essence of politics, rather than a perversion 
of it. Machiavelli aimed to teach princes how not to be good and insisted that 
a prince is always better off being feared than loved.113 The historical 
examples Machiavelli used to illustrate his argument, drawn from classical 
antiquity as well as from the Italy of his own day, consist almost entirely of 
shocking treacheries, strangulations, and massacres. In the same vein, 
Shakespeare's histories, together with Julius Caesar and Macbeth, dramatize 
the most typical move in politics: the seizure of power through vile murder. 
The Greek city-states were perpetually riven by stasis (civil war); 114 and even 
the Roman Republic, which hoped to pacify politics by forbidding active-duty 
military leaders from setting foot within the city, dissolved in a century of 
civil war and violence well before Caesar defied the ban and crossed the 
Rubicon. 115 Max Weber painted a less bloody but equally bleak picture of the 
absolute incompatibility of politics and morality in Politics as a Vocation. 116 
The "problem of dirty hands"-the recognition that no one can expect to win 
and retain political power without getting their hands dirty-is a theme that 
has preoccupied many writers. 117 Carl Schmitt, whose views I examine in 
to rule them, not to persecute or extenninate them. Although the Romans and Ottomans were often 
harsh, and nearly always exploitative, they generally adopted policies of toleration toward their ethnic 
minorities; every school child knows that the Romans incorporated foreigners' deities into the Pantheon. 
One suspects that these imperial powers would have found the very idea of exterminating or expelling 
minority ethnic groups baffling. Why eliminate sources of your own wealth and power? (I do not mean 
to deny that under fanatical rulers extenninations and expulsions did sometimes happen.) 
Matters were different in the age of imperialism, when African conquest combined imperial 
ambition with the poison of European racism. At that time, figures such as Belgium's King Leopold and 
the Gennan General von Trotha, who committed the twentieth century's first genocide in Gennan South 
West Africa, proved perfectly willing to combine conquest with extennination. See, e.g., ADAM 
HOCHSCHILD, KING LEOPOLD'S GHOST: A STORY OF GREED, TERROR, AND HEROISM IN COLONIAL 
AFRICA (1998) (describing Belgian colonialization of the Congo); MAMDANI, supra note 39, at 11-12 
(describing von Trotha's as the first genocide of the twentieth century). But perhaps the true origin of 
crimes against humanity lies in another transfonnation. Tolerant as they may have been of diversity, the 
multi ethnic imperial powers never appear to have entertained the contemporary idea that all groups are 
created equal. Barbarians were not equal to Romans, and dhimmis were not equal to Muslims. hnperial 
toleration was, oddly enough, a product of imperial condescension. Once the ideal of group equality 
took hold, however, diversity became a source of cultural and political threat rather than of wealth. 
Minorities were newly prepared to assert their own way of life, and that made them enemies of the 
regime. At that point, the idea of using the state to persecute minorities grew more compelling. Ignatieff 
perceptively notes that genocide represents a twisted fonn of utopianism-a vision of a world without 
enemies, without the threat posed by self-assertive groups whose manner of life differs from our own. 
Ignatieff, supra note 102, at 27. Just as imperial toleration could emerge from imperial condescension, 
crimes against humanity emerged as a kind of perverted by-product of group equality. 
113. NICCOLO MACHIAVELLI, THE PRINCE 61, 65-68 (Harvey C. Mansfield, Jr. trans., Yale 
Univ. Press 1985) (1532). 
114. See M.1. FINLEY, THE ANCIENT GREEKS: AN INTRODUCTION TO THEIR LIFE AND THOUGHT 
42-43,68-71 (1964). See generally the pages indexed under the word "stasis." 
115. Historian Michael Grant notes that "savage chaos and vendetta ... signalized these last 
moribund years of the Republic." CICERO, SELECTED POLITICAL SPEECHES 216 (Michael Grant trans., 
Penguin Books 1973). 
116. Max Weber, Politics as a Vocation (1919), reprinted in FROM MAx WEBER: ESSAYS IN 
SOCIOLOGY 77, 117-28 (H. H. Gerth & C. Wright Mills eds. & trans., 1991). 
117. For especially thOUght-provoking treatments, see STUART HAMPSHIRE, INNOCENCE AND 
EXPERIENCE 161-89 (1989); the papers collected in PUBLIC AND PRIVATE MORALITY (Stuart Hampshire 
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greater detail later in this Article, arFed that all authentic politics consists in 
mortal struggles between enemies. I I All of this suggests that murderousness 
is not so much the occupational disease of princes as their occupation. 
For liberals, the aim of government is advancing the interests of the 
governed rather than the power and glory of the rulers; the hallmark of 
liberalism lies in the protection of vital interests from encroachment by the 
state. Liberals are not so starry-eyed that they believe that politics is anything 
less than a bruising contact sport. Nevertheless, they draw the line at 
autopolemic violence. Theirs is a different vision of politics-a vision in 
which violence is counterposed to politics, rather than constituting it. 119 To the 
claim that their vision is unrealistic and utopian, liberals can respond with 
important examples, of which the United States is one of the clearest because 
of its two centuries of peaceful presidential succession unmarred by coups 
d ' 't t 120 e a s. 
The vision of human beings as political animals that I have presented 
here-and which, I am arguing, undergirds the legal conception of crimes 
against humanity-is liberal in the sense I have just described. It focuses on 
the natural need of human beings to dwell in society, the threat that social 
living inevitably poses to individual well-being, and the necessity of political 
organization to cabin that threat. Healthy politics is politics that succeeds in 
containing the threat. Perverted politics, or politics gone cancerous, intensifies 
the threat and in that respect truly counts as a crime against the human status. 
We have just seen that our character as political animals accounts for 
four of the five legal features of crimes against humanity. What about the 
fifth, the cruel and inhuman character of the particular offenses included in the 
legal definitions-the fact that the evils they inflict are the worst we can 
devise? On its face, this characteristic of crimes against humanity has the least 
to do with humans' character as political animals, and thus this characteristic 
seems to fit the theory I am proposing least well. It seems rather 
straightforward that these misdeeds get singled out not because they violate 
our nature as political animals, but because they violate basic moral decency. 
The underlying murder-type and persecution-type offenses inflict the 
maximum in suffering and humiliation that we can imagine. The special 
viciousness of these acts seems to signify bottomless hatred and enmity, 
coupled with a complete indifference toward the individual victim, who is 
humiliated and tormented for reasons having nothing to do with who she is, 
only with what group she belongs to. To combine maximum cruelty with 
maximum indifference pushes these offenses beyond the pale of civilized 
ed., 1978); and Michael Walzer, Political Action: The Problem oJDirty Hands, 2 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 160 
(1973). 
118. SCHMITI, supra note 2, at 26-29. For further discussion, see inJra Part V. 
119. Arendt provides a clear statement of this vision. See HANNAH ARENDT, ON VIOLENCE 
(1970) (distinguishing between genuine political power, constituted by people working together, and 
violence, which Arendt regards as fundamentally apolitical). 
120. Even the American Civil War was not a struggle over who would rule the country, and the 
losers were not tortured, banished, or executed as they would certainly have been in Machiavelli's times. 
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behavior. 121 Labeling them "crimes against humanity" registers our moral 
revulsion, which has little apparent relationship with a political definition of 
"humanity." 
Yet the connection between moral revulsion by great cruelty and the 
protection of our political nature exists even here, I believe. Great depravity 
by itself does not distinguish crimes against humanity from the cruelest deeds 
that municipal systems criminalize. Rather, what makes crimes against 
humanity distinctive lies in the fact that they are atrocities committed by 
governments and government-like organizations toward civilian groups under 
their jurisdiction and control. The drafters of laws on crimes against humanity 
intend not just that great cruelty be forbidden, but more specifically that 
henceforth, whatever else political conflict encompasses, it must never again 
include the greatest cruelties in its repertoire. Machiavelli was not wrong-
politics is rough and ruthless, and nothing will ever change that fundamental 
fact of life. But never again must politics cross over from ruthlessness to the 
abominations that we call crimes against humanity. The distinctive 
significance of this category of crimes is political, not simply moral. 
The preceding discussion has gone through the five characteristics of 
crimes against humanity, arguing that the humanness that crimes against 
humanity violates lies in our status as political animals. To sum up, crimes 
against humanity offend against that status in two ways: by perverting politics, 
and by assaulting the individuality and sociability of the victims in tandem. 
Identifying humanness with our capacity for politics is not, of course, the only 
way to understand humanness, nor is it the most edifying way. If I am right, 
however, it is the way that best captures whatever intuitions have framed the 
law governing crimes against humanity. 
V. SCHMITI'S DEMONIZATION CRITIQUE: A RESPONSE 
At this point, I wish to return to a topic I have mentioned previously but 
postponed for separate consideration: the danger that talk of crimes against 
humanity whose perpetrators are "enemies of humanity" threatens to 
demonize the perpetrators, to brand them as less than human, and hence to 
expel them from the circle of those who deserve human regard. The obvious 
paradox is that doing so undercuts the root idea of international human rights, 
namely that everyone deserves human regard. It is an indisputable fact that 
millions of ordinary human beings have committed crimes against humanity. 
If their deeds seem undeniably demonic, we must conclude that you do not 
have to be a demon to behave like a demon. As Mahmood Mamdani reminds 
us, the enthusiastic killers in the Rwandan genocide included priests, 
physicians, teachers, and even human rights activists. 122 The "demonization 
121. My remarks here have been influenced by Avishai Margalit & Gabriel Motzkin, The 
Uniqueness of the Holocaust, 25 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 65 (1996), as well as by AVISHAI MARGA LIT, THE 
DECENT SOCIETY 89-112 (Naomi Goldblum trans., 1996). 
122. MAMDANI, supra note 39, at 228. For an analysis of who committed the genocide and 
why, see id. at 202-33. According to Mamdani, the perpetrators included a large number of Hutu 
refugees from Burundi's Tutsi-Ied massacres of 1993, as well as the nearly one-seventh of Rwanda's 
Hutus displaced by the civil war. Both groups had a profound and understandable fear of what might 
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critique" argues that, at its very core, the concept of crimes against humanity 
entails the falsehood that the perpetrators have made themselves less than 
human. 
We may frame the point in a different way. I have argued that the aim of 
declaring crimes against humanity to be universal violations of law is 
ultimately to reformulate the very idea of politics to exclude these acts. In that 
sense, defining a category of "crimes against humanity" aims to transform the 
very meaning of human beings as political animals. Such utopianism should 
give us pause because utopianism creates the danger of doing whatever it 
takes to eliminate those who stand in its way-the enemies of humanity. 123 
Carl Schmitt-that most disquieting of legal philosophers-argues forcefully 
that trying to impose moral limits on politics is a utopian project that will only 
make politics more cruel. Schmitt offers one of the clearest and most forceful 
versions of the demonization critique, and I wish to set out his argument and 
respond to it. 124 Responding to Schmitt is important not only because of the 
remarkable power of his ideas-which have undergone a renaissance in recent 
years despite the stigma of his Nazi allegiance-but also because of his 
intellectual influence (via Hans Morgenthau) on the foreign policy realists 
who for so long have dominated U.S. political decision-making. 125 The 
realists have always been skeptical of humanitarian projects in international 
affairs, including international criminal law, and their skepticism-when it is 
not simply cynical-probably arises from their instinctive mistrust of political 
utopianism. 
Schmitt's "concept of the political" grows from two basic theses. First, 
and foremost, Schmitt insists that politics is about just one thing-the 
distinction between friend and enemy, and the basic life-and-death struggle 
between clashing groupS.126 Second, this life-and-death struggle is no mere 
metaphor: "[T]he friend, enemy, and combat concepts ... refer to the real 
possibility of physical killing.,,127 Schmitt does not mean that all political 
conflicts end in war, which he knows is patently untrue, but he does mean that 
"to the enemy concept belongs the ever present possibility of combat." 128 Real 
become of them under a Tutsi government, and, as Mamdani points out, "[b]y portraying opponents as 
potential perpetrators and ourselves as potential victims, war tends to demonize opponents and sanctify 
aggression as protective and defensive." ld. at 217. Obviously, this is no excuse for genocide, but it is 
worth pointing out that demonizing genocidaires may equally "sanctify aggression" against them. This 
is the argument I wish to consider in the present Part. 
123. Indeed, IgnatiefI argues perceptively that genocide itself represents a perverse form of 
utopianism, the quest for a world in which the Enemy-the Jews, the Tutsis, or whoever-no longer 
stands in the way of happiness and harmony. IgnatiefI, supra note 102, at 27. 
124. Another particularly biting version of the demonization critique may be found in Rorty, 
Human Rights. Rationality. and Sentimentality, supra note 87, at 113. 
125. Koskenniemi has drawn attention to the historical progression from Schmitt to 
Morgenthau to contemporary realism. KOSKENNIEMI, supra note 2, at 436-40. Koskenniemi notes the 
undeniable appeal of the realists' anti-utopianism, especially given that "while there has never been as 
much talk about international law and morality as in the twentieth century, never have atrocities on such 
wide scale been committed in the name of political utopias." ld. at 424. He adds: ''Under such 
circumstances, the choice between writing another 1,000 page textbook on humanitarian law and trying 
to deal with Schmitt's critiques of universal moralism should not be too difficult." !d. 
126. SCHMlTI, supra note 2, at 26-29. 
127. ld. at 33. 
128. ld. at 32. 
HeinOnline -- 29 Yale J. Int’l L. 122 2004
122 THE YALE JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol. 29: 85 
combat between real enemies, for mortal stakes, constitutes the deep meaning 
of politics for Schmitt. 
Schmitt's critique of liberalism is, quite simply, that liberalism closes its 
eyes to the basic fact of politics-the ever-present and ultimately deadly 
combat between enemies. Liberals want to cabin struggle to the non-violent 
realms of economic competition and intellectual debate, but they deceive 
themselves if they think this is genuinely possible. Their enemies will force 
the issue, and a society that turns the other cheek will simply disappear. 129 
Like it or not, politics and violence are mankind's destiny. 130 
Alternatively, liberals may join issue with their enemy and fight back, 
but then, like it or not, they have entered the political world of friend and 
enemy locked in combat, the very world that liberalism rejects. This sounds 
like a logical point-an argument that liberalism implies its opposite. But 
Schmitt's fundamental argument against liberalism is not logical analysis but 
prophetic warning that the liberal desire to eradicate friend-enemy death 
struggles from politics in the name of "humanity" will simply launch the most 
terrifying friend-enemy death struggle of them all-a war to end all wars in 
which the enemy is a "monster that must not only be defeated but also utterly 
destroyed.,,13l Schmitt's conclusion is the famous slogan: "[W]hoever invokes 
humanity wants to cheat.,,132 He explains: 
To confiscate the word humanity, to invoke and monopolize such a term probably has 
certain incalculable effects, such as denying the enemy the quality of being human and 
declaring him to be an outlaw of humanity; and a war can thereby be driven to the most 
extreme inhumanity.133 
That, in a nutshell, is the demonization critique. It seems astonishing that 
Schmitt wrote these words in the 1920s, before Great Britain terror-bombed 
residential neighborhoods in German cities and the U.S. fire-bombed Tokyo 
and nuked Hiroshima and Nagasaki, all in the name of defeating the enemies 
of humanity. The importance of his critique to the topic of crimes against 
humanity should be obvious: in Schmitt's eyes, the entire concept of humanity 
is a ruse that groups use in their struggle to master other groups. 
At bottom, Schmitt offers a moral argument against liberal moralism. 
His theory of politics, which at first exposure seems like nothing more than 
typical fascist-era glorification of war, turns out to be just the opposite-a 
warning against the destructive potential of war launched for humanitarian 
reasons. In fact, Schmitt insists that nothing can justify war except a threat to 
one's own existence.134 The parallel worry in the case of crimes against 
humanity seems clear: to label someone a criminal against humanity seems to 
justify any measures anyone might take to eliminate such an "inhuman" 
monster. The label substitutes for an argument, and outrage replaces the legal 
129. [d. at 51-53. 
130. [d. at 76. 
131. [d. at 36. 
132. [d. at 54. 
133. [d. 
134. [d. at 49. He labels as "sinister and crazy" the kind of national-interest thinking that 
accepts wars launched on behalf of enhanced prosperity. [d. at 48. 
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process-hence the conclusion that "whoever invokes humanity wants to 
cheat." 135 
But criminal prosecution is not war-fighting, and international criminal 
law is not a war against war. In the end, I do not believe that Schmitt's 
critique damages the conception of crimes against humanity offered here. On 
the contrary, the critique strengthens it. His warning about the dangers of 
dehumanizing others by labeling them enemies of humanity is important and, 
one hopes, unforgettable. It would apply, however, only if the project of 
international criminal law were the physical annihilation of criminals against 
humanity, which it plainly is not. If anything, the legal process offers greater 
protection to criminals against humanity than they have any reason to expect. 
That was precisely Robert Jackson's point in his opening speech at 
Nuremberg, when he stated: "Realistically, the Charter of this Tribunal, which 
gives them a hearing, is also the source of their only hope.,,136 
Furthermore, Schmitt's insistence on the inevitability of violent friend-
enemy groupings in human affairs should not and cannot carry over to a 
government treating the people it rules as the enemy. No doubt he had in mind 
the street battles between Communists and Nazis in Weimar Germany, which 
both sides regarded as a death struggle. But the step from street violence to the 
victorious Nazi government murdering its enemies in concentration camps 
marks the fatal moment when politics goes cancerous. The moment the Nazis 
took control of Germany, they assumed responsibility for the basic rights of 
even their enemies. The same was true when the Bolsheviks took control of 
Russia, notwithstanding Trotsky's sneers about "their morals and ours.,,137 As 
Schmitt himself writes, "no program, no ideal, no norm, no expediency 
confers a right to dispose of the physical life of other human beings.,,138 
Attacks on civilian populations always emerge from programs and 
expediency, typically in the form of paranoid frenzy, historical fantasy, or 
simply cold-blooded calculation. The step from murdering Communists for 
their political commitments to murdering Jews on the basis of theories of race 
enmity is a short one. That is why the declaration that certain ways of treating 
enemies are unacceptably atrocious is not an evasion of the political, even in 
Schmitt's sense of the term. Political struggles will continue to be waged as 
long as human beings exist, but they can be waged without exterminating, 
enslaving, raping, or persecuting civilian populations. These are forms of 
politics gone cancerous-the body politic becoming its own enemy. These are 
the forms that criminal law aims to punish. 
135. [d. at 54. 
136. 2 INT'L MILITARY TRIBUNAL, NUREMBERG, TRIAL OF TIlE MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE 
TIlE INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL, NUREMBERG, 14 NOVEMBER - 1 OCTOBER 1946, at 102 
(1947). 
137. LEON TROTSKY, THEIR MORALS AND OURS (pioneer 1939). 
138. SCHMIIT, supra note 2, at 48. Apparently, when it came time to sign up with the Nazi 
Party, Schmitt quickly forgot his own warning. 
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VI. CRIMES AGAINST HUMANKIND AND THE Locus OF JURISDICTION 
When we read "crimes against humanity" to mean "crimes against 
humankind," we highlight that all humankind is a party in interest because all 
humankind has been offended by what the perpetrator has done. This suggests 
the jurisdictional conclusion that Arendt draws: "[I]nsofar as the crime was a 
crime against humanity, it needed an international tribunal to do justice to 
it.,,139 As we saw earlier, the argument appeals to an analogy between 
domestic and international criminal law. Offenses against important 
community norms are domestic crimes tried by the state, the domestic 
community. In the same way, offenses against "the laws of humanity" are 
international crimes and as such, they must be tried by the international 
community. The analogy is straightforward. States are to the community of 
states as individual subjects are to their own state; international criminal laws 
are norms of the international community in the same way that domestic 
criminal laws are norms of the state that enacts them. 140 
139. ARENDT, supra note 8, at 269. 
140. As indicated earlier, Arendt borrows the domestic analogy argument from Telford Taylor, 
supra note 33 and accompanying text. But her principal inspiration, she explains, was the philosopher 
Karl Jaspers. ARENDT, supra note 8, at 269. Jaspers was Arendt's friend and mentor, and they 
exchanged a fascinating series of letters on whether an Israeli court or an international tribunal should 
try Eichmann. See HANNAH ARENDT - KARL JASPERS CORRESPONDENCE 1926-1969, at 410-26 (Lotte 
Kohler & Hans Saner eds., Robert Kimber & Rita Kimber trans., 1992) (letters of Dec. 12, Dec. 16, Dec. 
23, Dec. 31, 1960, and Jan. 3, Feb. 5, and Feb. 14, 1961). Jaspers argued that an international tribunal 
was essential because "[t]his case concerns all of humanity." Id. at 413 (letter of Dec. 16, 1960). He later 
added that humanity "is represented formally today by the UN," and continued: "It is a task for 
humanity, not for an individual national state, to pass judgment in such a weighty case; ... What he did 
concerns all of you [i.e., the members of the United Nations], not just us. Create the means by which 
humanity can mete out justice .... " !d. at 419 (letter of Dec. 31, 1960). IfIsrael was indeed to conduct 
the trial, Jaspers thought that it should conduct an inquiry but pass no sentence, instead holding 
Eichmann in custody until a sentence could be passed by some "court that, as a representative of 
humanity, is competent to judge a crime against humanity-and today the UN professes to be such an 
authority." Id. at 424 (letter of Feb. 14, 1961). Arendt at first responded that Eichmann was a hastis 
humani generis, like the pirate in traditional international law, over whom any state is competent to 
exercise jurisdiction. Id. at 414, 416 (letter of Dec. 23, 1960). She argued that politics would prevent the 
establishment of an ad hoc tribunal to try Eichmann, and then suggested that the only feasible alternative 
would be "to attach to the International Court at The Hague a criminal court for hastes generis humani 
[sic] that would be competent to try individuals regardless of nationality." Id. at 416. But, "[a]s long as 
such a court does not exist, international law holds that any court in the world is competent-so why not 
Israel?" Id. Subsequently, however, she concluded, "My pirate theory won't do. For the definition of 
piracy to apply, it is both factually and legally essential for the pirate to have acted out of private 
motives. And therein lies the rub." Id. at 423 (letter of Feb. 5,1961). She went on to agree with Jaspers 
that it would be crucial to the trial that the crime was against all of "humanity," and "is in no way 
limited to the Jews or the Jewish question." Id. But how the fact that Eichmann's crimes were against all 
humanity "can be presented both politically and legally remains the question." Id. 
By the time she wrote Eichmann in Jerusalem, Arendt had completely abandoned the theory of 
universal national jurisdiction based on the piracy analogy, expanding the reasoning in her letter of 
February 5, 1961, supra. The reason for universal jurisdiction over the pirate is that he commits his 
crimes on the high seas, not because robbery and murder are unique crimes; and what makes him hastis 
humani generis is that ''he has chosen to put himself outside all organized communities"; he is "in 
business for himself or ... he acknowledged obedience to no flag whatsoever." ARENDT, supra note 8, 
at 262. She therefore thought that analogizing Eichmann to a pirate "served only to dodge one of the 
fundamental problems posed by crimes of this kind, namely, that they were, and could only be, 
committed under a criminal law and by a criminal state." Id. International lawyers have likewise 
criticized the analogy between the pirate (who is subject to universal jurisdiction only for practical 
reasons of enforcement) and the criminal against humanity (who, if he is subject to universal 
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Although Arendt does not use the phrase "laws of humanity," the 
domestic analogy requires the existence of some humanity-wide law that 
crimes against humanity violate. The phrase "laws of humanity" is in any case 
not my invention; it comes from the most important precursors to the 
Nuremberg Charter's terminology-the so-called "Martens clause" in the 
Preambles to the 1899 and 1907 Hague Conventions. The phrase was used as 
well in a 1919 report to the Versailles Treaty drafters proposing to try the 
Turkish perpetrators of the Armenian genocide for "offenses against the laws 
of humanity," "breaches of the laws of humanity," and "crimes against 
civilization and humanity." 141 In this Part, I argue against the domestic 
analogy and against Arendt's jurisdictional conclusion that only international 
tribunals should try crimes against humanity. I argue that "humanity" does not 
form a political community that can enact "laws of humanity." International 
law is the product of state consent, and states represent humanity only in an 
attenuated, once-removed fashion. Political theorists sometimes overlook how 
weak this connection is because they are used to thinking in social-contract 
terms of states as recipients of delegated authority from their people. I argue, 
however, that social contract theory is unable to explain why states should 
choose a system of international law that protects human rights in other states. 
This part of the argument focuses on John Rawls's version of the theory, the 
best-developed attempt to offer a contractarian account of international law. 142 
In the end, I trace the failure of Rawls's argument back to a failure in the 
domestic analogy itself, which requires that the interests of humanity be 
mediated through states. 
A. The Normative Weakness of "Laws of Humanity" 
The term "laws of humanity" carries natural law resonance. But I 
suspect the term arose out of an embarrassed reluctance by twentieth-century 
jurists to invoke natural law, or to invoke more old-fashioned phrases like 
"laws of God" or even the Enlightenment's favorite "laws of reason.,,143 It is 
too evident that each of these lacks the positivity appropriate to a criminal 
statute, and perhaps that each of them too obviously begs the question of how 
some people but not others know what nature, God, or reason command, to 
say nothing of whether nature, God, or reason command anything at all. Talk 
jurisdiction, is so because of the unique character of his crime}. See, e.g., LYAL S. SUNGA, INDIVIDUAL 
RESPONSIBILITY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW FOR SERIOUS HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS 102-16 (1992). 
Arendt's position in Eichmann in Jerusalem blends Jaspers's unflinching insistence that Eichmann's 
case is appropriate only for an international tribunal with her own more pragmatic concern that such a 
trial would be politically infeasible. She believed that Israel was fully entitled to try Eichmann for 
crimes against the Jews, but "insofar as the crime was a crime against humanity, it needed an 
international tribunal to do justice to it." ARENDT, supra note 8, at 269. For a discussion of the 
legitimacy ofIsrael trying Eichmann for crimes against the Jews, see id. at 263. 
141. BASSIOUNI, supra note 1, at 63. 
142. See RAWLS, supra note 14. This book is an expansion of John Rawls, The Law of Peoples, 
in ON HUMAN RIGHTS: THE OXFORD AMNESTY LECTURES 41 (Stephen Shute & Susan Hurley eds., 
1993). 
143. The traditional phrase jus gentium refers not to "laws of humanity," but to international 
law, that is, law among states. It originally referred to the body of Roman law governing relations 
between Roman citizens and foreigners, or between foreigners, within the Roman empire. MALCOLM N. 
SHAW, INTERNATIONAL LAW 15 (4th ed. 1997). 
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of laws of humanity finesses these epistemological and metaphysical 
embarrassments by intimating that the laws have human provenance and 
human legislators. 
The trouble is that only political communities can promulgate laws, and 
humanity does not form a political community. There is no world government 
(a good thing, too), nor do relationships exist among humanity as a whole that 
qualify it as a single people. Human groups are diverse, and diversity as such 
yields no basis for political community. On the contrary, political 
communities always exist in a tension between the centrifugal forces of 
diversity and the centripetal forces of shared customs, languages, experiences, 
and projects-forces that bind the community together, prevent it from 
disintegrating, and make political organization possible. But these centripetal 
forces are precisely what humanity as a whole lacks. 
We may be inclined to resist this conclusion, which runs so contrary to 
millions of people's yearning for human solidarity that transcends nations and 
nationalism. Each year on New Year's Eve, choral societies the world over 
gather to perform the finale to Beethoven's Ninth Symphony-thousands of 
voices, from Bloomington to Capetown to Tokyo, singing Schiller's stirring 
invocation of Joy, the divine spark whose magic reunites the multitudes whom 
custom has divided, so that all men will finally be brothers. l44 One can almost 
imagine that all those thousands of harmonizing voices unite their audiences 
throughout the world and come close to making the words a self-fulfilling 
prophecy. But twenty minutes later the music stops, Joy folds her soft wings, 
and the choruses disperse back into communities that custom divides. In these 
communities, languages differ, ways of life differ, voices clash as well as 
harmonize, and political processes generate laws that vary and refract all the 
other differences. None can properly be regarded as laws of humanity 
because, in the important sense according to which laws express the political 
will of a people, there is no such people as "humanity. ,,145 
144. I am, of course, paraphrasing Schiller's Ode to Joy, as quoted in Beethoven's Ninth 
Symphony. "Deine Zauber bindet wiederlWas die Mode streng geteilt;lAlle Menschen werden 
Briider/Wo dein sanfter Fliigel weilt" (Your magic reuniteslWbat custom strictly divides;lAll men 
become brotherslWherever your soft wings linger). LUDWIG VON BEETHOVEN, SYMPHONY No.9, Opus 
125, FOURTH MOVEMENT (1824). The words may be found in any respectable recording of the 
symphony; I have taken them from the notes to HERBERT VON KARAJAN, BEETHOVEN 9 SYMPHONIEN 
DGG (1962). 
145. These observations in no way imply a cultural-relativist view about basic human rights, 
nor a denial that core principles of universal human rights may be identified. Indeed, my claim that all 
humankind has an interest in repressing crimes against humanity presupposes at the very least a 
universal human right not to be subjected to these crimes. For reasons skillfully argued by Bernard 
Williams, cultural relativism is an incoherent position ifit is taken to imply the (non-relative) wrongness 
of interfering with other people's cultures on behalf of human rights. Provided that interfering on behalf 
of human rights is one of our own values, a consistent relativist has no basis for complaint. See 
BERNARD WILLIAMS, MORALITY: AN INTRODUCTION TO ETHICS 20-26 (1972). For an example of the 
relativist position Williams attacks, see Statement on Human Rights, 49 AM. ANTHROPOLOGIST 539 
(1947). Williams describes relativism as "possibly the most absurd view to have been advanced even in 
moral philosophy." WILLIAMS, supra, at 20. In any case, even those inclined to embrace relativist 
positions on human rights never press their relativism to the point of overtly defending genocide or 
crimes against humanity. In the late 1990s, human rights theory was involved in an active debate about 
whether there were "unique Asian values," emphasizing community and economic development above 
individualism and political liberty. See, e.g., THE EAST ASIAN CHALLENGE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS (Joanne 
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One response to these concerns is that "humanity" is simply rhetorical 
shorthand for international society, that is, the community of states. 
Unfortunately, international society is at best an inadequate stand-in for 
humanity. The ban on crimes against humanity-arising, supposedly, from all 
humankind's revulsion at the gravest possible offenses-presents itself as a 
more powerful norm than any that we can think of. But international law 
norms are less powerful than domestic norms, because they have less 
connection with legitimate political processes of lawmaking. 
In domestic law, it is the connection between the state, the legal norms it 
promulgates, and the community whose values those norms express that 
makes the state a legitimate party in interest when those norms are 
transgressed. Legitimacy arises from the consent of the governed-from 
popular sovereignty institutionalized through democratic governance 
mechanisms. 146 If legitimacy requires popular sovereignty, then international 
law, formed by state actions and diplomatic undertakings many steps removed 
from popular control, necessarily has less legitimacy than domestic law. 147 As 
Paul Kahn puts it: 
The rule of law ... is not simply a matter of getting the content of rights correct. It is first 
R. Bauer & Daniel A. Bell eds., 1999}; Yash Ghai, Human Rights and Governance: The Asia Debate, 15 
AUSTL. Y.B. INT'L L. 1 (1994) (criticizing the "Asian values" thesis). But even those advancing the 
"Asian values" thesis never claimed that gross violations of basic human rights are an accepted and 
acceptable part of "Asia's different standard." Bilahari Kausikan, Asia's Different Standard, FOREIGN 
POL'y, Fall 1993, at 24. My argument is thus not a defense of human rights relativism. Rather, it is an 
argument that the norms forbidding crimes against humanity do not arise from processes that would 
permit us to regard them as laws governing a cosmopolitan political community. 
146. Something like this theory oflegitimacy is embodied in important international standards. 
The right to democratic governance appears explicitly in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 
art. 21, supra note 96, and in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec.16, 1966, art. 
25,999 V.N.T.S. 171, http://www.unhchr.chlhtmllmenu3/b/a_ccpr.htm; it is implicit in the right to self-
determination recognized in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra, art. 1 (I) and 
the International Covenant on Economic, Cultural and Social Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, art. 1 (I), 999 
V.N.T.S. 3, (entered into force Jan. 3, 1976) http://www.unhchr.chlhtmllmenu3/b/a_cescr.htm. On the 
incorporation of this norm into international law, see generally Thomas M. Franck, The Emerging Right 
to Democratic Governance, 86 AM. J. INT'L L. 46 (1992). 
147. This problem has been noted repeatedly by observers of the development of the so-called 
"new" customary international law (CIL), that is, the customary international law governing how states 
treat their own nationals. The term "new customary international law" originates in Curtis A. Bradley & 
Jack L. Goldsmith, Customary International Law as Federal Common Law: A Critique of the Modern 
Position, III HARV. L. REv. 815, 838-42 (1997). Bradley and Goldsmith's influential argument is that 
the American constitutional scheme does not and should not permit the new ClL to override domestic 
law, in large part because it attempts to make an end-run around domestic political processes that are 
more legitimate. Id. at 857-58. Elsewhere, Goldsmith and Eric Posner observe that many critics believe 
that the new ClL is "incoherent and illegitimate." Jack L. Goldsmith & Eric A. Posner, Understanding 
the Resemblance Between Modern and Traditional Customary International Law, 40 VA. J. INT'L L. 
639,640 (2000) (citing G.M. DANILENKO, LAW-MAKING IN THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY (1993); J. 
SHAND WATSON, THEORY AND REALITY IN THE INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS 79-106, 
106 (J 999); Patrick Kelly, The Twilight of Customary International Law, 40 VA. J. INT'L L. 449 (2000}). 
In the same vein, but with a less American slant, Bruno Simma and Philip Alston decry coutume 
sauvage (their term for the new ClL) as "a product grown in the hothouse of parliamentary diplomacy," 
a "cultured pearl version of customary law" that operates "through proclamation, exhortation, repetition, 
incantation, lament." Bruno Simma & Philip Alston, The Sources of Human Rights Law: Custom, Jus 
Cogens, and General Principles, 12 AUSTL. Y.B. INT'L L. 82,89 (1992). Customary law, they fear, "has 
changed from something happening out there in the real world, after the diplomats and delegates have 
had their say, into paper practice: the words, texts, votes and excuses themselves. The process of 
customary law-making is thus turned into a self-contained exercise in rhetoric." [d. 
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of all an expression of our sense of ourselves as a single, historical community engaging 
in self-government through law. To obey the law, on this conception, is to participate in 
the project of popular sovereignty. That pro~ect makes us a single community with a 
unique-and uniquely rneaningful-history.14 
It seems plain that just as all humankind has no such common project, neither 
does the international community of states. On the contrary. A state is charged 
with advancing the interests of its own people, not of people in general. To be 
sure, governments may fall far short of advancing the interests of their own 
people, but even if they do not, their duties to their own people are likely to 
make them unresponsive to universal human interests, precisely because 
domestic interests come first. This is no less true in democracies than in 
tyrannies: popular sovereignty means the sovereignty of our people, not of all 
people everywhere. 
Even international relations theorists who reject the realist premise that 
world politics consists of the anarchic competition of unitary, self-interested 
states still explain the emergence of international norms and institutions as 
functional means of facilitating state cooperation that is, broadly speaking, in 
the states' interests. 149 These theories differ from realism because they draw 
attention to subtleties that realists overlook: that international norms not only 
advance state interests but also constrain state behavior; that non-state groups 
are also players in international affairs; that states' interests are often 
redefined or constructed by their participation in international affairs and 
institutions; and that states are not unitary entities, but complex creatures with 
their own internal politics. All of this is completely compatible with the 
recognition that the primary responsibilities of governments run to their own 
people, not to a hypothetical cosmopolis or to abstract others elsewhere. 
How powerful are norms of international criminal law? To answer this 
question, it is useful to ask another. What does it mean for a society-either 
domestic or international-to adopt a norm of criminal law? It means, first, 
that men and women in the society are told not to engage in the forbidden 
conduct on pain of moral condemnation and punishment. Second, it means 
that the society undertakes to enforce the norm. Following Bentham, Meir 
Dan-Cohen has distinguished two kinds of legal rules: conduct rules directed 
to the general public and decision rules directed to officials. 15o Often, the two 
are equivalent. For example, a typical domestic criminal statute consists of 
what is generally understood as a conduct rule, roughly "Don't do Xl", 
phrased as a decision rule: "Anyone who does X shall be fined or imprisoned." 
148. Paul W. Kahn, Speaking Law to Power: Popular Sovereignty. Human Rights. and the New 
International Order, 1 CHI. J. INT'L L. 1,4 (2000). My argument in this Section draws on Kahn's essay, 
as well as on Paul W. Kahn, On Pinochet, BOSTON REv., Feb.lMar. 1999, at 8, 
http://bostonreview.rnit.eduIBR24.1Ikahn.html. 
149. For a useful overview of the variety of international relations theories in connection with 
international law, see Kenneth W. Abbott, Modem International Relations Theory: A Prospectus for 
International Lawyers, 14 YALE J. lNT'L L. 335 (1989); Anne-Marie Slaughter Burley, International 
Law and International Relations Theory: A Dual Agenda, 87 AM. J. lNT'L L. 205 (1993); Anne-Marie 
Slaughter et aI., International Law and International Relations Theory: A New Generation of 
Interdisciplinary Scholarship, 92 AM. J.lNT'L L. 367 (1998). 
150. Meir Dan-Cohen, Decision Rules and Conduct Rules: On Acoustic Separation in Criminal 
Law, 97 HARV. L. REv. 625 (1984). 
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But such equivalences do not mean that decision rules exist in one-to-one 
correspondence with conduct rules. The criminal statute will give rise to a 
host of additional decision rules directed toward a variety of officials: toward 
police ("Be on the lookout for people doing X and arrest them!"); toward 
prosecutors ("You may bring charges against X-perpetrators provided you 
have credible evidence"); toward legislators ("Budget money for X-
prevention"); and toward judges or juries ("Convict on charges of X if the 
evidence warrants it and none of the available defenses applies"). Dan-Cohen 
focuses on criminal law defenses--decision rules directed toward judges 
specifying when otherwise criminal conduct should not result in a conviction. 
Perhaps that explains why he labels rules directed toward officials "decision 
rules." I prefer to broaden the judge-centered notion of decision rules to 
include what might be called enforcement rules-norms directing officials in 
various offices to enforce the conduct rules. In these terms, adopting a norm 
of criminal law means simultaneously projecting a rule of conduct to the 
general public and an entire complex of enforcement rules toward a host of 
officials. Merely declaring that conduct is forbidden, without undertaking to 
enforce the conduct rule, is not adopting a norm of criminal law. It is adopting 
half a norm. To adopt a norm of criminal law, a state must not only condemn 
conduct, it must enforce the condemnation. In international criminal law, 
adopting the norm implies a third commitment as well, namely a commitment 
that the state itself should not organize or instigate the crime-in effect, a 
conduct rule directed at the state. No doubt the same is true in domestic law, 
but in domestic law the state's commitment not to engage in criminal behavior 
is so obvious that it is usually left unspoken. This is not the case in 
international law, where states explicitly undertake to avoid torture or 
genocide, either by signing treaties or participating in custom-formation. 
These, then, are the three components of a norm of international criminal law: 
conduct rules directed toward individuals, enforcement rules directed toward a 
multitude of state officials, and conduct rules directed toward states. Because 
international law has long been regarded as solely concerned with state 
behavior, not individual behavior, the least controversial form international 
criminal law assumes consists of state commitments not to engage in criminal 
conduct. 
If the last of these components seems the most firmly established in 
international law, the first, by contrast, is only indirectly part of international 
law given the classical understanding according to which international law 
creates a "horizontal" relationship between state and state, not a "vertical" 
relationship between international society and individuals. 151 Classically, a 
norm binds individuals only when it is incorporated into a state's law. 
Obviously, the practice of holding individuals accountable before 
international tribunals has transformed the classical picture, and the 
specification of crimes in the law of the tribunals is vertical law-conduct 
151. I borrow this tenninology from Harold Hongju Koh, Transnational Public Law Litigation, 
100 YALE LJ. 2347, 2351 (1991), who in turn borrows it from Lea Brilmayer, International Law in 
American Courts: A Modest Proposal, 100 YALE LJ. 2277, 2295 (1991). 
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rules directed toward individuals. But it cannot truly count as a criminal law 
norm unless it is enforced, and the commitment of the community of states to 
enforcement has proven to be pitifully weak. Conduct rules stripped bare of 
enforcement rules are legal norms only in an attenuated sense. 
The clearest proof of how weak states' political commitment to 
international criminal norms really is lies in their unwillingness to take risks to 
halt crimes against humanity while they are being committed. The Balkan 
Wars offer a telling case in point. Even the Western Europeans, in other 
respects the world's foremost advocates of legally enforceable international 
human rights, proved no more willing to halt the slaughter than the Americans 
or Russians. ls Nor, of course, was the United Nations any more effective. 
The catastrophe in Rwanda proved no different. By now everyone knows the 
story of the extraordinary fecklessness of the United Nations, the discreditable 
role of France, and the lengths to which the U.S. government went to prevent 
anyone from intervening to stop the genocide-because the United States did 
not want to intervene and feared that if anyone else took the lead the United 
States would look bad. ls3 Instead, the world community opted for inaction 
followed by after-the-fact tribunals capable of handling only a handful of 
cases. A genuine commitment to repressing crimes against humanity would 
require more than tribunals; it would require willingness to engage in 
humanitarian military interventions, willingness to provide massive assistance 
for states to build rule of law capacity, and willingness to forgo development 
strategies that create the social disruption that breeds crimes against 
humanity.ls4 Without such proactive, politically unpopular efforts to forestall 
humanitarian crimes, the enterprise of occasionally putting perpetrators on 
trial-even leaders like Milosevic and Kambanda-seems more like a 
publicity stunt than a commitment to humanitarian legal values. Kahn puts it 
well: "An international community that allows massive violations of human 
rights as long as a regime is in power, but then threatens to prosecute 
offenders once they are out of power-and even then only if they happen 
accidentally to fall within a state's jurisdictional grasp-is not a regime of 
law's ru1e.,,155 Until very recently, the international community showed no 
interest in the carnage and devastation that has killed millions in the Congo in 
152. For an analysis of the dynamics of international failure in former Yugoslavia, see Stanley 
Hoffman, Humanitarian Intervention in the Former Yugoslavia, in THE ETHICS AND POLITICS OF 
HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION 38 (Stanley Hoffman ed., 1996). 
153. See generally LINDA MELVERN, A PEOPLE BETRAYED: THE ROLE OF THE WEST IN 
RWANDA'S GENOCIDE (2000) (discussing international inaction in Rwanda, with special focus on the 
United Nations); POWER, supra note 44, at 329-89 (detailing American policy in Rwanda). See also 
PHILIP GoUREVITCH, WE WISH To INFORM You THAT TOMORROW WE WILL BE KILLED WITH OUR 
FAMILIES: STORIES FROM RWANDA 147-71 (1998) (discussing the American and French roles in the 
Rwanda catastrophe); GERARD PRUNIER, THE RWANDA CRISIS: HISTORY OF A GENOCIDE 273-305 (1995) 
(discussing the French intervention). 
154. See, e.g., AMy CHUA, WORLD ON FIRE: How EXPORTING FREE MARKET DEMOCRACY 
. BREEDS ETHNIC HATRED AND GLOBAL INSTABILITY (2003); HENRY SHUE, BASIC RIGHTS: SUBSISTENCE, 
AFFLUENCE, AND U.S. FOREIGN POLICY 40-51 (1st ed. 1980); PETER UVIN, AIDING VIOLENCE: THE 
DEVELOPMENT ENTERPRISE IN RWANDA (1998). 
155. Kahn, On Pinochet,supra note 148. 
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the past five years, and few resources are currently devoted to responding to 
the crisis. Perhaps in a few years there will be trials. 
It might be thought that the Rome Statute of the International Criminal 
Courtl56 provides a counterweight to these pessimistic conclusions, a 
demonstration that the community of states is indeed willing to commit itself 
to the project of international criminal accountability. Regrettably, I fear it is 
not so. Of the ten most populous countries in the world, only Brazil and 
Nigeria have ratified the treaty. The eight populous non-ratifiers by 
themselves encompass most of the world's population (3.4 billion out of over 
6 billion), and include the major powers of China, India, Indonesia, Japan, 
Pakistan, and Russia, with the United States spearheading the anti-ICC 
campaign.157 France and the United Kingdom are the only members of the 
nuclear club that have ratified the treaty. Even among the ratifiers it is hard 
not to suspect that many have little real interest in the project of international 
criminal accountability. Tyrannical states obviously have no interest in 
holding tyrants accountable for their crimes; democratic states have little 
interest in subordinating their own domestic laws to international law, as 
accountability requires; and powerful states have never conceded that they 
should be held accountable in the first place. Rather, in Richard Falk's words, 
they favor "an approach to accountability with the following feature-
'everybody but us. ",158 
The main point here is not simply that, as a matter of realpolitik, great 
powers are unwilling to subordinate their interests to the enforcement of 
international human rights. The point is rather that as a matter of principle, 
states owe it to their people to favor national interests over cosmopolitan 
ones-and so states will advance international human rights only to the extent 
that the advancement of human rights is widely perceived by their people as a 
national interest. By its very nature, the community of states cannot properly 
accommodate the interests of humanity. 
B. Social Contract Theory and the Domestic Analogy: Rawls 
To see this more clearly, it will be useful to examine a well-known 
argument to the contrary. In The Law of Peoples, John Rawls argues that a 
social contract among free and democratic peoples bargaining in an 
"international original position,,159 to determine the principles of their foreign 
policy-the Law of PeopleS-WOUld incorporate the principle that "[p ]eoples 
156. Rome Statute, supra note 41. 
157. The eighth state among the populous non-ratifiers is Bangladesh. 
158. Richard Falk, Accountability for War Crimes and the Legacy of Nuremberg, in WAR 
CRIMES AND COLLECTIVE WRONGDOING: A READER 113, 115 (Aleksandar Jokic ed., 2001). Falk is 
particularly scathing about "the reluctance of major states, especially the United States and China, to 
participate in this process [of accountability] if it includes the risk that their leaders might stand accused 
at some future point." [d. at 130. Falk notes "the central point that American leadership was never 
prepared to accept ... a framework of restraint as seriously applicable to its future diplomacy." [d. at 
131. 
159. RAWLS, supra note 14, at 32. 
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are to honor human rightS.,,160 If Rawls is right, then the failure of the actual 
community of states to commit itself strongly to human rights projects such as 
the eradication of crimes against humanity proves nothing about whether, in 
ideal theory, states can adequately represent humanity's interests. Rawls's 
argument purports to show that rational representatives of decent peoples 
would insist on incorporating human rights concerns into their foreign 
policies. 
Disappointingly, however, Rawls fails to supply any reasoning at all to 
support the conclusion that the Law of Peoples contains a human rights 
clause. Perhaps Rawls believes that the liberal and democratic character of the 
parties to the international social contract straightforwardly implies that all 
would place a premium on human rights, and presumably that much is correct. 
But it is one thing to place a premium on human rights in one's own society, 
another to place a premium on human rights in someone else's, and a third 
thing altogether to insist on an international law principle of human rights-a 
principle that might constrain foreign policy decisions reached through 
democratic means, such as a decision to offer most-favored-nation trade status 
to an egregious human rights violator. Every liberal society will honor human 
rights; that is what makes it liberal. But it does not follow that the principle of 
honoring human rights must belong to the Law of Peoples rather than to the 
domestic laws of peoples. Principles of national law do not automatically 
become principles of international law, even if all liberal democracies enact 
parallel principles. Principles of national law do not necessarily even translate 
into principles of a state's own foreign policy. 
Actually, Rawls offers no reasoning to support any of the eight articles 
in his proposed Law of Peoples; in effect, he leaves them as exercises to the 
reader. But it is fairly straightforward to supply the reasoning that would lead 
peoples to agree to most of them in a hypothetical social contract. For 
example, if I-as representative of my people--do not know whether, when 
the veil of ignorance is lifted, we will be a small and weak people or a great 
power, I will have good reason to insist that "our freedom and independence 
are to be respected by other peoples" (Principle 1) or that "peoples are bound 
to observe a duty of non-intervention" (Principle 4). Principles like these 
protect the weak nations from the strong. 
But why will I have reason to insist that other nations respect the human 
rights of their own nationals? Perhaps one can demonstrate that domestic 
human rights violators are more likely to aggress against their neighbors, but 
that proposition seems doubtful. During the heyday of Latin American 
dictatorships, the gross human rights violations of the regimes in Argentina, 
Brazil, Chile, Ecuador, EI Salvador, Guatemala, Paraguay, and Uruguay did 
not lead to international aggression, and today human rights violators like 
Cuba and Myanmar show no predilection toward aggressing against their 
neighbors. Alternatively, Rawls may believe that liberal democracies treasure 
their own human rights so much that they would agree ex ante (in the 
160. Id. at 37. This principle is one of the eight that constitute the Law of Peoples. 
Subsequently, Rawls extends the result to include decent non-liberal peoples as well. Id. at 62-80. 
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international original position) to permit international sanctions against them 
if they ever become human rights violators. But it is far from self-evident, to 
say the least, that any liberal democratic people would actually choose this as 
a clause in the social contract, let alone that the clause is a requirement of 
reason. Nor would liberal democratic peoples necessarily accept a pro-human-
rights clause in the Law of Peoples that might require them to stop doing 
business with human rights violators. In the end, it seems to me that Rawls 
offers no glimmerings of an argument connecting a liberal democratic 
domestic basic structure with a reasonable requirement to incorporate human 
rights into foreign policy or international law. 
What has gone wrong in the contractarian argument? At bottom, the 
problem stems from the domestic analogy-the analogy between people in a 
domestic society and peoples in an international society. Rawls builds the 
domestic analogy into the fundamental structure of his argument. Rather than 
modeling the Law of Peoples as the outcome of a hypothetical worldwide 
social contract among individuals, Rawls employs a more indirect two-level 
argument, with a separate social contract at each level. In the first, individuals 
agree to fair terms of cooperation within a single polity; this corresponds to 
familiar social contract derivations of governing principles within societies. In 
the second, "rational representatives of liberal peoples ... specify the Law of 
Peoples,,161 through a social contract among peoples. The two contracts mirror 
each other: in one, individuals choose principles for domestic society, and in 
the second, peoples choose principles for the Law of Peoples. The argument 
straightforwardly tracks the terms of the domestic analogy. It implies that the 
resulting principles of international law represent the wills of states (the 
organized form peoples assume), not of humanity. Principles representing the 
interests of humanity would be better modeled by the simpler version of the 
social contract in which individuals directly specify the Law of Peoples 
without the intermediation of states.162 Once Rawls accepts the domestic 
analogy and treats states rather than individuals as bargaining agents for the 
Law of Peoples, the game is up for universal human rightS.163 States' interests 
are parochial rather than cosmopolitan, and states have no reason to 
incorporate the Rrinciple that "[p ]eoples are to honor human rights" into the 
Law of Peoples. 64 
161. !d. at 32. 
162. Two well-known attempts to work out a Rawlsian view of international justice based on 
the one-tier version of the contract are CHARLES BEITZ, POLITICAL THEORY AND INTERNATIONAL 
RELATIONS (1979) and THOMAS W. POGGE, REALIZING RAWLS 241-73 (1989). 
163. It might be objected that Rawls is talking about peoples, not states, and takes pains to 
insist that a people is not the same as a state. However, as Allen Buchanan correctly points out, Rawls 
means "peoples with their own states." Allen Buchanan, Rawls's Law of Peoples: Rules for a Vanished 
Westphalian World, 110 ETHICS 697, 698 (2000). Rawls attributes most traditional powers of 
sovereignty to peoples, and this can make sense only if the people has a state. Only states, not peoples, 
have foreign policies. Id. at 698-99. 
164. For an argument to this effect, see Jack Goldsmith, International Human Rights Law and 
the United States Double Standard, 1 GREEN BAG 2d 365; 369-71 (1998). The proposition that states 
have no reason to incorporate a pro-human rights principle into the Law of Peoples does not mean that 
states have no reason to sign or ratify human rights treaties. Provided that the treaties are under-
enforced, and do not require parties to expend political, economic, or human resources to fight human 
rights abuses abroad, signing the treaties is a relatively cost-free enterprise that may purchase some good 
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We are left with a dilemma. Humanity cannot enact laws, because 
humanity is not a political community. International society (the society of 
states) can enact international laws, at least in the formal sense of hammering 
out verbal formulas endorsing human rights; but these will not be genuine 
laws of humanity without a commitment to enforcement that states have 
proven unwilling to undertake and which is difficult for states to undertake 
given their obligation to put their own citizens' interests first.165 The domestic 
analogy fails to bridge the gulf between the interests of states and those of 
humankind. 
C. The Failure o/the Domestic Analogy 
At this point, it should be clear that Arendt's domestic analogy argument 
that "insofar as the crime was a crime against humanity, it needed an 
international tribunal to do justice to it,,166 rests on an equivocation. Insofar as 
the crime was a crime against the international society of states, it arguably 
needed an international tribunal to do justice to it; but insofar as it was a crime 
against humanity, an international tribunal may well miss the point. An 
international tribunal-a creature of diplomacy and statecraft, not of 
humanity-should arouse a healthy skepticism about whether it can transcend 
the politicking, posturing, and intrigue that mark international political life. 
Obviously, this is not merely a theoretical problem. Although I have 
little doubt that Slobodan Milosevic is responsible for crimes against 
humanity, his accusation that the ICTY proceedings against him are political 
is not absurd (although I believe it is untrue). Nor are American fears that the 
ICC's jurisdiction over the crime of aggression may result in politicized 
prosecutions of American leaders merely redneck intransigence.167 The 
international tribunals will have to demonstrate that they represent the moral 
interests of humanity and not only the political and ideological interests of 
states parties. 
The alternative to international tribunals is the use of national courts to 
prosecute international crimes, either under their national or territorial 
publicity.ld. at 370-71. Oona Hathaway offers a similar explanation for her finding that some countries' 
ratification of human rights treaties correlates with worse human rights records: "When countries are 
rewarded for positions rather than effects-as they are when monitoring and enforcement of treaties are 
minimal and external pressure to conform to treaty norms is high-governments can take positions that 
they do not honor, and benefit from doing so." Oona A. Hathaway, Do Human Rights Treaties Make a 
Difference?, III YALE LJ. 1935, 1941 (2002). Rawls is discussing the real, not merely feigned, 
adoption of a Law of Peoples. 
165. A striking illustration of how states value nationals in comparison to foreigners occurred 
when, in the aftermath of the Rwandan genocide, the United States finally sent troops to Kigali. 
According to General Romeo Dallaire, the commander of the United Nations's peacekeeping force in 
Rwanda, Pentagon planners regarded one American casualty to be the equivalent of 85,000 dead 
Rwandans. POWER, supra note 44, at 38\. 
166. ARENDT, supra note 8, at 269. 
167. Rome Statute, supra note 41, art. 5(I)(d). There exists no single, agreed-upon definition of 
aggression, and the United States fears that an expansive definition might tum most first uses of 
American military force into aggression. Whether they ought to be regarded as aggression is, of course, 
an explosively political issue. In the face of deeply politicized disagreement during the drafting of the 
Rome Statute, the drafters in the end punted, postponing granting the ICC jurisdiction over the crime of 
aggression for at least seven years, while the parties negotiate over the definition of the crime. Rome 
Statute, id. arts. 5(2), 12 \. 
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jurisdiction or, more controversially, under universal jurisdiction. Under the 
Rome Statute, the principle of complementarity gives primacy to national 
investigations over international prosecutions.168 The leI's well-known 
Barcelona Traction dictum states that "the principles and rules concerning the 
basic rights of the human person" give rise to obligations erga omnes-
obligations in the performance of which all states have a legal interest. 169 
Originally intended as a theory of diplomatic protection, not universal 
jurisdiction, the Barcelona Traction dictum has nevertheless entered legal 
folk-culture as an authorization for wide-ranging protection of human rights, 
including universal jurisdiction.17o A few states have accepted the invitation 
and enacted domestic laws against crimes against humanity so that offenders 
can be tried under national rather than international law; a few others have 
enacted universal jurisdiction statutes.I?1 In effect, states that offer their 
national courts to try crimes against humanity do so as a kind of foreign aid, 
lending their well-financed, mature judicial institutions to nations that are 
worse off. The same seems to be true with Alien Tort Statute litigation in the 
168. Rome Statute, id., art. 17(1)(a)-(b). The essence of complementarity is that the ICC's 
jurisdiction complements the jurisdictions of states such that the ICC cannot assert jurisdiction unless 
states prove unwilling or unable to investigate and, when appropriate, prosecute. 
169. Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Co., Ltd. (Belg. v. Spain), 1970 I.C.J. 3, paras. 32-34 
(Feb. 5). In effect, the ICJ argued that basic human rights norms are so important that all states have an 
interest in their protection. That may be true, but we have seen that very little in the political theory of 
the state explains why. 
One solution to this problem lies in the idea that the international community gets its legal 
personification in the United Nations, and thus that the United Nations is the party in interest when 
obligations erga omnes get asserted. See ANDRE DE HOOGH, OBLIGATIONS ERGA OMNES AND 
INTERNATIONAL CRlMES: A THEORETICAL INQUIRY INTO THE IMPLEMENTATION AND ENFORCEMENT OF 
THE INTERNATIONAL RESPONSIBILITY OF STATES 91-127 (1996). But surely it is a far cry from the idea of 
a crime against all humankind-a crime in which all of us have a legal interest-to the idea of a crime in 
which the United Nations has a legal interest. The political authority of the United Nations rests entirely 
on the acquiescence of states and has very little to do with a claim to speak as humanity's representative. 
Of course, the United Nations sometimes does speak as humanity'S representative--several Secretary 
Generals can lay claim to having done so, often with great courage and conviction-but the moral 
authority of the Secretary General's office should not be mistaken for the political authority of the 
United Nations, any more than the moral authority of the papacy to speak for the interests of humankind 
should be mistaken for political authority to do so. 
170. See ROSALYN HIGGINS, PROBLEMS AND PROCESS: INTERNATIONAL LA W AND How WE USE 
IT 57 (1994); Alfred P. Rubin, Actio Popularis, Jus Cogens and Offenses Erga Omnes, 35 NEW ENG. L. 
REv. 265, 277-78 (2001). 
171. For a meticulous country-by-country overview of universal jurisdiction statutes and 
jurisprudence, current through summer 2003, see Luc REYDAMS, UNIVERSAL JURlSDICTION: 
INTERNATIONAL AND MUNICIPAL LEGAL PERSPECTIVES 81-219 (2003). In addition to Reydams's book, 
there is by now a large literature on universal criminal jurisdiction. See, e.g., Gilbert Guillaume, La 
competence universelle, formes anciennes et nouvelles, in MELANGES OFFERTS A GEORGES LEVASSEUR: 
DROIT PENAL, DROIT EUROPEEN 23 (1992); Luis Benavenides, The Universal Jurisdiction Principle: 
Nature and Scope, 1 ANNuARIO MEXICANO DE DERECHO INTERNACIONAL 19 (2001); Curtis A. Bradley, 
Universal Jurisdiction and U.S. Law, U. CHI. LEGAL F. 323 (2001); Kenneth C. Randall, Universal 
Jurisdiction Under International Law, 66 TEX. L. REv. 785 (1988); Anthony Sammons, The "Under-
Theorization" of Universal Jurisdiction: Implications for Legitimacy on Trials of War Criminals By 
National Courts, 21 BERKELEY J. lNT'L L. III (2003); Mark A. Summers, The International Court of 
Justice's Decision in Congo v. Belgium: How Has It Affected the Development of a Principle of 
Universal Jurisdiction That Would Obligate All States To Prosecute War Criminals?, 21 B.U. lNT'L L.J. 
63 (2003); Symposium, Universal Jurisdiction, 35 NEW ENG. L. REv. 241 (2001); Harvard Research 
Project on Criminal Jurisdiction, supra note 1, at 563-92. See also PRINCETON PROJECT ON UNIVERSAL 
JURlSDICTION: THE PRINCETON PRINCIPLES ON UNIVERSAL JURlSDICTION (2001), available at 
http://www.princeton.edul-Iapalunivejur.pdf. 
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United States. 172 Inevitably, such efforts straddle the same fault line as all 
foreign aid and development projects-the line between humanitarianism and 
distributive justice, on the one hand, and paternalism or self-interested 
political meddling on the other. Neither possibility can be excluded. Like 
Belgium's prosecution of Rwandan nuns who participated in the genocide, 
Spain's efforts to go after crimes against humanity committed during the 
Argentinean and Chilean dictatorships may be disinterested pursuits of justice, 
but they also strike some observers as transparent meddling by a former 
colonial master-condescending at best and neo-colonialist at worst. 173 
For better or for worse, international criminal law remains 
jurisdictionally eclectic. Crimes against humanity have been prosecuted in 
national courts (e.g., Canada, France, and Israel)174 and in international 
tribunals (Nuremberg, ICTY, and ICTR), and the Rome Statute's 
complementarity provisions perpetuate this jurisdictional eclecticism. 175 In 
subsequent sections, I shall explain why I think that this should remain a live 
option notwithstanding the possibility of political abuse. 
Our basic question still remains, however: in what sense is humanity (as 
distinct from states or international organs created by states) the party in 
interest when it comes to crimes against humanity? With it comes a parallel 
question: if the international party in interest is humanity, what entitles state-
created courts, either municipal or international, to try criminals in humanity's 
name? 
172. See 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2000). See also the view of Anne-Marie (Slaughter) Burley that 
behind the Alien Tort Statute lay the notion that the United States is honor-bound to fulfill duties under 
the law of nations. Anne-Marie Burley, The Alien Tort Statute and the Judiciary Act of 1789: A Badge of 
Honor, 83 AM. J.INT'L L. 461 (1989). 
173. See, e.g., Congo v. Belgium, supra note 19, (separate opinion ofJudge ad hoc Bula-Bula), 
discussed at length infra in Section IV.A; REYDAMS, supra note 171, at 192 (discussing the hypocrisy of 
Spain prosecuting officials offormer colonies while failing to prosecute members ofthe Franco regime); 
Sammons, supra note 171, at 138-39 (discussing Belgian colonialism and human rights prosecutions); 
Francisco Valdes, Postcolonial Encounters in the Post-Pinochet Era: A Lat-Crit Perspective on Spain, 
Latinas/os and "Hispanismo" in the Development of International Human Rights, 9 U. MIAMI INT'L & 
COMPo L. REv. 189, 208-11 (2000-2001) (discussing tension between the Spanish colonial ideology of 
Hispanismo and human-rights prosecutions). 
The case involving two Rwandan nuns and two other defendants is Prosecutor v. Vincent 
Ntezimana et al., Cour d' Assises de I' Arrondissement Administratif de Bruxelles-Capital (8 June 2001) 
(Belg.), http://www.asf.belAssisesRwanda2/fr/fr_VERDICT_verdict.htm. 
174. See, e.g., the Finta case, supra note 47 (Can.); the Touvier case, supra note 71, and the 
Barbie case, supra note 73 (Fr.); Cr.C. (Jm.) 40/61, Attorney-Gen. of the Gov't ofIsrael v. Eichmann, 
45 P.M. 3, translated in 361NT'LL. REp. 18 (1968) [hereinafter Israel V. Eichmann]. 
175. See Rome Statute, supra note 41, art. 17 (I)(a)-(b). It is an interesting and unsettled 
question whether a state's investigation or prosecution of a purported international criminal under a 
universal jurisdiction theory, rather than a theory of territorial or nationality jurisdiction, would mean 
that, under complementarity, the ICC could not assert its jurisdiction. If the ICC's jurisdiction is 
someday held to pre-ernpt other tribunals' universal jurisdiction, that will undermine jurisdictional 
eclecticism. 
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VII. THE VIGILANTE JURISDICTION 
A. The Human Interest in Repressing Crimes Against Humanity 
The answer to the first question, I think, has been apparent all along. To 
call humanity-humankind-a party in interest is not to regard humanity as a 
political community, but rather as a set of human individuals. To say that 
humanity has an interest in suppressing crimes against humanity is to say that 
human individuals share that interest, not that some collective entity called 
"humanity" has it. 
It is tempting to argue that the interest all humans share in expunging 
crimes against humanity from the repertoire of human behavior is a moral 
interest, a recognition that these crimes are the most odious we can imagine. 
But this argument is too facile. After all, in the twentieth century, hundreds of 
thousands of more-or-Iess ordinary people committed crimes against 
humanity, apparently with few if any moral qualms. In what sense, then, did 
these legions of ordinary executioners share a moral interest in repressing 
their own crimes? Arendt puts the objection strongly: "To fall back on an 
unequivocal voice of conscience--or, in the even vaguer language of the 
jurists, on a 'general sentiment of humanity'-not only begs the question, it 
signifies a deliberate refusal to take notice of the central moral, legal, and 
political phenomena of our century.,,176 Line up the 1915 Turkish ar.my, the 
1942 S.S., the 1992 Balkan militias, the interahamwe and machete-wielding 
Rwandan civilians of 1994--and, for that matter, the American lynch mobs of 
the 1920s-in an imaginary diabolical muster of criminals against humanity. 
Then tell this enormous multitude of humanity that what they have done 
violates the general sentiment of humanity and hear their response: "Who is 
this 'humanity' whose general sentiment we have violated? Humanity consists 
of people like us." Unless we are prepared to deny the humanity of the 
criminals-and reflect on the irony of that!-we will have to agree with their 
response. 
To be sure, sophisticated psychology contains resources for explaining 
how people's moral responses can deviate catastrophically from their baseline 
moral beliefs without their being aware of it. Famous experiments in social 
psychology have demonstrated that people subjected to seemingly mild 
situational pressures to conform to murderous roles and commands will do so 
in remarkably high numbers, even though what they are doing deviates from 
their sincerely stated moral convictions when they are outside the situation.177 
But the disquieting ease of recruiting people to commit crimes against 
humanity nevertheless casts doubt on how universally shared the purely moral 
interest in repressing these crimes really is. After all, how can we be certain 
which situationally induced moral beliefs represent the baseline and which 
176. ARENDT, supra note 8, at 148 (citation omitted). 
177. I summarize and discuss some of these experiments in David Luban, The Ethics of 
Wrongful Obedience, in ETHICS IN PRACTICE: LA WYERS' ROLES, REsPONSIBILITIES, AND REGULATION 94 
(Deborah L. Rhode ed., 2000); David Luban, Integrity: Its Causes and Cures, 72 FORDHAM L. REv. 279 
(2003). 
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represent the deviations? Why not suppose that murderous attacks on 
supposed blood enemies of one's ethnic, racial, or religious group, encouraged 
by community leaders and moral authorities, do represent some people's 
moral baseline?178 Richard Rorty may well be right when he speculates that 
most people "live in a world in which it would be just too risky-indeed, 
would often be insanely dangerous-to let one's sense of moral community 
stretch beyond one's family, clan, or tribe.,,179 For such people, claiming that 
their moral baseline condemns the group-on-group violence of crimes against 
humanity simply begs the question. 
Once again, I suggest that looking to the law itself explains the universal 
human interest in repressing crimes against humanity. The theory embedded 
in the law, developed in Part III of this Article, explains why all humankind 
shares that interest. According to that theory, the distinguishing feature of 
crimes against humanity arises from our character as political animals. Each 
of us is an individual who belongs to groups and who has no alternative to 
living in politically organized communities; we are all, in effect, hostage to 
politics. Even if Rorty is right that expanding the sense of moral community 
beyond the family, clan, or tribe seems unacceptably dangerous to most 
people in the world, the last century's historical experiences of massacre and 
violence show how much more dangerous it is not to. The law was born out of 
these experiences, and its birth pains were the agonies of millions. 
The human interest in expunging crimes against humanity from the 
repertoire of politics seems straightforward: in a world where crimes against 
humanity proceed unchecked, each of us could become the object of murder 
or persecution solely on the basis of group affiliations we are powerless to 
change. This is not a merely hypothetical threat. Today we live in a world in 
which almost all nations are patchworks of ethnic, racial, religious, and 
cultural groups. In part, this is the result of globalization. But it is also the 
product of a century of wars and upheavals that have displaced hundreds of 
millions of people. Ours is a world of diasporas everywhere, a world in which 
innumerable groups find themselves in the situation of the "eternal Jew": 
strangers in a strange land, even when-like the German Jews and the 
Rwandan Tutsis-they are no strangers and have dwelt in the land for 
centuries. The crimes against humanity that drenched the twentieth century in 
gore proved that group-on-group politics has no built-in principle of restraint. 
And so, just as all women share an interest in ensuring that women are not 
killed solely for being women, and all Jews share an interest in ensuring that 
Jews are not killed solely because they are Jews, all human beings share an 
interest in ensuring that people are not killed by their neighbors solely because 
178. Of course, matters are unlikely to be quite so simple. For example, Mark Osiel reports that 
Argentinian officers involved in the disappearances and tortures of the Dirty War were often deeply 
reluctant to commit what they knew were atrocious crimes. They turned for guidance to the priests they 
regarded as supreme moral authorities, and were told that their deeds were essential to defend Catholic 
civilization against communism and the slow moral decay brought on by liberalism. MARK J. OSIEL, 
MAss ATROCITY, ORDINARY EVIL, supra note 12. Here, the officers' moral baselines seem to have 
included inconsistencies between the recognition that they were committing profound crimes and the 
belief in the moral authority of their priests. 
179. Rorty, Human Rights, Rationality, and Sentimentality, supra note 87, at 125. 
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of their group affiliation; for all of us have neighbors whose group is not our 
own. 
The nature of modern states intensifies this interest, because technical 
advances in administration, in information gathering, in monitoring and 
tracking people, in transporting killers and victims swiftly from place to place, 
and-above all-in slaughtering people, have made crimes against humanity 
feasible to a degree never attained in earlier epochs. Even the low-tech 
Rwandan genocide, carried out in large part with machetes and clubs, was 
possible only because of a highly rationalized state apparatus, a system of 
ethnically coded identity cards, and a centralized radio station inciting and 
coordinating the murderers. The Rwandan genocide could hardly have 
occurred before the twentieth century. These two facts of modern life-the 
piebald character of states, and the technical advances that make large-scale, 
coordinated attacks on civilians possible-are the real source of the universal 
human interest in suppressing crimes against humanity. 
Thus the "laws of humanity" are a recognition of the heightened danger 
of politics in the modem world. They are not, at bottom, laws created by any 
political community at all, but rather by universal human need. Their 
normative force does not arise from the fact that they have been positivized in 
the statutes of the international tribunals and a few domestic legal systems, 
nor from the tepid commitment of states to enforce them. They represent 
every human being's rightful demand that the political rough-and-tumble 
never again include the uttermost barbarism that crimes against humanity 
represent. Anyone who transgresses these laws is henceforth an enemy of all 
humans.lso 
180. As we saw earlier in Part V there is a danger that thinking in such terms demonizes 
criminals against humanity. But I trust that the earlier discussion of the demonization critique offers 
adequate caution against this danger. 
The approach I follow here--combining (a) an insistence that jurisdiction over crimes against 
humanity originates in people, not states; (b) a jurisdictional eclecticism that allows various tribunals to 
exercise that jurisdiction; and (c) an argument that the human interest in repressing crimes against 
humanity arises from piebald societies and advanced technology-superficially resembles the 
"cosmopolitan pluralism" of Paul Schiff Berman, The Globalization of Jurisdiction, 151 U. PA. L. REv. 
311, 490-96 (2002). But the resemblance is more apparent than real. Berman's theory of jurisdiction 
derives from a postmodemist recognition that people belong to multiple and shifting communities, 
including sub-state communities, all of which have claims to jurisdiction over some matters of concern 
to them. The view I present here is a straightforward Enlightenment-inspired conception of a universal 
human interest in expunging extreme violence and persecution from the repertoire of politics. It is based 
on a universalist description of human political nature, and that makes it cosmopolitan universalist rather 
than cosmopolitan pluralist. Moreover, I suspect that-like most liberal cosmopolitans-I take a more 
jaundiced view of "imagined communities" than Berman does. Where he finds them a source of 
meaning and identity, id. at 472-76, I fmd them a seed-bed of ethnic or religious strife, and thus 
contributing causes of crimes against humanity; furthermore, I find metaphysical claims that community 
constitutes identity overstated. Luban, supra note 95. Most importantly, my argument is far narrower 
than Berman's; it is an argument about jurisdiction over crimes against humanity, not about jurisdiction 
in general, and I have no wish to generalize the jurisdictional theory beyond crimes against humanity. 
The argument, after all, is that all humankind has an interest in repressing these crimes, not that all 
humankind has an interest in anything more robust. 
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B. Hostis Humani Generis 
The precondition of criminal punishment is the severing of bonds with 
the wrongdoer-the withdrawal of social protection that opens him to 
shunning, imprisonment, or, in the extreme case, execution. In ordinary 
domestic crimes (not crimes against humanity, but crimes against a specific 
community), the withdrawal of protection is only partial. The community-
personified for such purposes by the state-gets to punish the wrongdoer, but 
individuals, including the crime victims, do not. This merely restates the 
earlier observation that municipal crimes are offenses against the community, 
and that the community is the party in interest. As we have seen, because there 
is no world community, the party in interest in a crime against humanity is 
humanity itself taken severally, not jointly. Here, the withdrawal of social 
protection from the wrongdoer is universal. As Arendt put it in her imaginary 
speech to Eichmann about why he must be punished: "[W]e find that no one, 
that is, no member of the human race, can be expected to want to share the 
earth with yoU.,,181 
The archetype of such universal severing of bonds with the wrongdoer is 
God's banishment of Cain (before God relents and protects him). "[T]he voice 
of thy brother's blood crieth unto me from the ground. And now art thou 
cursed from the earth, which hath opened her mouth to receive thy brother's 
blood from thy hand; . . . a fugitive and a vagabond shalt thou be in the 
earth.,,182 Cain immediately understands the practical significance of God's 
curse: "[E]very one that findeth me shall slay me.,,183 Cain has become, in the 
literal sense, hostis humani generis-unfit for the society of anyone, and 
(within the moral limits of proportionality) anyone's legitimate target. 
I am suggesting that taking seriously the notion of crimes against 
humanity, in the sense of crimes against all humankind, implies a different 
jurisdictional conclusion than Arendt's domestic analogy argument for 
international tribunals. The jurisdiction implicit in crimes against humanity is 
not international jurisdiction, nor even universal jurisdiction in the familiar 
lawyer's sense of jurisdiction that falls to the courts of any state, but rather 
what might be called vigilante jurisdiction in which the criminal becomes 
anyone's and everyone's legitimate enemy.l84 I choose this term, with all its 
181. ARENDT, supra note 8, at 279. Arendt is explaining why Eichmann must be executed, but 
her explanation fits non-capital punishment as well: I do not quote her to signify my support for the 
capital punishment of those who perpetrate crimes against humanity. My own view is that justice neither 
requires nor forbids capital punishment for heinous violations of other people; thus, the decision whether 
to abolish capital punishment must be arrived at on other grounds, such as the presence or absence of a 
collective sense that capital punishment is inconsistent with civilized standards. 
182. Genesis 4:10-12 (King James). 
183. Genesis 4:14 (King James). 
184. Interestingly enough, Arendt comes close to this suggestion when she proposes that it 
might have been legitimate for a Jew to assassinate Eichmann on the streets of Buenos Aires, provided 
that the assassin was willing to stand trial. She praises similar assassinations carried out by solitary 
individuals on the streets of Europe against the organizers of the 1917-20 Ukrainian pogroms and the 
Armenian genocide. ARENDT, supra note 8, at 265-67. Paul Kahn comes close to a similar suggestion 
when he argues that the Spanish efforts to bring Pinochet to trial are neither more nor less legitimate 
than a hit squad pursuing grave human rights violators around the world. Kahn, On Pinochet, supra note 
148. 
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uncomfortable connotations, rather than the familiar legal term "universal 
jurisdiction," for an important reason. A universal jurisdiction offense is one 
that all states have an interest in prosecuting, but I am arguing that the interest 
in repressing crimes against humanity is universal among people, not 
necessarily among states. Humankind, not the community of states, is a party 
in interest in crimes against humanity, and "humankind" refers to an aggregate 
of humans, not a collective entity. Politically speaking, no such collective 
entity exists. And the concomitant obligation erga omnes of states is the 
obligation to withdraw protection from the perpetrator, just as God withdrew 
h . fr C' 185 uman protectIOn om am. 
VIII. NATURAL JUSTICE AND JURISDICTIONAL ECLECTICISM 
I expect the notion of vigilante jurisdiction will strike many readers as a 
monstrous suggestion, because it declares open season on anyone whom 
anyone else reasonably believes to be a criminal against humanity. I agree that 
the prospect of vigilante justice is monstrous. But it is important to see why. 
The reason is not that only states and their instrumentalities have the moral 
right to punish the guilty. It is that vigilantes cannot be trusted to determine 
who is guilty and who is not, nor to moderate their punishments to fit the 
crime. Remember that in the Bible story, God tempers Cain's punishment by 
protecting him against vigilantes.186 
Consider a fictional example of vigilante justice at work: Ariel 
Dorfman's disturbing drama of transitional justice, Death and the Maiden. 187 
Through a series of coincidences, a physician who may have presided over 
rape and torture sessions during the Pinochet dictatorship falls into the 
clutches of one of the victims, Paulina. Paulina stages her own "trial" of the 
doctor, based on a simple proposition: confess and live, or deny and die. The 
doctor frantically insists that she has the wrong man. Paulina was blindfolded 
during her entire ordeal fifteen years before, and she recognizes the doctor 
only by his voice. Her husband, Gerardo, a prominent human rights lawyer, is 
in agony over Paulina's mad plan, but he can do nothing because Paulina has 
a gun pointed at the doctor's head. All he can do is plead with her. 
Gerardo: A vague memory of someone's voice is not proof of 
anything, Paulina, it is not incontrovertible .... What 
can he confess ifhe's innocent? 
Paulina: Ifhe's innocent? Then he's really screwed.188 
185. This view is analogous to early theorists' analysis of universal jurisdiction. As Luc 
Reydams explicates the arguments of Grotius and Vattel, ''The accent is ... more on the negative 
obligation not to shield a fugitive from prosecution by granting asylum than on a positive right to 
exercise universal jurisdiction. The right is primarily a corollary of the obligation." REVDAMS, supra 
note 171, at 36-37. 
186. Genesis 4:10-12 (King James). 
187. ARIEL DORFMAN,DEATH AND THE MAIDEN (1991). 
188. [d. act 1, sc. 4; act 2, sc. 1. 
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Paulina insists that "[d]uring all these years not an hour has passed that I 
haven't heard it, that same voice,,,189 but later even she admits that she may be 
mistaken.190 And the price of her mistake will be a death sentence, regardless 
of whether the doctor has committed crimes. The doctor's plight--on 
Gerardo's hypothesis of innocence--represents the problem with vigilante 
. . 191 JustIce. 
Of course, official tribunals also screw the innocent, because courts are 
seldom interested solely in the truth. In recent years, the American debate 
about the death penalty has finally begun to come to grips with the travesty of 
many capital trials, with their incompetent defense attorneys and vindictive 
prosecutors. In every legal system, rules of evidence and procedure 
incorporate trade-offs between fact-finding accuracy, the protection of 
privacy, investigative cost, and the sheer desire to mollify the public with 
quick convictions and harsh penalties. 
But these difficulties demonstrate the need for better tribunals, not no 
tribunals. Open tribunals with even-handed and rational rules, written bills of 
indictment for crimes whose elements must be specified and proven beyond a 
reasonable doubt, uncompromised defense counsel, a presumption of 
innocence, and the other requirements of natural justice provide the best 
safeguard against rEunishing the innocent, whereas vigilante justice offers no 
safeguard at all. 1 As Jackson argued at Nuremberg (in words I quoted 
earlier): "If these men are the first war leaders of a defeated nation to be 
prosecuted in the name of the law, they are also the first to be given a chance 
to plead for their lives in the name of the law. Realistically, the Charter of this 
Tribunal, which gives them a hearing, is also the source of their only hope.,,193 
The British, after all, wished to shoot them on the spot rather than try them. 
And if the British had spared them, it seems entirely likely that their own 
countrymen would have lynched them. Limiting the entitlement to punish to 
tribunals built on the requirements of natural justice functions like the mark of 
Cain, protecting suspected wrongdoers from the caprice of vigilantism or 
victors' vengeance. 
Only tribunals respecting the requirements of natural justice should be 
authorized to try those accused of crimes against humanity, and in practice 
these tribunals must be established by states or international organizations 
established by states. But the authority of these tribunals derives from the 
vigilante jurisdiction and the requirements of natural justice, not from the 
political authority of the states that sponsor them. If state-established tribunals 
189. Id. act 1, sc. 4. 
190. Id. act 3, sc. I. 
191. Or rather, it represents a problem with vigilante justice. The fundamental objection to 
vigilantism since Aeschylus's Oresteia has not been its erratic fact-finding, but its potential for 
generating endless blood feuds. At the end of Eumenides, where the establishment of a court displaces 
the Furies (representing endless cycles of vengeance and vendetta), the chorus prays that their city 
should not be given over to ''the dry dust that drinks/the black blood of citizens/through passion for 
revenge/and bloodshed for bloodshed." AESCHYLUS, Eumenides, in AESCHYLUS I: ORESTEIA 169, 11. 
979-82 (Richard Lattimore trans., 1953). 
192. For an explanation of the term "natural justice," see supra note 17. 
193. 2 TRIAL OF THE MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS, supra note 136, at 102. 
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assume exclusive power to try and punish, the primary reason is to protect the 
accused against mistakes and not because states have a direct interest in 
punishment. In effect, this brings universal jurisdiction in through the back 
door, because any national or international tribunal satisfying the conditions 
of natural justice may exercise it. But the real basis is a kind of delegated or 
representative jurisdiction, derived from the vigilante jurisdiction. 
The arguments I offer here are hardly novel. In fact, they echo Grotius, 
the founder of international law. According to Grotius, anyone has the natural 
right to punish a criminal.194 "But as our judgment is apt to be biassed [sic] ... 
since the fonnation of families into states, judges have been appointed, and 
invested with the power of punishing the guilty .... ,,195 Grotius's natural right 
to punish resembles what I have called the vigilante jurisdiction-and his 
caution about biased judgment implies that official tribunals derive their 
jurisdiction from the natural right to punish, an argument parallel to the one 
offered here. Notably, Grotius also maintained that any state has jurisdiction 
"not only for injuries affecting immediately themselves or their own subjects, 
but for gross violations of the law of nature and of nations, done to other states 
and subjects"-that is, for crimes against humanity.196 
Tribunals that respect natural justice may be either national or 
international, just as tribunals that violate it may be either. The requirement of 
natural justice implies jurisdictional eclecticism, governed by the principle 
that any forum is appropriate to try crimes against humanity provided that it 
offers a good approximation of natural justice. 
The other reason for jurisdictional eclecticism, a reason inherent in the 
Rome Statute's complementarity principle,197 is that nations may not be 
willing to prosecute their own criminals against humanity. Criminals against 
humanity have friends and defenders; operating, as they do, in their organized 
groups, they could hardly fail to. The vigilante jurisdiction permits any 
tribunal-be it a national tribunal exercising jurisdiction over its own citizens 
or those who have injured its citizens, the national tribunal of a third-party 
country exercising universal jurisdiction, the ICC, or an ad hoc international 
tribunal-to adjudicate crimes against humanity, so long as it provides natural 
justice. 
A crucial component of natural justice is impartiality-in Grotius' s 
words, "our judgment is apt to be biassed [sic] by our affections, in cases 
where our interest is concerned.,,198 That raises the delicate question of 
whether a politically motivated prosecution violates the requirements of 
natural justice. As a general proposition, the answer is no. After all, every 
194. HuGO GROTIUS, DE JURE BELLI AC PACIS [THE RIGHTS OF WAR AND PEACE) 228, bk. II, 
ch. 20, sec. VII (A.C. Campbell trans., M. Walter Dunne 1901). Elsewhere, Grotius is more cautious and 
confines the natural right to punish to individuals "of competent judgment, and not implicated in similar 
or equal offences." Id. at 226. 
195. Id. at 228. 
196. Id. at 247, bk. II, ch. 20, sec. XL. The Israeli District Court that convicted Adolph 
Eichmann quoted these arguments of Grotius to justify its exercise of jurisdiction in the case. Israel v. 
Eichmann, supra note 174, para. 14. 
197. Rome Statute, supra note 41, art. 17 (I)(a)-(b). 
198. GROTlUS, supra note 194, at 228, bk. II, ch. 20, sec. VIII. 
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prosecution of crimes against humanity originates in political decisions and 
motives. Political organization gives birth to these crimes, and putting 
perpetrators on trial means putting their politics on trial. Justice in such cases 
can hardly be disentangled from political ends such as discrediting the 
perpetrators' politics. Some theorists maintain that political trials of major 
human rights violators are not only inevitable, but indeed desirable. 199 Both 
the Nuremberg and Eichmann trials were politically motivated, but their 
overall fairness-and above all the felt sense of necessity in staging them-
ultimately overcame the appearance that they were tainted. 
Arendt's complex view of the Eichmann trial seems right to me. 
Contrary to the exponents of political trials, Arendt insists that the sole 
purpose of the trial was to do justice to Eichmann, not to fulfill political goals 
or even to make a historical record of Nazi crimes.200 She harshly criticizes 
the prosecution and Israeli Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion for mUddying 
the waters of the trial with ulterior political motives. But she also rejects the 
argument that Israeli judges could not be counted on to conduct a fair trial and 
lauds the judges for doing everything in their power to prevent the trial from 
deteriorating into a political sham.201 In other words, Arendt grasps that a trial 
launched for political reasons may nevertheless be conducted fairly; and even 
those who favor political trials do not want rigged Vishinskyite farces. 202 No 
doubt the professionalization of the judiciary and a separation of powers that 
provides judges with genuine insulation will prove to be necessary conditions 
for the requisite objectivity, though no one should be under any illusions that 
these conditions will be sufficient.203 
199. This view is defended most famously by JUDITH N. SHKLAR, LEGALISM (1964). The best 
contemporary exponents are DOUGLAS, supra note 1 and MARK OSIEL, MAss ATROCITY, COLLECTIVE 
MEMORY, AND THE LAW (1999). 
200. ARENDT, supra note 8, at 253. In this view, Arendt echoes the eloquent disclaimer of the 
Israeli District Court, which emphasized that "[t]he judicial process has ways of its own, laid down by 
law and immutable, whatever the subject-matter of the trial," and forcefully insisted that a court of law 
is suited neither for historical investigation (because the court passively accepts only the evidence the 
parties bring to it) nor for moralizing (because "[a]s for questions of principle which are outside the 
realm of law, no one has made us judges of them and therefore our opinion on them carries no greater 
weight than that of any person who has devoted study and thought to these questions"). Israel v. 
Eichmann, supra note 174, para. 2. 
201. ARENDT, supra note 8, at 259-60. 
202. Andrei Yanuarievich Vishinsky (1883-1954) was the chief prosecutor at the Moscow 
"Witch Trials" of 1936-38. See generally ROBERT CONQUEST, THE GREAT TERROR (1968). See also 
DOUGLAS, supra note 1, at II (arguing that even a political trial "must satisfy law's stem 
requirements"); OSIEL, supra note 199, at 69 (arguing that liberal governments may stage show trials 
only if they "adhere to legal rules reflecting liberal principles of procedural fairness and personal 
culpability as conditions of criminal liability"); SHKLAR, supra note 199, at 152 (arguing that "[p]olitical 
trials are not defensible" if they "circumvent the demands oflegality"). 
203. The best proof of the fairness of the Nuremberg Tribunal lies in its acquittal of such major 
figures of the Third Reich as Fritzsche, Papen, and Schacht. In this vein, it seems relevant that it was an 
Israeli court that ultimately exonerated Ivan Demjanjuk from charges that he was the Treblinka guard 
"Ivan the Terrible." Cr.C. (Jm.) 373/86, Israel v. Demjanjuk (1988), rev·d Cr.A. 347/88, Demjanjuk v. 
Israel, 47(4) P.D. 221 (S. Ct.1993). This was after an American court had found to the contrary. United 
States v. Demjanjuk, 518 F. Supp. 1362 (N.D. Ohio 1981). The Israeli court's decision was based on the 
finding that Demjanjuk was actually an S.S. guard at Sobibor - hardly a show-stopper if the Israeli 
court was truly bent on vengeance. The Demjanjuk case stands as a testimonial to the ability of a court to 
engage in objective fact-finding, notwithstanding the political stake that its nation has in pursuing the 
trial. A useful summary of the history of the Demjanjuk case, and the extensive investigation Israel 
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The case may be different when it comes to a prosecution under 
universal jurisdiction, where the transparent urgency of the Nuremberg and 
Eichmann trials is absent, the trier's connection to the case is slight, and a 
political motivation is suspected. Precisely because many nations could 
prosecute under universal jurisdiction in such cases, the trial may raise 
suspicions grave enough to violate the requirements of natural justice even 
though its overall process is fair. 204 
Jurisdictional eclecticism holds that any tribunal satisfying the 
requirements of natural justice should be able to assert jurisdiction over 
crimes against humanity, but the natural question arises as to who decides 
whether a tribunal meets the requirements of natural justice. After all, it is one 
thing to state an ideal and another to institutionalize it. To begin with the 
obvious, no person brought to trial for a crime against humanity can count on 
a custodial court for protection from its own unfairness. Faced with a 
challenge, a fair court will decide fairly that it is a fair court; and an unfair 
court will decide unfairly that it is a fair court.205 Diplomatic or political 
pressure from the outside world is the only real protection against an unfair 
trial that an accused person can count upon once he or she is in the custody of 
a court lacking in natural justice. Thus, scrutinizing the fairness of tribunals 
can protect suspects from unfair trials only if it happens before they fall into 
the custody of the tribunals. In practice, this means that any institutional 
mechanism for evaluating tribunals must operate when a custodial power is 
deciding whether to honor the tribunals' extradition requests. 
There is no reason to doubt that outsiders can judge the natural justice of 
a tribunal; existing law contemplates such an inquiry in vanous 
circumstances. One is the procedure contemplated by the ICC's 
complementarity provisions. Under the Rome Statute, the ICC has jurisdiction 
over a case only if a state which has jurisdiction over it is "unwilling or unable 
genuinely to carry out the investigation or prosecution,,,206 which implies that 
the ICC may have to put a state's legal system on trial to determine 
unwillingness.207 Indeed, where doubts arise as to whether a state is merely 
undertook that led to Demjanjuk's eventual acquittal, may be found at Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 
The Demjanjuk Case Factual and Legal Details (July 28, 1993), at http://www.israel.org/mfalgo.asp? 
MF AHOaziO. Extensive documention of the Israeli proceedings are available at The Nizkor Project, 
John Demjanjuk, at http://www.nizkor.org/hweb/peopleld/demjanjuk-johnl (last visited Dec. 14,2003). 
204. I elaborate elsewhere on this argument in connection with the British House of Lords' 
decision to set aside its first Pinochet opinion because of an apparent conflict of interest on the part of 
one of the judges. David Luban, Law's Blindfold, in CONFLICT OF INTEREST IN THE PROFESSIONS 23, 25-
27, 30-34 (Michael Davis & Andrew Stark eds., 2001). I argue that while the mere appearance of 
conflicts of interest not actually present should not generally disqualify judges from trying cases, a high-
profile international case like Pinochet demands different treatment. The suspicion of a politically partial 
decision could discredit the process and tum Pinochet into a martyr. The Pinochet case is also discussed 
further infra at notes 264-271 and accompanying text. 
205. In either case, the inquiry is not likely to be searching-in the case of an unfair tribunal, 
because it does not want a searching inquiry, and in the case of a fair tribunal, because it does not need 
one. The ICTY, the procedural fairness of which is in my view beyond serious doubt, faced challenges 
to its natural justice by Slobodan Milosevic. It disposed of them in a few short paragraphs. Decision on 
Preliminary Motions, Prosecutor v. Milosevic, Case No. IT-02-54, paras. 8-22 (Trial Chamber, Int'l 
Crim. Trib. for the Former Yuglosavia, Nov. 8, 2001), http://www.un.orglicty/ind-e.htm. 
206. Rome Statute, supra note 41, art. 17(1)(a). 
207. See id., art. 17(2). 
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going through the motions of investigation and prosecution in order to shield a 
defendant, the Rome Statute instructs the Court to "consider ... whether ... 
the proceedinrs were not or are not being conducted independently or 
impartially."zo In other words, the Rome Statute presumes that the ICC is 
competent to scrutinize state legal systems for fairness. 
By contrast, states hearing extradition requests by other states normally 
follow a "rule of judicial noninquiry" into the fairness of the requesting state's 
legal system.209 However, the rule does not derive from an incapacity of one 
state's judiciary to evaluate the fairness of another's; rather, its motivation is 
to preserve international comity. Furthermore, the rule has exceptions, and 
courts in both the United States and Canada have stated that they will not 
follow it in cases where a foreign court's deviations from due process are 
gross-a dictum that implies the availability of judicial inquiry into other 
states' judicial systems, for how else could a judge determine that the foreign 
court's deviations are groSS?ZlO It would require no great modification of 
existing law to reverse the presumption of judicial noninquiry when a state 
with no obvious jurisdictional connection to a supposed crime against 
humanity attempts to extradite a suspect for trial under universal jurisdiction. 
Thus, in two of the most likely contexts where the question of jurisdiction 
arises-potential prosecution by a party to the ICC, and extradition requests 
by states wishing to prosecute someone accused of crimes against humanity-
mechanisms modeled on those already in place could be instituted to examine 
whether a state aiming to put the accused on trial satisfies the conditions of 
natural justice. 
IX. AN ILLUSTRATION: CONGO V. BELGIUM 
At this point, I wish to illustrate several themes broached so far by 
discussing an extended example: the ICJ's Congo v. BelgiumZl1 decision, also 
known as the Arrest Warrant case. First, I take up the question about political 
trials raised in the preceding section by examining accusations that Belgium's 
attempted prosecution of the Democratic Republic of the Congo's foreign 
minister was politically tainted. Next, I examine the various separate opinions 
debating the legality of universal jurisdiction statutes. My aim is to 
demonstrate that the debate lies precisely on the fault line separating 
classically state-centered international law from a view that subordinates the 
interests of states to those of humankind. Precisely the same large divide lies 
at the basis of the final issue I consider-the question of immunity that the IC] 
addressed in its principal Congo v. Belgium holding. Thus, the overall aim of 
this extended case study is to illustrate the instabilities that the appeal to 
"humanity" occupies in the world of international law. 
208. Id. art. 17(2)(c). 
209. See John Dugard & Christine Van den Wyngaert, Reconciling Extradition with Human 
Rights, 92 AM. J.INT'L L. 187, 189-91,202-04 (1998) (discussing rule of non inquiry and exceptions to 
protect defendants against human rights violations). 
210. Id. at 190. 
211. Congo v. Belgium, supra note 19. 
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Congo v. Belgium arose from the attempt by Belgium to prosecute the 
Democratic Republic of Congo's foreign minister, Abdulaye Yerodia 
Ndombasi, for grave breaches and crimes against humanity. The charges were 
based on anti-Tutsi speeches Yerodia had made in 1998, which allegedly led 
to several hundred lynchings and summary executions.212 When a Brussels 
magistrate issued a warrant for Yerodia's arrest under Belgium's universal 
jurisdiction statute,213 Congo instituted proceedings against Belgium in the 
International Court of Justice to quash the warrant, in order to redress the 
"moral injury" done to Congolese sovereignty. Congo argued that Belgium's 
universal jurisdiction statute violated international law, and that under 
customary international law a foreign minister enjoys immunity from 
prosecution. After the parties agreed to drop the universal jurisdiction issue, 
the ICJ addressed only the immunity issue (although several judges issued 
separate opinions on universal jurisdiction), and agreed with the Congo.z14 
This case attracted a great deal of attention. Belgium's universal 
jurisdiction statute compelled prosecutors to investigate complaints initiated 
by putative victims of humanitarian crimes. The result was a flood of 
proceedings against other world leaders, including Yasser Arafat (palestine), 
Paul Biya (Cameroon), Fidel Castro (Cuba), Laurent Gbagbo (Ivory Coast), 
Hissen Habn~ (Chad), Saddam Hussein (Iraq), Denis Nguesso (Congo-
Brazzaville), Augusto Pinochet (Chile), Hashemi Rafsanjani (Iran), and Ariel 
Sharon (Israel~; the Sharon case, in particular, proved to be a lightning-rod of 
controversy. 21 Belgium, aPEarently, had decided to become the Delaware of 
international criminal law. 16 Indeed, in the wake of Congo v. Belgium, 
Belgian legislators who support expansive universal jurisdiction introduced 
legislation to reassert Belgium's ability to pursue its prosecutions. 
Subsequent events unfolded at a startling pace. In March 2003, at the 
behest of family members of civilians killed in the 1991 Gulf War, Belgian 
prosecutors launched an investigation of former President George H. W. Bush, 
Vice President Dick Cheney, Secretary of State Colin Powell, and retired 
212. Jacques Verges, an attorney representing the Democratic Republic of the Congo in the ICJ 
proceeding, explained the basis of the charges: 
In the first place, he is alleged to have made a televised statement on 4 August 1998, in 
which "speaking in Kilongo, the language of the Bas Congo [sic]", he called on "his 
brothers" to "rise up as one to throw the common enemy out of the country" using all 
possible weapons available, ''including shotguns, machetes, pickaxes, arrows, sticks and 
stones." It is further alleged that on 27 August 1998 H.E. Yerodia Ndombasi said of the 
enemy: "They are scum, germs that must be methodically eradicated .... " 
Oral Pleadings of Nov. 20, 2000, Congo v. Belgium, supra note 19, http://www.u-
paris2.fr/cij/icjwww/idocketliCOBE/iCOBEcr/iCOBE _icr2000-32 _ translation. him. 
213. Loi du 16 juin 1993 relative a la repression des infractions graves aux Conventions 
intemationales de Geneve du 12 aoiit 1949 et aux Protocols I et II du 8 juin 1977, additionnels aces 
Conventions, Moniteur Beige, Aug. 5, 1993, at 17751 (Belg.). 
214. Congo v. Belgium, supra note 19. Originally, the Democratic Republic of the Congo had 
based its complaint both on objections to universal jurisdiction and arguments that Yerodia should be 
immune from prosecution. During the course of the litigation, Congo abandoned the first claim, and this 
precluded the ICJ from addressing it. 
215. Congo v. Belgium, supra note 19 (separate opinion of Judge ad hoc Bula-Bula), para. 79; 
Congo v. Belgium, supra note 19 (dissenting opinion ofJudge ad hoc Van den Wyngaert), para. 87. 
216. For a clear discussion of the Belgian events, see REYDAMS, supra note 171, at 106-18. Not 
without reason, Reydams describes the events as "a veritable juridical soap opera." [d. at 109. 
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General Norman Schwartzkopf, concerning the bombing of Baghdad's al-
Amiriya shelter.217 Belgium hastily amended its law to exclude such 
embarrassing prosecutions in the future; nevertheless, at a June NATO 
meeting, U.S. Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld threatened to move 
NATO's headquarters out of Brussels unless the Belgian law was 
rescinded.218 In July 2003, Belgium responded by caving in to American 
pressure. The Belgian legislature amended the statute to apply only if the 
victim or the accused was a Belgian citizen or long-term resident at the time 
of the alleged crime, and to grant immunity to high government officials.2I9 It 
is thus no longer a universal jurisdiction statute. In one sense, this history 
presents a cautionary tale on the imprudence of an aggressive, overreaching 
universal jurisdiction statute, and it is conceivable that it is the end of 
universal criminal ~urisdiction, because henceforth no nation will risk arousing 
American wrath. 2 0 Nobody wants to become a second Icarus. In another 
sense, of course, the fact that Belgium was bullied out of her ambitious 
enforcement project proves nothing at all about the soundness or wisdom of 
universal jurisdiction as a matter of principle. In the discussion that follows, I 
adopt the latter perspective. As we shall see, important arguments can be 
offered against universal jurisdiction, but the bare fact that the U.S. 
government aggressively opposes it is not one of them. 
A. Judge Bula-Bula 's Separate Opinion 
Among the numerous separate opinions in Congo v. Belgium, the 
astonishing diatribe by Judge ad hoc Bula-Bula (the Democratic Republic of 
the Congo's representative on the Court) stands out. The lengthy, 
unconventional, and frequently very passionate opinion denounces Belgium'S 
attempt "to pose as prosecutor for all mankind, in other words, to claim the 
right to redeem human suffering across national borders and over 
generations. ,,221 But Bula-Bula also levels a number of more specific political 
accusations at Belgium. For him, Belgium is not guilty merely of moral 
hubris. Belgium is guilty of political bad faith. Bula-Bula reminds his readers 
that Belgium was the Congo's colonial master, inflicting hideous evils on the 
Congolese people for decades.222 Furthermore, during the civil war following 
de co Ionization, Belgium was deeply implicated in the assassination of 
nationalist Prime Minister Patrice Lumumba (a deed Bula-Bula labels a 
217. US Leaders Named in War Crimes Charges, INDEP. (London), Mar. 19, 2003, at 8. 
218. Vernon Loeb, Rums/eld Says Belgian Law Could Imperil Funds/or NATO, WASH. POST, 
June 13, 2003, at A24. 
219. Belgium Scales Back Its War Crimes Law Under U.S. Pressure, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. I, 
2003, at A6; War Crimes Bill Eased by Belgium, WASH. POST, Aug. 2, 2003, at A17. 
220. See Glenn Frankel, Belgian War Crimes Law Undone by its Global Reach; Cases Against 
Political Figures Sparked Crises, WASH. POST, Sept. 30, 2003, at AI. In the words of one of the law's 
supporters: '''We didn't lose everything, but we lost a lot. We have to live in the real world. It was an 
excellent law, but unfortunately it was used in a political way, and at the end of the day, we moved 
backward rather than forward. It's a setback. '" Id. at AIS. 
221. Congo v. Belgium, supra note 19 (separate opinion ofJudge ad hoc Bula-Bula), para. 8\. 
222. !d. n.Sl (citing HOCHSCHILD, supra note 112). See generally HOCHSCHILD, supra note 
112. 
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"crime against humanity,,)223-and Bula-Bula reminds us that Yerodia was a 
Lumumbist in the government of fellow Lumumbist Laurent Kabila.224 
According to Bula-Bula, the sole reason that Yerodia was forced out of 
Kabila's government was Belgian meddling on behalf of a Congolese 
opposition party.225 He finds it "most singular" that of all the world leaders 
investigated by Belgium, Belgium issued a warrant only for Yerodia, 
meanwhile backpedaling as hard as possible from the politically embarrassing 
Sharon prosecution.226 Nor does Bula-Bula neglect to call attention to the 
continuing "illegal exploitation of natural resources" in the Democratic 
Republic of the Congo by Belgian companies/27 he asks bitterly why Belgium 
does not exercise its territorial jurisdiction by prosecuting those companies.228 
More significantly, he points to the deaths of millions of Congolese in the 
recent wars against Rwanda and Uganda-deaths largely ignored by the 
Western press-and asks why no one seems eager to prosecute these as 
international crimes.229 In short, Belgium is not simply setting herself up as 
the "prosecutor for the whole human race," she is also acting in questionable 
faith to perpetuate "neocolonialist chaos" that serves her own interests.23o 
For human rights lawyers applauding Belgium's excellent adventure in 
universal jurisdiction and taking for granted the purity of Belgian motives, 
these accusations-not to mention the bitter invective of Bula-Bula's 
opinion-should serve as an important caution. I should say straightaway that 
I have no idea to what extent Bula-Bula's accusations are true, although the 
Belgian role in Lumumba's death is by now beyond serious dispute and the 
millions of recent deaths in the Congo have been ably documented. Belgium's 
Judge ad hoc Christine Van den Wyngaert denies any Belgian impropriety.231 
But even if Bula-Bula's accusations of conspiracy prove false, they have the 
ring of plausibility and there can be little doubt that they will be widely 
believed in much of the world. One's inclination may be to conclude that any 
state except Belgium should prosecute the Yerodia case. 
For the fact remains that regardless of Belgian motives, the Yerodia case 
concerns grave and eminently prosecutable accusations. Here, at any rate, 
Judge Bula-Bula's opinion offers no satisfaction. To be sure, he points out that 
nineteenth-century Belgians used accusations of native barbarity as an excuse 
223. Congo v. Belgium, supra note 19 (separate opinion of Judge ad hoc Bula-Bula), paras. 8-
II. 
224. Id. para. 14. 
225. Id. para. 23. 
226. !d. para. 80. 
227. !d. para. 13. 
228. Id. para. 14. 
229. !d. paras. 72, 82. In fact, however, Congo has filed a genocide complaint against Rwanda 
in the ICJ. Press Release 2002/15, In!'1 Court of Justice, The Democratic Republic of the Congo Initiates 
Proceedings Against Rwanda Citing Massive Human Rights Violations by Rwanda on Congolese 
Territory (May 28, 2002), http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/ipresscom/ipress2002/ipresscom2002-
15_ crw _20020528.htm. 
230. Congo v. Belgium, supra note 19 (separate opinion of Judge ad hoc Bula-Bula), paras. 75, 
25. 
231. Congo v. Belgium, supra note 19 (dissenting opinion of Judge ad hoc Van den Wyngaert), 
para. 87. 
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for colonialism, and insinuates that Belgium is up to its old tricks.232 On the 
facts of the case, however, he offers only the unsurprising news that the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo rejects the charges against Yerodia and the 
risible reassurance that "Presidents of the Congolese Bar asserted before local 
media, the da~ after notification of the [Belgian] warrant ... that 'the case-file 
was empty. '" 33 
The Y erodia case starkly represents both troubling and hopeful aspects 
of universal jurisdiction, understood as a stand-in for vigilante jurisdiction. 
The prosecution may well represent a political abuse of legal process for base 
ends; alternatively, it may represent the only hope to bring an instigator of 
mass murder to justice. Disturbingly, it may represent both at once. 
On the theory presented here, the fundamental question should be 
whether the Belgian prosecution satisfies the demands of natural justice. At a 
minimum, natural justice requires fair courts with fair procedures and accurate 
fact-finding. Even supposing that the Belgian courts satisfy these minimal 
requirements, however, the credible possibility that Belgium's prosecution 
results from base political motives may itself violate natural justice. In that 
case, Belgian jurisdiction in this case is a mistake, even if Belgium is right to 
exercise its jurisdiction in its other high-profile cases, where it has no political 
dog in the fight. 234 
B. The Universal Jurisdiction Opinions 
In this Article, I have defended jurisdictional eclecticism, the view that 
whichever tribunal offers an acceptable approximation to natural justice may 
try crimes against humanity. This view presupposes that any tribunal may 
exercise jurisdiction regardless of its territorial or national connection to the 
crime, which in tum implies universal jurisdiction. As mentioned above, the 
ICJ in Congo v. Belgium did not, in the end, rule on the legitimacy under 
international law of Belgium's universal jurisdiction statute; however, a 
number of separate opinions addressed the issue. In fact, eight separate 
opinions, representing ten of the Court's sixteen judges, discussed universal 
jurisdiction. They divided almost evenly over the legitimacy of universal 
232. Congo v. Belgium, supra note 19 (separate opinion of Judge ad hoc Bula-Bula), para. 50. 
233. Id. para. 71. 
234. However, Luc Reydams offers additional criticisms of Belgium's adherence to the 
requirements of natural justice in its universal jurisdiction cases--eriticisms that, if accurate, apply 
across the board. He points to the remarkable delays in the trial of the four Rwandan genocidaires (five 
years), and remarks, "Such a delay is hardly reconcilable with the right to be tried within a reasonable 
time." REYDAMS, supra note 171, at III. He elaborates the criticism of "the gap between the aim of the 
Belgian legislature (the establishment of universal jurisdiction far beyond treaty obligations) and the 
apparent lack of institutional capacity of the domestic criminal justice system," and comments further: 
The presence in Belgium of suspected Rwandan genocidaires illustrates this: four were 
tried after an unjustifiable delay, a dozen or more are left in peace. The situation fuels the 
criticism that the proceedings in absentia against the world's vilIains are window-
dressing .... The result was absurd: a tiny country (with a none too efficient criminal 
justice system) assumes broader powers than the ICC. 
!d. at 118. 
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jurisdiction, with five judges supporting it,235 four opposin.p it,236 and one 
(Judge Oda) finding the present law too unsettled to tel1.23 The currently-
pending ICJ case between Congo and France will specifically address the 
universal jurisdiction issue that Congo v. Belgium failed to reach;238 in the 
meantime, the separate opinions in the latter case provide some insight into 
the fault lines between competing approaches. 
The most thorough consideration by non-partisan judges appears in the 
pro-universal jurisdiction opinion of Judges Higgins, Kooijmans, and 
Buergenthal and the anti-universal jurisdiction opinion of President 
Guillaume.239 Guillaume takes the dimmest view, arguing that universal 
jurisdiction would create "judicial chaos" that would benefit only the 
powerfu1.240 Significantly, he argues that "international law knows only one 
true case of universal jurisdiction: piracy,,241_a substantially narrower view 
of universal jurisdiction than that of most scholars and jurists. Conventional 
law, Guillaume notes, often incorporates obligations either to extradite or to 
prosecute (aut dedere aut prosequi), but it authorizes only "subsidiary" 
universal jurisdiction for offenders that states choose not to extradite, not true 
universal jurisdiction.242 Finally, Guillaume objects that "[u]niversal 
jurisdiction in absentia as applied in the present case is unknown to 
internationallaw.,,243 
The first of these arguments is unpersuasive. The second is more 
complex; I shall suggest that Guillaume's reading of the current state of 
international law presupposes the very conclusion he means to establish, 
namely that universal jurisdiction must be subordinated to the other 
jurisdictional principles. And the objection to universal jurisdiction in 
absentia turns out, I believe, to be only a variant of the more general argument 
against universal jurisdiction, namely that it violates the traditional sovereign 
rights of states. I take up these points in order. 
235. Congo v. Belgium, supra note 19 (separate opinion of Judge Koroma), para. 9; id. 
(dissenting opinion of Judge ad hoc Van den Wyngaert), para. 59; id. (separate opinion of Judges 
Higgins, Kooijmans & Buergenthal), para. 65. 
236. Id. (separate opinion of President Guillaume), para. 16; id. (declaration of Judge Ranjeva), 
para. 12; id. (separate opinion of Judge Rezek), para. 6; id. (separate opinion of Judge ad hoc Bula-
Bula), para. 79. 
237. Id. (dissenting opinion ofJudge Oda), para. 12. 
238. See Congo v. France, supra note 20. 
239. "Partisan" judges were Judge Van den Wyngaert (Belgium's judge ad hoc) and Judge 
Bula-Bula (the Democratic Republic of the Congo's judge ad hoc). 
240. Congo v. Belgium, supra note 19 (separate opinion of President Guillaume), para. 15. It 
should be noted that President Guillaume is a noted authority on universal jurisdiction. See Guillaume, 
supra note 165. 
241. Congo v. Belgium, supra note 19 (separate opinion of President Guillaume), para. 12. 
242. Id. "Subsidiary" means that a state having custody of suspects can exert universal 
jurisdiction over them only if for reasons unrelated to the crime they cannot be extradited. See 
REVDAMS, supra note 171, at 29-31, for a sketch of the early history of subsidiary universal jurisdiction. 
In this portion of the argument, I draw heavily on Reydams's superb book. I note, however, that 
Reydams is much less sympathetic to universal jurisdiction than I, and reaches the opposite conclusion 
about Congo v. Belgium, endorsing the Guillaume opinion and criticizing that of Higgins, Kooijmans, 
and Buergenthal. Id. at 227-31. 
243. Congo v. Belgium, supra note 19 (separate opinion of President Guillaume), para. 12. 
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Clearly, Guillaume's "judicial chaos" argument envisages a multitude of 
states squabbling over jurisdiction to try international offenders, with the 
powerful grabbing the defendants they want to try and protecting those they 
do not. Admittedly, this is a horrible prospect, as even Judge Van den 
Wyngaert concedes.244 But Guillaume overlooks the fact that the same 
prospect for judicial chaos frequently exists without universal jurisdiction. 
After all, under accepted jurisdictional principles, states can prosecute 
offenses committed by anyone within their own territorial boundaries, or by 
their own nationals anywhere, or by non-nationals abroad whose crimes have 
their effects on a state's territory, or whose victims are nationals, or whose 
crimes injure a state's national security interests.245 Realistically, this wealth 
of jurisdictional options means that under existing law, three or more states-
the territorial state where the conduct occurred, the perpetrator's national 
state, and the victims' states-will often have concurrent jurisdiction over the 
offender, but judicial chaos has not been the result. Instead, jurisdictional 
priority is settled through diplomatic means and the balancing of different 
states' interests.246 Guillaume offers no reason for believing that matters 
would be different under universal jurisdiction. Moreover, Guillaume's 
judicial chaos argument presupposes mUltiple states-and perhaps the ICC-
fighting over the right to prosecute international crimes, where in reality states 
have proven unwilling to touch these cases with a ten-foot pole.247 
Next, consider Guillaume's argument that conventional international law 
does not recognize universal jurisdiction except in the case of piracy, but 
rather accepts only "subsidiary" aut dedere aut prosequi jurisdiction. Dozens 
of international treaties contain aut dedere aut prosequi clauses, which all 
follow the same format: the treaties obligate their parties to extradite or 
prosecute those accused of certain crimes (such as skyjacking or official 
torture) and further obligate their parties to establish through statute their 
jurisdiction to prosecute these crimes. The question is whether the jurisdiction 
established in accordance with these treaties is invariably subsidiary. 
244. Congo v. Belgium, supra note 19 (dissenting opinion of Judge ad hoc Van den Wyngaert), 
para. 87. 
245. Respectively, these fall under the subjective territorial principle, the nationality principle, 
the objective territorial or effects principle, the passive personality principle, and the protective 
principle, all of which are well-established grounds of jurisdiction. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE 
FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 402 (1987) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT]. 
246. Reasonable exercise of jurisdiction and a balancing of legal interests is caned for in Inst. 
ofIn!'1 Law, Draft Resolution on the Extraterritorial Jurisdiction of States, art. 4.1 (1993), reprinted in 
65-II Y.B. INST. INT'L 1. 133 (1993). Similarly, the Restatement of the Foreign Relations Law of the 
United States limits "unreasonable" exercises of jurisdiction by states even when one of the 
jurisdictional principles is satisfied, and offers a list of eight factors whose balancing determines the 
reasonableness of jurisdiction. RESTATEMENT, supra note 245, § 403. Admittedly, the Restatement's 
reasonableness test does not apply to universal jurisdiction, but nothing in the Restatement comes close 
to suggesting that jurisdictional disputes involving multiple assertions of universal jurisdiction would 
not be resolved the same way that other concurrent jurisdiction disputes are. See id. § 404. 
247. For example, in 1997 the United States lobbied several states with universal jurisdiction 
statutes to try Khmer Rouge leader Pol Pot, but an of them refused. See Elizabeth Becker, U.S. 
Spearheading Effort To Bring Pol Pot to Trial, N.Y. TIMES, June 23,1997, at Ai. 
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Modem international criminal law treaties divide into three distinct 
groupS.248 The first, and oldest, do indeed establish only subsidiary universal 
jurisdiction. They contain explicit language stating that the custodial state can 
prosecute a non-national only if extradition has been demanded and cannot be 
granted for reasons unconnected with the offense.249 By conditioning 
prosecution on the failure of extradition, these treaties make it clear that 
universal jurisdiction is subsidiary to other forms of jurisdiction. However, 
beginning with the 1970 Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure 
of Aircraft, known commonly as the "Hague Hijacking Convention," more 
than twenty treaties have adopted aut dedere aut prosequi clauses that do not 
contain language conditioning prosecution on non-extradition.25o More 
significantly, these treaties all add explicit language that the treaty "does not 
exclude any criminal jurisdiction exercised in accordance with national 
law.,,251 In other words, the treaty obligations set only a lower bound on the 
exercise of jurisdiction, not an upper bound. Given that these treaties require 
parties to establish universal jurisdiction and impose no conditions on its 
exercise, it seems that the universal jurisdiction established under them is not 
merely subsidiary.252 The third group of treaties bolsters even more the 
contention that non-subsidiary universal jurisdiction exists in conventional 
law: these treaties, including the Convention for the Suppression and 
Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid and the 1949 Geneva Conventions, 
clearly permit states to try alleged offenders of any nationality.253 Evidently· 
these conventions contemplate full-fledged universal jurisdiction-the very 
universal jurisdiction whose existence Guillaume denies. In short, non-
subsidiary universal jurisdiction exists to a greater extent in international law 
than Guillaume acknowledges. 
Of course, treaties often contain ambiguities, and these are no 
exceptions; jurists have read the universal jurisdiction in them broadly, as I 
248. REVDAMS, supra note 171, at 43-68. 
249. These include the pre-World War II conventions on counterfeiting currency, on 
suppression of the illicit traffic in dangerous drugs, and for the prevention and punishment of terrorism. 
REVDAMS, supra note 171, at 44-47. 
250. Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft, Dec. 16, 1970, art. 7, 22 
U.S.T. 1641, 1646,860 U.N.T.S. 105, 109 [hereinafter Hague Hijacking Convention]. For a summary of 
the aut dedere aut prosequi clauses in numerous multilateral conventions, see M. Cherif Bassiouni, 
Universal Jurisdiction/or International Crimes: Historical Perspectives and Contemporary Practice, 42 
VA. J.INT'LL. 81, 122-134(2001). 
251. Hague Hijacking Convention, supra note 250, art. 4(3), 22 U.S.T. at 1645, 860 U.N.T.S. 
at 108. For a discussion of similar language in other multilateral conventions, see Bassiouni, supra note 
250, at 122-134. 
252. One reply to this argument is that the Hague Hijacking Convention and others that mimic 
its formulations obligate states parties to establish universal jurisdiction over the offense only "in the 
case where the alleged offender is present in its territory and it does not extradite him .... " Hague 
Hijacking Convention, supra note 252, art. 4(2), 22 U.S.T. at 1645, 860 U.N.T.S. at 108. But this clause 
limits only the obligation of states to establish universal jurisdiction, not the scope of the universal 
jurisdiction they establish. 
253. International Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid, 
Nov. 30, 1973, arts. 4(b), 5, 13 LL.M. 50, 54 (1976); Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of 
Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949, art. 129,6 U.S.T. 3316, 3418, 75 U.N.T.S. 135,236 [hereinafter 
Geneva Convention III]; Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of 
War, Aug. 12, 1949, art. 146, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 3616, 75 V.N.T.S. 287, 386 [hereinafter Geneva 
Convention IV). See the discussion of these Conventions in REVDAMS, supra note 171, at 53-56, 59-61. 
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have, but also more narrowly.254 However, the heart of the argument is not 
about the fine-grained parsing of treaty language. It is about a fundamental 
difference in interpretive outlook-the very difference between statism and 
cosmopolitanism that recurs at every point in the discussion of crimes against 
humanity. Maurice Travers, for example, wrote in 1920 that unrestricted 
universal jurisdiction "goes against the nature of the penal law and against the 
very conception of State.,,255 Sixteen years later, Mikliszanski countered that 
universal jurisdiction: 
places itself at the philosophical level, at the level of the very nature of the penal nonn: 
stripping the latter of the statist-territorial character (caractere etatico-territorial) which 
has been wrongly attributed to it, and retaining only its true and unique value which is to 
be fundamentally and uniquely hurnan.256 
If you begin, as Travers does, with the viewpoint that the traditional order of 
states constitutes the essential subject of international law, it seems inevitable 
that the reach of jurisdiction ends where the usual powers of states end. 
Traditionally, states exert sovereignty over their territory and their nationals, 
and are entitled to protect their people and their vital interests. These 
elementary propositions of political theory generate the territorial, nationality, 
passive personality, and protective principles of jurisdiction. For a statist, 
these principles are the default settings in international jurisdiction; thus, the 
statist reading of treaties containing universal jurisdiction clauses assumes that 
they cannot intend to bypass the more basic principles. A cosmopolitan, on the 
other hand, takes seriously the idea that in recognizing crimes against 
humanity, the law aims to expunge these acts from the political repertoire of 
states. The cosmopolitan no longer assumes that the political theory of 
sovereignty sets the defaults in international law. The interests of humanity-
humankind-take precedence. Thus the cosmopolitan will read universal 
jurisdiction clauses in treaties without assuming tacit defaults to traditional 
sovereignty-based principles. Judge Guillaume's opinion adopts the statist 
stance, whereas Judge Van den Wyngaert's adopts the cosmopolitan one. The 
argument turns on the background assumptions of political theory that 
interpreters bring to the task. In effect, Guillaume's interpretation of the 
treaties assumes what he wishes to show-that full-fledged universal 
jurisdiction does not exist in conventional law. As we move forward in time 
from the pre-war treaties to the Hague Hijacking Convention, and then to the 
254. For example, Judge Guillaume--who was involved in the drafting of the Hague Hijacking 
Convention-has argued that the treaty incorporates subsidiarity. See Guillaume, supra note 171, at 33-
35. For a similarly narrowing interpretation of the universal jurisdiction clauses in the Geneva 
Conventions, see REYDAMS, supra note 171, at 54-55. 
255. MAURICE TRAVERS, 1 LE DROIT PENAL INTERNATIONAL ET SA MISE EN OEUVRE EN TEMPS 
DE PAIX ET EN TEMPS DE GUERRE 75 (1920), quoted and translated in REYDAMS, supra note 171, at 32. 
256. K. Mikliszanski, Le systeme de I 'universalite du droit de punir et Ie droit penal subsidiare, 
REVUE DE SCIENCE CRIMINELLE ETDE DROIT PENAL COMPARE 331, 333 (1936), quoted and translated in 
REYDAMS, supra note 171, at 33-34. Reydams's survey of treaty debates, international resolutions, and 
official drafts and studies finds the same disagreement surfacing again and again. REYDAMS, supra note 
171, at 43-80. 
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Apartheid and Torture Conventions,257 the statist stance recedes and becomes 
less credible as an interpretation of the history that the treaties reflect. 
What about Guillaume's argument that universal jurisdiction in absentia 
is "unknown to international law,,?258 In my view, the "in absentia" issue is 
far less important than it may at first appear. Talk of "universal jurisdiction in 
absentia" conjures up the image of a judicial travesty in which Yerodia is 
tried and convicted in his absence, without a defense-a major outrage against 
the requirements of natural justice. But nothing of the sort was going on. 
Belgium opened an investigation of Yerodia in absentia, and issued an arrest 
warrant to try to get him into Belgium. The real issue is not judicial 
proceedings in absentia, but Belgium's effort to get custody of Yerodia in 
order to exercise jurisdiction that is not in absentia. Traditionally, universal 
jurisdiction meant custodial jurisdiction: the state with custody of a suspect 
investigated and tried him. First came custody, then investigation. Here, 
Belgium investigated first and then attempted to gain custody. It is hard to see 
why anything of vital importance turns on the sequence of events. 259 
Congo argued that by attempting to obtain custody of a Congolese 
national who was not in Belgian territory, and who had not harmed Belgian 
interests, Belgium was violating Congo's sovereign rights. By now, however, 
the reply is clear: it simply begs the question to suppose that a state has a 
sovereign right to protect perpetrators of crimes against humanity. In the end, 
then, the argument against universal jurisdiction in absentia is no stronger-
indeed, it is no different-than the overall argument against universal 
jurisdiction.26o It rests on a view that the sovereign rights of states prevail over 
the interest in prosecuting crimes against humanity, and that is precisely the 
premise that cosmopolitans are unwilling to grant. 
I shall spare only a few words on the Higgins-Kooijmans-Buergenthal 
opinion, which comes very close to the jurisdictional eclecticism I favor, and 
with which I largely agree. The three judges believe that international law is 
evolving in the direction of universal jurisdiction over crimes against 
humanity, and they favor "a flexible strategy, in which newly-established 
international criminal tribunals, treaty obligations and national courts all have 
their part to play.,,261 Their "flexible strategy" does not specify that the 
requirements of natural justice must determine which part each institution 
257. See supra notes 251-53. 
258. See Congo v. Belgium, supra note 19 (separate opinion of President Guillaume), para. 12. 
259. Indeed, trying to get custody of a suspect abroad in order to try him is not "unknown to 
intemationallaw," even under a theory of universal jurisdiction. An example is the Pinochet case, where 
the United Kingdom held Pinochet pending an extradition proceeding launched by Spain for universal 
jurisdiction crimes. See Regina v. Bow St. Metro. Stipendiary Magistrate and Others, Ex parte Pinochet 
Ugarte, [2000]1 A.C. 147 [hereinafter Pinochet III]; infra note 264 (discussing the Pinochet litigation). 
See also United States v. Yunis, 924 F.2d 1086 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (asserting universal jurisdiction over a 
Jordanian who had hijacked a Jordanian airliner in Lebanon; the United States obtained custody of 
Yunis by luring him onto a yacht and arresting him when it entered international waters). 
260. I take this to be the import of the Higgins-Kooijmans-Buergenthal opinion. See Congo v. 
Belgium, supra note 19 (separate opinion of Judges Higgins, Kooijmans, and Buergenthal), at paras. 53-
58. 
261. See id. paras. 51-52. 
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plays-but nothing they say excludes these requirements, and jurisdictional 
flexibility is another name for jurisdictional eclecticism. 
C. Immunity and the End of Politics as Usual 
The principal holding of Congo v. Belgium limits the capacity of third 
parties to prosecute crimes against humanity against incumbent officials of 
other countries. The IC] finds a rule of customary international law that 
immunizes sitting foreign ministers-and, by implication, a potentially 
broader class of high governmental officials-from prosecution by third 
parties.262 The basis of the immunity is functional-foreign ministers must be 
able to travel about the world freely in order to conduct the foreign policies of 
their countries.263 The same argument may extend the scope of the immunity 
to finance ministers and others whose positions require international travel. 
One reply to this argument might be that nothing compels states to 
appoint suspected criminals against humanity to important diplomatic posts, 
and that they perhaps ought to do so only at their own peril. But many regimes 
in the world are steeped in gore, with leadership corps all implicated to some 
degree in gross crimes. Other nations must still be able to do diplomatic 
business with criminal regimes; thus, their foreign ministers require immunity. 
The case is little different from honoring white flags so that criminal armies 
can send emissaries to parley. On practical grounds, it is hard to see how the 
IC] could have decided the immunity issue differently. 
But the theory behind the judgment begs the question in the same way as 
the arguments against universal jurisdiction. It supposes that the customary 
international law of immunity, the purpose of which is to permit diplomatic 
business as usual, applies even where the diplomat on the other side may have 
committed crimes against humanity. It makes state-to-state diplomacy the be-
all and end-all of international law. But the whole idea behind prohibiting 
crimes against humanity is that these crimes should never be tolerated in the 
course of politics. The IC] fails to acknowledge that just to the extent that 
international law recognizes the category of crimes against humanity, it 
departs from its statist premises. The Congo v. Belgium opinion reveals an 
unbridgeable gap between the perspectives of states and their individual 
human victims. States are an unavoidable necessity; states are also a dire 
threat. That double fact forms an integral part of the human condition, and the 
argument over immunity for high state officials with bloody hands displays 
the political nature of our existence in its harshest and most troubling light. 
One way out of this dilemma-a way, oddly enough, that the IC] did not 
pursue in Congo v. Belgium-is the path taken by Britain's Law Lords in their 
262. The grounds are shaky because, as Judge Van den Wyngaert points out in her dissenting 
opinion, the Court does not bother to demonstrate-and probably could not demonstrate----a state 
practice of immunizing foreign ministers charged with crimes against humanity. See Congo v. Belgium, 
supra note 19 (dissenting opinion of Judge ad hoc Van den Wyngaert), at paras. 11-23. There simply 
exists no paper trail of investigations and indictments of other states' foreign ministers for crimes 
against humanity that have been quashed invoking a rule of immunity, and that is what it would take to 
prove a rule of customary intemationallaw. 
263. See Congo v. Belgium, supra note 19, at para. 53. 
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final Pinochet decision.264 They faced an issue directly analogous to that in 
Congo v. Belgium: do heads of state and former heads of state enjoy immunity 
from prosecution in other states' courts for international crimes? The rules for 
head-of-state immunity are very similar to those the IC] finds for foreign 
ministers. As Lord Millett explains, within the classical theory of international 
law-the theory "that states were the only actors on the international 
plane,,265-head-of-state immunity derives from the immunity of states 
themselves, because the head of state personifies the state. According to 
customary international law, an incumbent head of state enjoys immunity for 
all his misdeeds, public and private, out of respect for his office. For example, 
even if he is a kleptomaniac who goes on shoplifting sprees in foreign 
countries, he retains personal immunity by reason of his office from 
prosecution abroad for his thefts. Once he leaves office, however, he loses 
immunity for his private acts. Now other states can prosecute for his previous 
shoplifting, because it is a quintessentially private act having nothing to do 
with his functions as a head of state. Nevertheless, his official acts retain their 
character as acts of the state itself, and so he still enjoys subject-matter 
immunity from prosecution for those acts, even if they were crimes. In short, 
during his incumbency, he is immune for all acts, public or private; but after 
his incumbency, he retains immunity only for official acts, and he can be 
criminally tried for private acts committed while in office as well as for 
crimes committed before and after the incumbency. The IC] articulates the 
identical rule for foreign ministers in Congo v. Belgium.266 
264. Regina v. Bow St. Metro. Stipendiary Magistrate and Others, Ex parte Pinochet Ugarte, 
[2000] I A.C. 61 [hereinafter Pinochet 1]; Pinochet III, supra note 259. Augusto Pinochet, Chile's 
former leader, was detained in London when a Spanish magistrate issued an extradition request for him 
to stand trial in Spain for crimes committed during his brutal dictatorship. The original warrant 
concerned murders, but a subsequent warrant substituted charges of torture and terrorism. Pinochet 
claimed immunity from prosecution as a former head of state, but the Law Lords rejected the claim in 
Pinochet I. Subsequently, the opinion was withdrawn because one of the Lords voting in the narrowly-
divided opinion had an official connection with Amnesty International, which had intervened in the 
case. The opinion withdrawing Pinochet I is Regina v. Bow St. Metro. Stipendiary Magistrate, Ex parte 
Pinochet Ugarte, [2000] I A.C. 119 [hereinafter Pinochet 11]. After rehearing the case, a different panel 
of Lords also found Pinochet extraditable, but narrowed the class of crimes for which he could be 
extradited based on a reading of the double-criminality requirement in the British extradition statute. 
Although only the opinions in Pinochet III have legal force in the United Kingdom, I believe that all the 
opinions in both Pinochet I and Pinochet III contribute to the meaning of the case in international law; 
Pinochet I was withdrawn for reasons independent of its reasoning on the legal issues, and Pinochet III 
reached the same result as Pinochet I on the immunity issue, differing from Pinochet I only in its 
reading of the British extradition statute. Thus, for purposes of determining the Pinochet litigation's 
contribution to the customary international law of immunity, all the speeches in both opinions seem 
equally relevant. (Lord Hoffman, the member of the Pinochet I panel whose alleged appearance of bias 
led to the withdrawal of the opinion, did not make a speech.) 
265. Pinochet III. supra note 259, at 268 (Lord Millett, ]., dissenting). 
266. The IC] stated the rule as follows: 
[A] Minister for Foreign Affairs ... occupies a position such that, like the Head of State 
or the Head of Government, he or she is recognized under international law as 
representative of the State solely by virtue of his or her office .... The Court accordingly 
concludes that ... he or she when abroad enjoys full immunity from criminal jurisdiction 
and inviolability. 
Congo v. Belgium, supra note 19, paras. 53-54. The court continued, however, to state that immunity 
would not be permanent: 
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Lord Millett's way of posing the issue, by emphasizing that the statist or 
classical view of international law would grant Pinochet immunity even for 
gruesome international crimes, raises precisely the dilemma between statist 
"business as usual" and the human interest in eliminating crimes against 
humanity from the repertoire of politics. But the Law Lords found a way out 
of the dilemma that superficially preserves the immunity of states while 
actually accepting the alternative picture. Former heads of state enjoy subject 
matter immunity for their official acts. The question, as the Law Lords saw it, 
was whether Pinochet's acts of torture were official. Lord Goff of Chieveley 
thought the answer is yes: "The functions of . . . a head of state are 
governmental functions, as opposed to private acts; and the fact that the head 
of state performs an act, other than a private act, which is criminal does not 
deprive it of its governmental character.,,267 In Pinochet I, Lord Lloyd of 
Berwick elaborated this argument more clearly than did any of the Pinochet 
III opinions. "Of course it is strange to think of murder or torture as 'official' 
acts or as part of the head of state's 'public functions.' But if for 'official' one 
substitutes 'governmental' then the true nature of the distinction between 
private acts and official acts becomes apparent.,,268 He explained: 
It is a regrettable fact that almost all leaders of revolutionary movements are guilty of 
killing their political opponents in the course of coming to power, and many are guilty of 
murdering their political opponents thereafter in order to secure their power. Yet it is not 
suggested (I think) that the crime of murder puts the successful revolutionary beyond the 
pale of immunity in customary internationallaw.269 
However, most of the Lords in Pinochet III disagreed. The heart of their 
response was that at least since the Convention Against Torture, acts of torture 
"cannot be regarded as functions of a head of state under international law 
when international law expressly prohibits torture as a measure which a state 
can emRloy in any circumstances whatsoever and has made it an international 
crime." 70 In other words: states (and their personifications, heads and former 
heads of state) retain immunity for their official acts, and so the classical 
theory that states must honor each other's sovereign dignity gets upheld, at 
least nominally. But torture can no longer be regarded as an official act. 
It is this last finding that bears radically humanitarian implications-
implications that, if taken seriously, spell the end of the classical theory. If we 
take officially sponsored torture as a synecdoche for all the crimes against 
[A]fter a person ceases to hold the office of Minister for Foreign Affairs, he or she will 
no longer enjoy all of the immunities accorded by international law in other States. 
Provided that it has jurisdiction under international law, a court of one State may try a 
former Minister for Foreign Affairs of another State in respect of acts committed prior or 
subsequent to his or her period of office, as well as in respect of acts committed during 
that period of office in a private capacity. 
Id. para. 61. 
267. Pinochet III, supra note 259, at 217 (Lord GoffofChieveley, J.). 
268. Pinochet I, supra note 264, at 96 (Lord Lloyd of Berwick, J.). 
269. Id. 
270. Pinochet III, supra note 259, at 262 (Lord Hutton, J.). Lord Browne-Wilkinson reaches 
the same conclusion. Id. at 203-05 (Lord Browne-Wilkinson, J.). He asks: "Can it be said that the 
commission of a crime which is an international crime against humanity and jus cogens is an act done in 
an official capacity on behalf of the state?" Id. at 203. His answer is no. Id. 
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humanity, the argument in effect concludes that from the moment that 
international law prohibits them, crimes against humanity can no longer form 
a lawful part of politics. Acts of state remain beyond the reach of other states' 
courts, but henceforth the most typical brutalities of politics no longer count 
as acts of state. This doctrine accords perfectly with the account of crimes 
against humanity offered here, in which autopolemic political violence 
violates humanity's nature as a political animal and should no longer count as 
a legitimate part of politics. In the guise of a conservative opinion, the 
Pinochet Lords reached their result through a deeply anti-conservative 
argument, one that declares a legal end to the worst of politics as humanity 
has had to endure it up to now. 
As mentioned above, the Congo v. Belgium opinions never even 
consider the question of whether Yerodia' s speeches were an official function 
of a foreign minister, given that they may well have been incitements to 
crimes against humanity. Had the IC] done so, the Pinochet doctrine suggests 
that it should have decided the immunity issue differently.271 Plainly, the IC] 
was not prepared to do so. Perhaps the judges understood all too well that to 
accept the argument that crimes against humanity are ultra vires acts would 
profoundly undermine the statist premises of international law, and therefore 
the IC] itself. We shall see. In August 2003, Liberia brought proceedings in 
the IC] against Sierra Leone for issuing an arrest warrant for former Liberian 
President Charles Taylor.272 The IC] will thus confront the immunity Issue 
once agam. 
X. CONCLUSION: WHAT'S IN A NAME? 
This Article offers an interpretation of crimes against humanity-an 
interpretation according to which they represent an affront to our nature as 
political animals, our double character as unsociably social individuals who 
combine self-awareness and self-interest with a natural need for the society of 
others. This double character, I have argued, is the aspect of humanity that the 
law aims to protect; its universal importance is the reason that all humanity 
has an interest in criminalizing atrocious violence and persecution committed 
by organized groups against civilian popUlations. The interpretation, therefore, 
271. One important question Pinochet III leaves unsettled concerns what sort of legal events 
convert torture from an official to an ultra vires act. Here, the Law Lords disagreed among themselves, 
with some locating the date at whatever point-presumably Nuremberg-when torture became an 
international crime, others focusing on its criminalization in the Convention Against Torture, and still 
others emphasizing the fact that the Convention contains a universal jurisdiction clause. This question, 
which may seem like the sort of dreary technicality that only a lawyer or a theologian can love, has 
important implications when we tum from torture to other crimes against humanity. If the decisive legal 
event making them ultra vires is their criminalization in a widely-accepted international treaty, then the 
Rome Statute has the effect of stripping away former head-of-state immunity in national courts. If, on 
the other hand, the decisive event is the enactment of a treaty containing a universal jurisdiction clause, 
the Rome Statute, which has no universal jurisdiction clause, will not fill the bill and-<>n the Pinochet 
arguments-the immunity remains intact. 
272. Press Release, Int'l Court of Justice, Liberia Applies to the International Court of Justice 
in a Dispute with Sierra Leone Concerning an International Arrest Warrant Issued by the Special Court 
for Sierra Leone Against the Liberian President (Aug. 5, 2003), http://www.icj-
cij .org/icjwww/ipresscomlipress2003/ipresscom2003-26 _xx _ 20030805.htm. 
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explains the sense in which crimes against humanity are crimes against 
humanness as well as crimes against humankind. These are crimes committed 
by politically organized groups against other groups in the same civil 
society--crimes consisting of the most barbaric atrocities and humiliations, 
and falling outside the legitimate realm of sovereign self-determination. 
Crimes against humanity assault our individuality by attacking us solely 
because of the groups to which we belong, and they assault our sociability by 
transforming political communities into death traps. In a world consisting 
largely of piebald, patchwork polities, where distinct groups live uneasily side 
by side, every human being has an interest in ensuring that politics never 
transgresses the limits set by these laws. Anyone who violates them becomes 
an enemy and legitimate target of all humankind. This gives rise to what I 
have labeled the "vigilante jurisdiction." However, I have also argued that 
vigilante justice by its very character violates the precepts of natural justice, 
and thus that vigilante jurisdiction must always be delegated to tribunals, 
provided that these conform to the standards of natural justice. The point of 
the argument is that tribunals trying crimes against humanity are not 
vindicating state interests, but rather human interests; their obligation is 
simply to ensure that this vindication satisfies natural justice. As a 
consequence, I have defended jurisdictional eclecticism: any tribunal, national 
or international, should potentially have authority to try crimes against 
humanity, and the choice of tribunal should be based largely on the 
requirements of natural justice. 
Lawyers in the tradition of legal realism may well be skeptical of the 
very project of trying to establish legal conclusions by analyzing concepts 
such as "crimes against humanity." For the realists, concepts are traps and 
conceptual analysis is a distraction. They argue that the sole meaning of legal 
terms lies in their practical consequences, to be discovered by examining what 
courts actually do with the concepts.273 Holmes goes so far as to suggest that 
the law might be better off if all moral terms were replaced with artificial 
words carrying no extralegal connotations.274 That way, no one would be 
misled into supposing that legal phrases are anything more than terms of art. 
Realists would dismiss the thought that "crimes against humanity" has 
anything to do with "humanity" in any of its senses. "Crime against 
humanity" is just a semantically-neutral label, with no more internal structure 
than the nonsense word "Crimeagainsthumanity ," a word to which 
"humanity" (the last eight letters of the nonsense word) has no more 
conceptual relevance than "Crimea" (the first six letters). And propositions 
like "ethnic cleansing is a crime against humanity" mean nothing more than 
that those responsible for ethnic cleansing will be treated in certain specified 
ways by courts. 
Needless to say, I reject this argument, both in general and in the 
particular case of crimes against humanity. Law is hardly an esoteric subject, 
273. See Felix Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach, 35 COLUM. L. 
REv. 809, 820-23 (1935). 
274. Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REv. 457, 464 (1897). 
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and legal words are nowhere near as specialized as Holmes suggests. Of 
course, law contains some wholly technical words-renvoi, subpoena, fee 
simple-but most legal words are not technical. How could they be, if law is 
supposed to guide human action? Any literate person, with or without legal 
training, will be able to read a statute or a judicial opinion and follow most of 
what it says. 
In the case of crimes against humanity, there is no robust case law 
assigning the phrase a technical meaning, and indeed the various statutes 
defining it-the Nuremberg Charter, Allied Control Council Law No. 10, the 
ICTY, ICTR, and Rome Statutes, national statutes, and a handful of law 
commissions' proposals-all define it differently. The concept is still in the 
childhood of its legal development, and those wrestling with the appropriate 
codification are in very much the same position as mathematicians in the early 
stages of a new field. The pioneers of topology had no "official" definition of 
a topological space. Their task was to come up with one, and the raw materials 
they had to work with were intuitions about what conceptual work the 
definition was supposed to do. Lawyers trying to codify crimes against 
humanity are in the same boat. They must begin with an intuitive idea of what 
crimes against humanity are, and then test their formulations against their 
intuitions. Whatever connotations the language itself has will greatly influence 
these intuitions. The language may put them on false trails, but it is not simply 
a placeholder for legal decisions that have not yet been made. The term 
"crimes against humanity" packs an enormous rhetorical wallop, and it does 
so not because lawyers treat it as a technical term, but rather because all of us 
know that "humanity" means something universal and immensely important. 
After a century in which crimes against humanity have taken tens of millions 
of lives, it may b.e that understanding the twin meanings of "humanity" that 
these deeds offend is the least we owe the dead. 
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ApPENDIX: SOME STATUTORY DEFINITIONS OF CRIMES AGAINST 
HUMANITY AND GENOCIDE 
(1) Nuremberg Charter275 
Article 6( c): 
Crimes against humanity: namely, murder, extermination, enslavement, 
deportation, and other inhumane acts committed against any civilian 
population, before or during the war; or persecutions on political, racial or 
religious grounds in execution of or in connection with any crime within the 
jurisdiction of the Tribunal, whether or not in violation of the domestic law of 
the country where perpetrated. . 
Article lI(c): 
(2) Allied Control Council Law No. 10: 
Punishment of Persons Guilty of War Crimes, 
Crimes Against Peace and Against Humanity276 
Crimes against Humanity. Atrocities and offences, including but not limited to 
murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation, imprisonment, torture, rape, 
or other inhumane acts committed against any civilian population, or 
persecutions on political, racial or religious grounds whether or not in 
violation ofthe domestic laws of the country where perpetrated. 
275. Nuremberg Charter, supra note 5. 
276. CCL No. 10, supra note 33. 
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(3) Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal 
for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTy)277 
Article 5 - Crimes against humanity: 
163 
The International Tribunal shall have the power to prosecute persons 
responsible for the following crimes when committed in armed conflict, 









(h) persecutions on political, racial and religious grounds; 
(i) other inhumane acts. 
277. ICTY Statute, supra note 37. 
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(4) Statute oftbe International Criminal Tribunal 
for Rwanda (ICTR)278 
Article 3 - Crimes against Humanity: 
The International Tribunal for Rwanda shall have the power to prosecute 
persons responsible for the following crimes when committed as part of a 
widespread or systematic attack against any civilian population on national, 








(h) Persecutions on political, racial and religious grounds; 
(i) Other inhumane acts. 
278. ICTR Statute, supra note 40. 
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(5) Rome Statute of the 
International Criminal Court (ICC)279 
Article 7 - Crimes against humanity: 
165 
1. For the purpose of this Statute, "crime against humanity" means any of 
the following acts when committed as part of a widespread or systematic 





(d) Deportation or forcible transfer of population; 
(e) Imprisonment or other severe deprivation of physical liberty III 
violation of fundamental rules of international law; 
(f) Torture; 
(g) Rape, sexual slavery, enforced prostitution, forced pregnancy, enforced 
sterilization, or any other form of sexual violence of comparable 
gravity; 
(h) Persecution against any identifiable group or collectivity on political, 
racial, national, ethnic, cultural, religious, gender as defined in 
paragraph 3, or other grounds that are universally recognized as 
impermissible under international law, in connection with any act 
referred to in this paragraph or any crime within the jurisdiction of the 
Court; 
(i) Enforced disappearance of persons; 
(j) The crime of apartheid; 
(k) Other inhumane acts of a similar character intentionally causing great 
suffering, or serious injury to body or to mental or physical health. 
279. Rome Statute, supra note 41. 
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2. For the purpose of paragraph 1: 
(a) "Attack directed against any civilian population" means a course of 
conduct involving the multiple commission of acts referred to in 
paragraph 1 against any civilian population, pursuant to or in 
furtherance of a State or organizational policy to commit such attack; 
(b) "Extermination" includes the intentional infliction of conditions of 
life, inter alia the deprivation of access to food and medicine, 
calculated to bring about the destruction of part of a population; 
(c) "Enslavement" means the exercise of any or all of the powers 
attaching to the right of ownership over a person and includes the 
exercise of such power in the course of trafficking in persons, in 
particular women and children; 
(d) "Deportation or forcible transfer of population" means forced 
displacement of the persons concerned by expulsion or other coercive 
acts from the area in which they are lawfully present, without grounds 
permitted under international law; 
(e) "Torture" means the intentional infliction of severe pain or suffering, 
whether physical or mental, upon a person in the custody or under the 
control of the accused; except that torture shall not include pain or 
suffering arising only from, inherent in or incidental to, lawful 
sanctions; 
(f) "Forced pregnancy" means the unlawful confinement of a woman 
forcibly made pregnant, with the intent of affecting the ethnic 
composition of any population or carrying out other grave violations 
of international law. This definition shall not in any way be 
interpreted as affecting national laws relating to pregnancy; 
(g) "Persecution" means the intentional and severe deprivation of 
fundamental rights contrary to international law by reason of the 
identity ofthe group or collectivity; 
(h) "The crime of apartheid" means inhumane acts of a character similar 
to those referred to in paragraph 1, committed in the context of an 
institutionalized regime of systematic oppression and domination by 
one racial group over any other racial group or groups and committed 
with the intention of maintaining that regime; 
(i) "Enforced disappearance of persons" means the arrest, detention or 
abduction of persons by, or with the authorization, support or 
acquiescence of, a State or a political organization, followed by a 
refusal to acknowledge that deprivation of freedom or to give 
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information on the fate or whereabouts of those persons, with the 
intention of removing them from the protection of the law for a 
prolonged period of time. 
3. For the purpose of this Statute, it is understood that the term "gender" 
refers to the two sexes, male and female, within the context of society. 
The term "gender" does not indicate any meaning different from the 
above. 
Article 6 - Genocide: 
For the purpose of this Statute, "genocide" means any of the following acts 
committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, 
racial or religious group, as such: 
(a) Killing members of the group; 
(b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group; 
(c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to 
bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part; 
(d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group; 
(e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group. 
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